

MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF CULTURE

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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a political psychological analysis of culture to conceptualize it as a political value, i.e. as a causal factor shaping intra- and inter-organizational international business behavior. It highlights how culture manifests itself circumstantially as a variable shaping intra- and inter-organizational collective behavior amidst rapid, crisis-level, multinational conflictual change. Internal and external contextual factors determine the intensity and the saliency of this value in an organization. Values are individual and collective active actor drives to achieve an end state. Norms are distinguished from values in that they display behavioral pattern principles that may be explicit or implicit, manifested as behavioral attitudes. The paper thereby conceptualizes the policy making relevance of difference in national cultures. It critiques economic nationalism from the perspective of organizational management. It discusses the implications for leadership of reconciling these cultural differences as national values among multinational staff members in regard to communication among personnel. Intercultural/international perceptions of other cultures, specifically stereotyping, are part of the challenge to effective leadership communication within a multicultural/multinational organizational environment. A leadership imperative is to facilitate multinational cultural organizational value integration. A response to recent survey critiques of the state of the field regarding culture and international business is presented.

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INTRODUCTION

This writer first confronted the issue of the conceptualization of culture as a causal factor in private sector business organizational behavior when assigned to teach an undergraduate course. “Methodology for International Studies” was first offered by this writer in Spring Semester 2017 and again in Spring 2018 and Spring 2019 at the Catholic University of Korea (CUK). The author was aware of the basic introductory literature in organizational management and leadership and also of the introductory textbooks for qualitative research methodology. The course became an opportunity to explore the concept of cultural value from the perspective of globalization as a factor shaping international business behavior.

Weerts (2014) affirms that “all investigations are informed by literature and disciplinary frameworks. Prior knowledge enables a scholar to focus the inquiry and interpret data” (135, referencing Merriam, 2009 and Creswell, 2013). This methodology course was offered in the interdisciplinary context of the CUK International Studies Department. The course used two textbooks: Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner, *Riding the Waves of Culture: Understand Diversity in Global Business* (McGraw-Hill, 2012) and John W. Creswell and Cynthia N. Poht, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, (Sage, 2018). Earlier editions of these textbooks have been translated into Korean.

Availability of Korean language translations was a consideration given that the author does not know Korean and teaches courses in English. CUK Korean students generally feel more secure if they know that they can reference a Korean translation of a textbook if necessary. As a political science faculty member, this writer explored these issues with his students from the perspective of political psychology.

The writer as instructor worked within the context of the prevailing career preoccupations of the students in selecting course textbooks and materials. The international studies curriculum is oriented towards preparation for finding entry-level professional employment in the private sector. The instructor placed the course within the pro-globalization policy context of this South Korean university, nominally private but intensively dependent on national government education ministry guidance and funding. The writer pointed out to his students that the Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner textbook is only one of the standard introductory textbooks used to teach organizational management in a multinational/multicultural setting. The writer called the students' attention to two other standard texts: Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov's *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind* (2010) and Richard D. Lewis' *When Cultures Collide: Leading Across Cultures* (2005).

Trompenaars has stated elsewhere, "Norms are shared orientations of what we define as what we should do. Values are what we like to do. Basic assumptions are values that have become norms" ("Dr Fons Trompenaars on Culture" [sic] 2009, ~0:43-49). One of the prevalent values of *homo sapiens* particularly at the collective level is to "like" to form, defend and expand the security and status of shared, large, intensely held, self-identity communities (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 93-96). Actors "like" to act in this way while also more prone to perceive a significant challenge, i.e. threat or opportunity, regarding the influence of these communities, i.e. their respective nations (Ibid., 96-99).

The Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner text presents a theoretical framework developed and applied to improve training for increased effectiveness in mid-level multinational business management. It emphasizes multicultural diversity and the need of a manager to prepare to integrate effectively cultural differences among organizational personnel. The focus is on avoiding interpersonal national sub-group conflict in a multinational enterprise (MNE). E.g. the text presents a vignette about Italian sales staff rebelling as a group against an inadvertently insulting American manager. The manager announced the implementation of an individual pay per performance incentive program that offended their group-oriented norms and values (2012, 79-80, 104-05). The focus of this paper is on why the barriers to that manager's communication and motivational efforts consequently increased due to this misstep. Leadership's capacity for effective communication decreased due to resultant suspicion and resentment regarding the manager's values and attitudes as now (mis)perceived collectively by the Italians. Repairing this relational damage is difficult; the text has various accounts of consequent organizational performance failures leading to removal from leadership positions.

National cultural differences are organizational fault lines around which formation of national cultural identity ingroups versus outgroups arise within an organization, e.g. in MNEs. Observers typically view economic nationalism at the state policy making level. Recent experiences involving Carlos Ghosn and the obstacles to Renault, Nissan and Mitsubishi integration illustrate national ingroup-outgroup dynamics in an MNE. Ghosn, "former chairman and CEO of Nissan Motor Co. and the Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Alliance," was arrested and detained for months by Japanese prosecutors under charges of fraud (Lampton, J., 2019, 21). He fled surreptitiously from Japan to one of his diaspora citizenship homelands, Lebanon, to the relief of some; his defense lawyers at a trial would have emphasized the prosecution's "political motivations" (Lewis, Inagaki and Cornish, 2019, para. 11). Commercial performance of both Renault and Nissan has subsequently been poor ("Carlos Ghosn," 2020).

The theoretical conceptualization of culture depends upon the phenomena, policy-related or otherwise, that the analyst aims to analyze. One scholarly summary declares in “Culture and Cognitive Science” under “What is Culture?”:

“Those who advance definitions of culture do not necessarily assume that a good analysis must be faithful to the colloquial understanding of that term. Rather, these definitions are normative, insofar as they can be used to guide research. A focus on artifacts might orient research towards manufactured objects and institutions, a focus on behavior might promote exploration of human activities, a focus on symbols might take language as a principal subject of study, a materialist orientation might shift attention toward ecology, and a focus on mental states might encourage psychological testing. Philosophically, definitions that focus on external variables tend to imply that culture is not reducible to the mental states of individuals, whereas psychological definitions may imply the opposite” [emphasis added] (Stanford Encyclopedia, 2011, para. 6).

This paper focuses on the group behavioral manifestation of culture in response to external variables including collectively perceived threats and opportunities to national well-being. Defending or expanding the influence of the national ingroup sharing a perception of a common culture in the midst of social interaction is the collective behavioral manifestation of this culture. This writer’s academic field is political science and international relations with a focus on nationalism. Defining nationalism as the political value drive to promote the political influence of a national cultural community is a salient theme in the international relations literature. From this perspective, culture is relevant as a system of collective norms of an ingroup, the loyalty to which preoccupies the ingroup in perceiving and responding to challenges from outgroups. Culture exists as a loyalty community and this affective allegiance motivates or drives behavior. In contrast, the entry for “value theory” in the Stanford Encyclopedia portrays value as an evaluative ideal (2016). This difference illustrates the puzzle concurrent with the use of the term, value, an issue which the instructor explored with the students through the semester in the methodology course.

The immediate impetus for this paper was a pair of scholarly articles, one a recent article by Tung and Stahl (2018), “The Tortuous Evolution of the Role of Culture in IB [International Business] Research: What We Know, What We Don’t Know, and Where We are Headed.” The other is a response to Tung and Stahl (2018) by Peterson and Barreto (2018), “Interpreting Societal Culture Value Dimensions.” Both appeared in the *Journal of International Business Studies*. The recommendations and suggestions within these two articles constitute the framework of this paper. Tung and Stahl approvingly quote Devinney and Hohberger, “the field [culture in international business] has become stuck in a ... rut and more radical thinking is necessary” (Tung and Stahl, 2018, 1172, quoting Devinney and Hohberger, 2017, 48). Tung and Stahl continue in their literature survey that

“Buckley et al. (2017) stressed the need for IB research to embrace interdisciplinary research methods and multi-level approaches to study phenomena-based and -driven research, such as the rise of economic nationalism and income equality (in short, grand challenges) that we have alluded to in this paper. In their opinion, this can help bring about a “renaissance in international business research” to attain a bilateral or multilateral exchange of theories and research methodologies with other disciplines” (Tung and Stahl, 2018, 1185).

Tung and Stahl (2018) survey the international business scholarly literature’s focus on culture and find this subfield to need new conceptual approaches: “[P]rogress in the field has been slow and continues to be hampered by overly simplistic and incomplete accounts of culture, inadequate conceptualizations and operationalizations, an overreliance on distance concepts and dimensional models of culture, and other theoretical, conceptual, and methodological limitations” (1172). Tung and Stahl echo the call of others:

“The international context of business is ripe for new theory development involving unique constructs. Thus, the final category of influence involves the development of theory to explain phenomena that emanate from the international or MNE context. While insights may be drawn from existing theory, the international or MNE context requires a new causal logic to explain relationships” (Thomas, Cuervo-cazurra and Brannen, 2011, 1077).

This paper first outlines the conceptualization of culture as a factor shaping nationalistic behavior as it relates to international business while dialoguing with selected scholarly literature. Tung and Stahl argue that “we [the scholarly discipline] need to adopt a multi-method approach that draws on an array of research design options and methods, including qualitative methods” for “greater attention to process and context” (2018, 1183). This paper’s theoretical framework interlinks cultural phenomena at the individual, organizational, national and international systemic levels of analysis with a focus on policy. This analysis aims to be useful in application. The Data and Methodology section highlights that a theory-informed survey of the public record provides useful macro-level insights along with triangulation utilizing scholarly sources. The Results and Discussion section applies the propositions developed in the preceding critical dialogue with Tang and Stahl (2018) and Peterson and Barreto (2018). It develops the concept of economic nationalism with a focus on the Ghosn Renault-Nissan case.

The Path Forward section integrates the economic nationalism framework developed here with the Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner model. It illustrates the usefulness of this incorporation for teaching future supervisors managing diversity amidst economic nationalism predispositions in the context of ineluctable globalization. It offers suggestions for complementing Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner in training future managers regarding organizational leadership in relationship to nationalism and stereotyping. The comments highlight the escalating prominence of economic nationalism in international affairs amidst the Covid-19 pandemic global crisis. The conclusion notes the implications of the national securitization of public health and health care more broadly in response to the pandemic.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Cultural Identity and Actor Behavior

At the collective macro, community-level of the analysis of culture as behavior, Tung and Stahl (2018) reference Inglehart and Norris (2016) in analyzing the significance of cultural polarization and conflict. They display themselves in “cultural backlash” as behaviorally expressed in the rise of populism driving Brexit and Trumpism (Inglehart and Norris, 2016, 13). The intensifying dissatisfaction of heretofore societally dominant, more traditional, older, religious, less formally educated, male, Caucasian segments of society to cultural diversification contributes to polarization. Charismatic political entrepreneurs identify the contextual political opportunities and offer themselves as the leaders around which the discontented can rally. “The evidence examined in this study suggests that the rise of populist parties reflects, above all, a reaction against a wide range of rapid cultural changes that seem to be eroding the basic values and customs of Western societies” (Inglehart and Norris, 2016, 30). I.e. Tung and Stahl point to Inglehart and Norris (2016) to support the contention that the cultural backlash against evident domestic group power shifts is due to widening constituency cultural divergences. They are a primary cause of populism; it is not merely rising class income inequality *per se* (Tung and Stahl, 2018, 1172). Inglehart and Norris (2016) emphasize the importance of cultural change as a contextual factor, which is a focus of Tung and Stahl (2018).

Cultural change and conflict analysis here centers on relationships bridging different behavioral levels of analysis, i.e. at the individual, organizational, state and international systemic levels. This study proposes a social psychology-based theory of nationalism to conceptualize these dynamics, applying the framework developed in Cottam and Cottam (2001). Individual, organizational and national identity conflict dynamics amidst intergroup competition, cooperation and conflict help drive change in the policy making

environment of business and economics. Values may be conceptualized as motivations for behavior, i.e. value is shorthand for motivational value, or simply motivation. The observer infers these values from actor behavior implying a desired future state of affairs. Value motivations may be defined as “striving to obtain a more desirable future” as reflected collectively through strategic policy (Vohs and Hafenbrack, 2018, para. 2).

Affective/emotional predispositions regarding different behavioral choices implies that these emotions are important in driving behavior (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 99-105). In some situations, formalized, articulated ideals can override emotional predispositions. In conceptualizing a group or community’s values, individual member exceptions are more likely to be subsumed during a crisis within the prevailing affective inclination regarding ethical behavior choices. A national community’s affective and behavioral policy predilections together are stimuli response attitudinal inclinations that collectively constitute a national community’s culture. Culture, including prevailing notions of morality and ethics, have strong affective/emotional connotations in periods of conflict and crisis. Collectively displayed intense concern with the influence of that cultural community/national group is a value motivation.

A group/community may have other value motivations, e.g. economic profit. A national ingroup has more than one motivation for its collective policy behavior pattern predisposition. Different values are advanced by different ingroup constituencies, e.g. many in the US business sector favor more trade with China, while the US national security sector is more cautious. Some value motivations are more intense and salient than others in different social, economic and political contextual environments. The irremediably incremental policy making process for a large community or organization aims to accommodatively reconcile these values, addressing all of them in making policy. The collective system of these attitudinal response predispositions including in the form of policy indicate a more desirable future state of affairs which the observer as analyst identifies and articulates. I.e. a leader, citizen or employee does not have to be consciously aware of and articulate the actual collective values of an organizational actor in order for that collectivity to display those values.

Leaders and participants will tend to offer self-justificatory explanations for their behavior utilizing reference to ingroup romantic self-image symbols or memes, including favored ideological symbols. “Heider (1958) postulated that a positive self-perception is necessary for positive [cognitive] balancing to occur [in] that self-concept expressed through self-justification is a form of CD [cognitive dissonance] reduction” (Wagner, 2017, 211). Building on Heider’s work, Hanson and Yosifon survey the research and note that “[p]eople are generally averse to being dishonest, and will avoid lying without good reason. One central lesson of the research on motivated reasoning, however, is that a ready way to avoid lying is to change beliefs rather than behavior. Dissonance can be induced or introduced into a circumstance of clarity and consonance” [...] [sic] (2004, 109).

Emotions energize large human communities to behave collectively to achieve an implicit desired future, e.g. national defense against a perceived intense threat, not philosophies and ideologies *per se*. The latter tend to evoke emotions insofar as they are part of the romantic, idealized stereotypical self-images for the national ingroup, e.g. Americans are patriotic, rugged individualists. “Symbols ... arouse strong feelings as they poignantly articulate the idea that all members of a community share the same destiny” (Issa, 2016, 3). *Homo sapiens* has evolved to develop the capacity to differentiate itself into “super-large” ingroups, e.g. nation-states, by relying upon symbols to identify individual members and exclude others (Moffett, 2013, 221). Membership in a national ingroup correlates with collective ingroup predispositions to be vulnerable to intense emotions (Pettigrove and Parsons, 2012). Leaders attempt to manipulate these national cultural symbols to shape political and policy making processes. While appealing to nationalist sentiments may offer human resource mobilization capabilities, MNE leadership seeks to avoid offending national group constituent members within the organization. Affronting national self-identity ingroups generates intraorganizational polarization and consequent dysfunction. I.e. intensifying intra-organizational national

subgroup mutual contempt, rivalry, suspicion and fear obstruct effective intra-organizational communication and management.

The analyst may portray a national community's cultural system of behavioral norms at one point, although this ecological system evolves over time and context. Different values/motivations predominate in particular social and political milieus over other values. E.g. Chung and Woo have shown that Korean individuals who feel positively affirmed regarding their national cultural identity are more amenable to positive affirmation of other national groups. This affirmation extends towards the culture of their former imperial occupier, Japan (2015). National cultural constituent intergroup conflict reduces MNE capacities for cooperative organizational behavior to achieve organizational goals. National group members tend to display similar behavior patterns associated with intense ingroup loyalty solidarity in a context of high intergroup conflict, i.e. intense emotional affect and stereotyping (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 99-122). Intra-organizational effective communication and cooperation becomes more difficult in an organization polarized around national subgroups. From another perspective, Horak highlights the intensity and salience "as an institution" of Korean affective, ascription-based ties among individuals, *yongo* (연고), in a competitive business context. Expatriates should expect that among corporate staff these ties will override "a corporate code of conduct that prevents certain information from being revealed to competitors" (2018, 212).

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2012) aim to focus on organizational leadership's awareness of these differing national cultural norms and values. A manager's goal is to integrate them through effective MNE intra-organizational communication. Organizational leadership should successfully orchestrate intra-organizational relations, i.e. generate high morale, to allow for effective intra-organizational communication. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner's conceptualization of cultural behavioral norm and value change centers on increasing cognitive and affective tension. This tension emerges from a growing divergence between a national group's values and the governing, dominant stratum's imposed behavioral norms. The existence of such a significant tension implies that the behavioral norms are imposed upon an increasingly recalcitrant group. This recalcitrance may have been present at the beginning of the relationship. This resistance may have intensified over years and generations as the enforced behavioral norms become too onerous due to the changing environmental context. This context includes the evolving values of subordinate groups.

In their discussion, Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner highlight the anomalies involving eastern Europe. They underline surprising findings regarding stated egocentric, individualistic policy preferences of middle level managers. They appear to reflect a continuing backlash against the collectivistic norms imposed under Communism (2012, 71-72, 176). A generation later, changing contexts produce evolving collective behavior patterns manifesting themselves in shifting, conflictual norms, at least cognitively. E.g. in eastern European democracies, various forms of post-Communist "nostalgia" have emerged among different more or less disillusioned populist constituencies in different national contexts (Głowacka-Grajper, 2018, 930). A preoccupation with what is perceived as the best policy prescription for the well-being of the nation is a consistent feature of these discussions. To some degree, these universal appeals to national well-being are political efforts to shape the national policy making process to justify and defend the interests of particular national societal constituencies.

Behavioral Analysis of Culture

Culture as a ubiquitous factor in societal cleavage and polarization issues is a focus of media discourse. Tung and Stahl (2018) highlight the importance of culture in societal and global conflict topics. E.g. growing income inequality and insecurity, immigration and refugees, terrorism and human rights violations "all have a distinctly cultural component" (1168). Tung and Stahl (2018) applaud the call by colleagues for redirecting international business research towards these "big questions" and "grand challenges" (1168,

quoting Buckley, Doh and Benischke, 2017). This analysis aims to contribute from the perspective of nationalism and national self-expression conceived as the participatory dynamics of national cultural ingroup loyalty in relation to organizations.

Tung and Stahl highlight that a levels of analysis challenge confronts the study of culture as a contextually dependent, explanatory factor in international business behavior. Focusing on the circumstantial dynamics of culture brings into focus the dilemmas of extrapolating phenomena across “levels of analysis” in order conceptually to “bridge” them (2018, 1177). E.g. Hofstede (1980) authored a seminal study on the impact of national cultural differences on international business. He cautioned against fallacious extrapolation of his findings to predicting individual behavior. His typology of dimensions of differences between national organizational cultures “are meaningless as descriptors of individuals or as predictors of individual differences because the variables that define them do not correlate meaningfully across individuals” (Minkov and Hofstede, 2011, 12). Such an inappropriate extrapolation from the national level to the individual level would be a case of an “ecological fallacy” (Tung and Stahl, 2018, 1171). The latter is

“the fallacious inference that the characteristics (concepts and/or metrics) of an aggregate (historically called 'ecological') level also describe those at a lower hierarchical level or levels. The fallacy is also sometimes called the 'disaggregation error' (Van de Vijver and Poortinga, 2002); the 'fallacy of unwarranted subsumption' (Knorr-Cetina, 1988); Galtung calls it 'the fallacy of the wrong level' (Galtung, 1967); or 'the fallacy of division' (Aristotle, 350BC in Axinn, 1958). In short, each part is assumed to have the same characteristic or characteristics of the whole and thus that extrapolation from a higher level to lower ones accurately describes the lower. An illustrative example is: the false derivation that any Japanese individual is collectivist because Japan, it is supposed, is culturally a collectivist country (cf. Ryang, 2004). A completed jig-saw is usually a rectangle, but the individual pieces of the jig-saw are not rectangles. The colour green is a composite of blue and yellow” [sic] (McSweeney, Brown and Iliopoulou, 2016, 47).

“A *disaggregation error* is made when a higher order characteristic is incorrectly attributed to a lower order” (Van de Vijver and Poortinga, 2002, 142). The ecological fallacy is moving from a collective, behavioral organizational level to extrapolate individual behavior, inappropriately. The atomistic fallacy is extrapolating to the organizational behavior level regarding the impact of culture from studying individuals’ cultures (Tung and Stahl, 2018, 1176). Tung and Stahl argue that “multilevel research questions require adequate concepts and theoretical rationales for each level of analysis, as well as auxiliary theories that explain connections between levels” (2018, 1177). The dynamics of national cultural identity expression bridge variables at the individual decision maker and collective behavioral levels of analysis to explain organizational behavior in multinational contexts.

Knorr-Cetina proposes that

“Macro-sociology recognizes not only aggregate properties of populations derived by simple addition from the characteristics of individual population elements (for example, the variable population size). It also recognizes 'emergent' properties of social units. In fact, macro-sociology and social structuralism appear to be consistently defined as the study of those 'emergent' properties which macro-scale units are seen to possess 'above and beyond' those of micro-scale units” (1988, 34).

Whether or not culture is always a primary factor shaping the behavior of an organization is context dependent, i.e. MNE material profit expectations typically do determine MNE behavior. In other environments, the national subgroup components of an MNE may collectively come to perceive the critical

influence interests of their national communities as confronting intense challenge. This confrontation may come by corporate leadership behavior, external state government policies, or some collectively perceived challenging combination of factors. Then national ingroup political loyalty dynamics can override these prospective material profit gains and generate substantial material losses. An appropriate theoretical framework for the political psychology of nationalism allows moving beyond dismissing this predictable consequential behavior as being irrational.

Tung and Stahl highlight the importance of the analysis of “economic nationalism” as one of the “grand challenges” in the study of culture’s impact on international business (2018, 1185). The challenge of nationalism is referenced once in Buckley, Doh and Beniscke:

“As such, in the evolution, or stalling, of globalization, a host of challenges awaits: is the reaction against freer trade permanent and what are its consequences? Is globalization fracturing and is the global project dead, destroyed by its own patterns of success and failure? These questions are not only important to the field of IB in general, but particularly in the context of grand challenges, because a move towards renewed nationalism will make it more difficult for MNEs and non-traditional organizational forms to address these challenges - or may further accentuate the impact of grand challenges on MNEs themselves” [emphasis added] (2017, 1057).

Tung and Stahl note that in the current state of research into the relationship of culture to international business, the impact of culture in applied areas is difficult to demonstrate. In specific “subdomains” in the field, such as “international joint ventures,” “market entry,” “cross-border knowledge transfer” the “strength of the relationship between cultural differences and IB outcomes tends to be relatively weak in practical terms” (2018, 1177). Tung and Stahl advocate for identifying the context in terms of “situational factors” that determine “how and when it [culture] makes a difference” (Ibid.). They call for a conceptualization of culture from the perspective of “context” (Ibid.). Culture is observed through collective behavior. This paper’s theoretical framework facilitates situationally identifying culture as an organizational policy making process factor shaping collective perceptual and behavioral patterns. Characterizing the situational factors that evoke these behavioral patterns then becomes the aim. Peterson and Barreto (2018) respond explicitly to Tung and Stahl (2018). Peterson and Barreto “define culture as “patterns of social behavior, social interaction, and conscious and unconscious influences on action that recur in or typify a society” (Peterson and Barreto, 2018, 1191, referencing themselves, 2014, 1134). *Culture represents discernible societal processes that occur regularly, though not invariantly*” [emphasis added] (Peterson and Barreto, 2018, 1191).

Other writers note that culture as a causal factor in organizational behavior is not always predominant. Tung and Stahl (2018) conceptualize culture’s role in IB as a “probabilistic behavioral manifestation with contextual elements” (1176). They point specifically to the work of Devinney and Hohberger who dynamically contextualize culture’s role in IB: “[c]ulture cannot be thought about just as a latency but as a latency that is revealed in a context” (Devinney and Hohberger, 2017, 56). This paper suggests that culture as an organizational driver may be conceptualized as emerging within crisis contexts. I.e. the members/citizenry of an organization collectively perceive themselves as sharing a culture as members of a cultural community under challenge. This community has a shared past and therefore the expectation of a common future that collectively identifies an intense challenge to its influence in the environment. Peterson and Barreto continue in arguing that culture should be conceptualized in IB at a collective, and not at an individual level. This collective definition maintains continuity with the use of the term in other social sciences (2018, 1191). They also note that “[s]ocieties of special interest to IB include governmentally bounded and ethnically based geographic groups including diasporas that typically have a geographic homeland” (Ibid, referencing Peterson, Søndergaard and Kara, 2018).

Peterson and Barreto (2018) in effect advocate for conceptualizing culture as patterns of collective behavior that demonstrate intensely shared ingroup self-identification with a collectivity. The fundamental relationship to the individual is that upon birth a specimen of *homo sapiens* is socialized by various collectivities into self-identity ingroups, and these have their respective cultures. A family may have a culture and it may be a powerful focus of loyalty and allegiance regarding behavioral action to achieve ends perceived as necessary for individual well-being, broadly conceived. Individuals are socialized into and adopt additional ingroup identities, e.g. their schools, sects, universities, cities, regions, classes, employers' organizations, nations and states. The respective affective and perceptual intensity of self-identification with these multiple different ingroups varies. Cottam and Cottam (2001) argue that the formation of a national identity refers to the emergence of a primary intensity self-identity community. I.e. it is the largest perceived, primary intensity shared self-identity community of self-perceived common fate (2). Nation-state numerical population sizes range from as small as Iceland to as large as China.

Identity Community Complementarity and Organizational Nationalistic Behavior

As Byrne notes, primary, terminal, i.e. national self-identity, including ethnic/cultural self-identity community membership, appears to be a consequence of socialization, as with family self-identity. "Civic conceptions of national identity," in contrast, focus national loyalty upon a territorial community (2018, 2). Immigrant national communities, such as Brazil and the US, would be examples in which the latter belief predominates. Education and socialization institutions teach children that treason against the nation is unforgivable under any circumstances. E.g. South Korean mainstream nationalist historiography confronting local collaborators with the Japanese former imperial occupier portray their actions as unpardonable crimes: "in common parlance *ch'inilpa* [collaboration] does not refer to a political faction which relies on foreign support, but rather has the far more negative connotation of collaborators and national traitors who committed unpardonable antihistorical (*panyoksajogin*) acts" (De Ceuster, 2001, 228). Soviet and Yugoslav state socialization institutions failed to override existing ethnic ingroup primary intensity self-identifications in these multinational states. Despite great expenditure of resources and use of extreme coercion, they failed to create a new territorial community-based primary intensity self-identification among their respective modal citizenries.

Cottam and Cottam endeavor to operationalize the intensity of this shared national identity. Indicators focus on collective behavior patterns signifying a prevailing view that the community has the right to national self-expression via a sovereign state. E.g. the greater susceptibility of public opinion to influence via intense manipulation of positive and negative stereotypes of national self and other is one marker. Nation-states thus have a relative resource mobilizational advantage over non-nation-states, *ceteris paribus* (2001, 149-152).

Other signs may also be found in the self-perceived cultural uniqueness of the community, including its linguistic composition, e.g. the extent to which the national language is considered distinct. Another indicator is the extent to which the community shows a predisposition as manifested in its educational system to socialize children about a historical golden age in pre-modern times. An additional marker is the degree to which the community shares a belief that it has a geographical territory that it historically associates with that reputed pre-modern golden age. The importance of so-called Judea and Samaria and Jerusalem to Jewish nationalism and Kosovo to Serbian nationalism are examples. Another gage is a shared community worldview that within those common ethnic and territorial boundaries, it is a unique spiritual/religious community. A shared self-defined belief that the community belongs to a unique genetic/racial group of people in terms of (alleged, subjectively defined) phenotypes is another indicator. The prevalence in collective, shared community memory of suffering a genocidal experience is an additional marker. Also, a prevailing community worldview must exist that the community has the contextual, comparative power capability base to create an economically viable and militarily defensible state (Ibid., 2001, 32-47).

Nation-states are an ideal-typical category, i.e. their component self-identity communities all compliment rather than conflict with each other; they display “identity community complementarity” (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 45-47). I.e. they display a community base whose modal citizenry share an assumption of co-terminus overlap of state territorial boundaries with primary intensity national ethnic, sectarian and racial boundaries. The controversy surrounding the Carlos Ghosn case, as discussed below, highlights the impact of economic nationalism. France, the headquarters of MNE Renault and Japan, the headquarters of MNE Nissan, are two examples of communities approaching the nation-state ideal-typical model laid out by Cottam and Cottam. Ghosn, holding simultaneously Brazilian, Lebanese and French citizenship, illustrates the relationship of nation-state governments to diaspora behavior as perceived as being exploited by other nation-states. State elites “use transnational practices of diaspora mobilization as a means of generating material resources and political support in an increasingly integrated world economy” (Adamson and Demetriou, 2007, 491).

In their dialogue with Tung and Stahl (2018), Peterson and Barreto emphasize the importance of context-focused factors shaping patterns of behavior via patterns of collective perception. They warn against conceptualizing, analyzing and measuring culture in terms of a focus on the mental equipment within a particular individual’s mind. Membership in ingroups shapes these patterns of perception and behavior, especially during times of perceived crisis:

“Several of the commentaries that Tung and Stahl (2018) summarize suggest that IB is slipping back into the Rokeach (1968) era by overemphasizing personal values and missing the implications that value-linked societal characteristics have for the less deliberative aspects of cognition. Such use creates confusion about the meaning of culture in IB and a discontinuity with its use in major culture theories in other fields (Fischer, 2007; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952; Ortner, 1984; Peterson & Barreto, 2015)” (Peterson and Barreto, 2018, 1203).

These “value-linked societal characteristics,” shaping “the less deliberative aspects of cognition,” characterize ingroup vs. outgroup behavior. Group behavior functions at another level of causality and analysis than individual cognition. Group behavior emerges when intense but latent affective common cultural bonds become salient due to dynamic contextual factors, manifesting in group collective perceptual trends. These shared so-called value-linked societal characteristics generate emerging, systematic patterns in the group’s prevailing perceptions of relevant policy targets. Amidst a crisis, they simplify as they become predominant, i.e. stereotypes (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Organizational leadership makes policy decisions on the basis of the politically prevailing perceptions of their targets within the initiator. Predictable patterns in perceptual stereotyping and their associated policy behavior patterns are particularly prone to emerge among nationalistic actors, including nation-states and their diasporas (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 22-24, 100, 105-122).

This paper focuses on the collective, organizational level in understanding cultural values as a group driver to understand the less deliberative aspects of cognition, i.e. stereotyping of target actors. An assumption in Cottam and Cottam drawing from Fritz Heider’s theory (1958) of cognitive balancing is that motivation shapes perception. If a group collectively as reflected in its government/management/leadership sees an intense challenge, then the challenger will more likely be perceived in affective, stereotypical, i.e. simplified, terms. This simplification associates with intensification of affect so as to facilitate urgent action to deal with the challenge rooted in individual human nature, i.e. fight or flight (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 11-12). For collective organizational behavior, the initiator will tend to perceive the policy making process in the perceived challenger/target as less complex and more limited than it really is. The parameters of perceived policy option range for the initiator in dealing with this adversary will tend to narrow due to this stereotyping of the other. Plausible policy choices to influence the politics of the policy making process within the target will more likely be unseen or dismissed. The relationship with the target is increasingly seen as zero-sum rather than win-win, and the aim moves toward subduing, even eliminating, the target. As

noted, nationalistic individuals and collectives are more prone to engage in such stereotyping (Ibid., 87-122).

Economic Nationalism

This study conforms with Peterson and Barreto's conceptualization of culture as societal values in the form of collective motivations revealed in behavior patterns pointing towards a desired end-state:

“Values, in their [Kroeber and Kluckhohn, (1952)] use, describe ends that are implicit in a society's patterns of behavior; whereas a different term, attitudes, designates what an individual personally endorses. Cultural anthropology has continued to use values to designate societal characteristics, including a society's working consensus (not homogenous agreement) to behave in ways consistent with societal values (Fischer, 2007; Ortner, 1984)” [emphasis added] (Peterson and Barreto, 2018, 1193).

This end state is inferred by the observer/analyst; it may or may not be articulated more or less clearly by the collectivity's leadership. The end state may imply maintenance of organizational autonomy. E.g. national subgroup organizational suspicion rejects vociferously an MNE corporate so-called national champion transforming into a transnational entity by merging with another national champion. Corporate national champions are viewed as components of the influence capability of the nation in the world. Today, Russian fossil fuel corporate entities Rosneft and Gazprom are “at the center of a drive by the Kremlin to create "national champions" to promote Russia's geopolitical and economic interests” (Higgins and Kramer, 2020, para. 24). Witt notes that international business research has “a long tradition of looking at questions of national competitiveness.” US Cold War defense department spending “funded the rise of Silicon Valley and other high-tech clusters” that lead to American preeminence in the Internet, microelectronics and aviation industries. “In effect, US defense spending assumed the role of industrial policy in other countries” (2019, 1070).

The *New York Times* reported on June 30, 2020 that the Indian government banned nearly sixty mobile phone Chinese software applications, including the globally popular TikTok video-sharing platform. The move follows renewed deadly territorial border dispute violence with China. New Delhi views foreign IT company digital acquisition of personal user data as a national security threat to Indian sovereignty via “digital colonization,” a perceived threat from China that has intensified (Abi-Habib, 2020, para. 21). Nationalistic collective organizational behavior can lead to cooperative integration strategies to achieve national goals against a perceived, common challenge. E.g. west European nation-states subsidized and integrated their aerospace industries to counteract American corporate economic sectoral dominance in aerospace. ““The importance of Airbus transcends the purely economic aspects of its activities,” said Daniel Capparelli, head of the trade practice at Global Counsel, a consulting firm. Airbus, he said, is the “flagship example” of choosing and supporting European Union-wide industrial champions. Its success “enables Europe to throw its weight around and compete with the U.S. on a global scale,” said Mujtaba Rahman, managing director for Europe at the Eurasia Group, a political consulting firm” (Reed, 2020, para. 19-20). Middle power European nation-states integrate their resources to promote their national development goals against US economic sector monopoly threats.

Automotive industry forecasts indicate global automotive industry consolidation is inevitable due to overcapacity and the immense outlay necessary to create the era of autonomous, electrified vehicles. “Car mergers usually fail” with the exception of Fiat and Chrysler, unlike Chrysler's 1998-2007 “legendary failure” merger with Germany's Daimler-Benz (Ewing, Boudette and Dooley, 2019, para. 23-24). American stockholders challenged Chrysler's merger with Daimler, protesting Daimler's dominance in what was allegedly to be a “merger of equals” despite Daimler paying \$34 billion (O'Dell, 2000, para. 6). Chrysler's second merger with Fiat occurred after its 2009 bankruptcy and generous US government subsidies,

restructuring and downsizing to sell it amidst the 2008 Great Recession (Mitchell and Pulizzi, 2009). Fiat-Chrysler and Peugeot/PSA initiated their merger in late 2019 and will have “to navigate the political crosscurrents in France, Italy and the U.S., where the automakers have deep national roots” (Ebhardt, Nussbaum and Lepido, 2019, para. 13).

The emergence of economic nationalism occurs under particular contextual circumstances which government and corporate leadership can attempt to influence and shape. European integration peace strategy functionally aims to influence regional political dynamics to avoid circumstantial political conditions that increase propensities for collective nationalist behavior (DeDominicis, 2020). If leadership fails to navigate the contextual currents effectively, an organizational crisis may emerge while corporate leadership may be targeted for blame. The case study of Carlos Ghosn discussed below indicates that his arrest in Japan was due to more than allegations of embezzlement. Reports imply Japanese suspicion that he was advocating France’s interests over Japan’s in attempts to further integrate Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi alliance drove both his arrest and bizarre escape. An attitude can be formalized and endorsed, e.g. as ethical principles or law, but the actor may not necessarily display that endorsed attitude towards a perceived enemy. Intensely conflictual, zero-sum behavior indicates intense perception of challenge from a target and the salience of formally articulated ethical parameters may decline as the initiator responds vigorously.

The conceptualization of culture and its relationship to collective behavior here focuses on the interactive intergroup context of competition and cooperation. National cultural group loyalty and attitudes have to be activated/stimulated to reveal their policy making salience in ingroup vs. outgroup behavior. This ingroup vs. outgroup conduct intensifies obstacles to communication and cooperation, whether the cooperation is to obtain material profit or some other aim. Attitudes are conceptualized here as stimulus response patterns. Attitudes are agglomerations of perceptions of relevant targets’ motivations and capabilities that evolve. They may become institutionalized, e.g. Germans routinely responded with suspicion to French policies for much of their history until the postwar era (Cottam, 1977, 61-62). They may evolve; the EU integration movement aims to promote initiator perceptions of complexity in target motivation to support promotion of cooperative attitudes. European integration’s end state is change in values, including historically intense European national ingroup external influence drives. The EU integration movement strives to build a broader, more intense European identity superseding a value preoccupation with national sovereignty. It provides incentives to change in perceptions of nation-state-based actors. The accumulation of these perceptual pattern changes ideally encourages cooperative attitudes, in turn ideally leading to the long-term trend of changes in values.

These values functionally targeted for change include national self-identity sovereignty values, i.e. nationalism. MNEs play a critical role in these collective trends because they are more prone to exploit the greater profitability that is apparent to them through utilizing a stable, integrating pan-European market. Regulating to promote integration among European economic enterprises, and MNEs in particular, is an engine for these collective trends. The great majority of European Union law regulates the European internal market (Nugent, 2010, 56). Lou highlights that self-perceived “losers” in these Euro-globalization processes react, resulting in nationalist polarization. E.g. those traditionally status-dominant cultural groups that today are comparatively lacking in foreign language skills and higher education certifications, may become the core of populist Euroscepticism. Brexit would be one such manifestation, illustrating that economic nationalism can sacrifice corporate material profit in favor of national sovereignty demands (2017, 526). Despite economists’ prevailing views of the net economic loss to Britain from Brexit, and the overall opposition of the British business community to Brexit, the modal British citizen demanded it. “If there is a pattern, it is that big businesses, including foreign-owned ones, are anti-Brexit, while significant minority of smaller British-owned ones are Leavers” (McRae, 2016, para. 3).

Culture and Change

The predominance and ecological systemic configuration of cultural values and norms within a polity change among evolving constituencies concomitantly with socio-economic community development. Familiar nationalistic behavior patterns among some other constituency actors within national publics remain present. Tung and Stahl (2018) address this transformation by referencing the work of Inglehart and his collaborators and more recent contributions. Tung and Stahl note that the ongoing World Values Survey overseen by Inglehart has revealed evidence of “massive cultural change” globally in a relatively brief period of time (2018, 1178, referencing Inglehart and Baker, 2000). In yet another response to Hofstede’s dimensions approach, Tung and Stahl assert that Taras, Steel and Kirkman (2012) “uncovered dramatic shifts in cultural values when compared with the original data reported in Culture’s Consequences [Hofstede, 1980]. To give one example, they found that South Korea’s score on individualism has risen considerably, from 18 in 1960 to 61 in 2000” [*sic*] (2018, 1178-79).

Tung and Stahl (2018, 1179) point to work by Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson (2017) on the transformations in South Korea that have occurred in terms of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions model. They attribute these changes as due to South Korea’s “modernization.” “South Korea has seen strong modernization in business and society as well as a decrease in emphasis on Confucian principles, and these shifts are also reflected in a major decrease in uncertainty avoidance (i.e., from 85 to 37) and increase in masculinity (i.e., from 39 to 62)” (Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson, 2017, 23). Tung and Stahl further note the role of modernization in changing scores across Hofstede’s cultural dimensions by again referencing the work of Taras, Steel and Kirkman (2012). The latter’s “meta-analysis revealed that Hofstede’s scores always had the strongest correlations with measures of societal progress (e.g., indicators of human development, political freedom, GDP/capita, gender equality, and innovation) obtained in the 1980s and the weakest correlations with measures representing the 2000s” (Tung and Stahl, 2018, 1179).

Taras, Steel and Kirkman note that “[a]t this present rate of decline, none of Hofstede’s scores will have a recognizable connection to the world’s culture by 2050 with some, such as masculinity, probably becoming fully disconnected between 2020 and 2030” (2012, 337). Viewing culture as an aggregate of dimensional characteristics overlooks culture’s role as intense but often latent cultural ingroup delimitators. They set the boundaries for assertive allegiance behavior and mobilization, involving stereotyping and affect, emerging within dynamic conflictual contexts of crisis.

Attempts to conceptualize values as motivations/drives at an individual level of analysis include Abraham Maslow’s familiar hierarchy of needs framework. Individuals manifest a preoccupation with satisfying needs. Upon satisfaction within a societal context of one category or set or type of need, the actor then behaviorally modifies to display a preoccupation with the next set or type on the hierarchy. In hierarchical order, they are “physiological, safety, love, esteem and self-actualization” and “[t]here are reversals and jumps in the hierarchy depending on the motivators an individual has to achieve them” (Day, 2017, 4). In terms of the IB literature that calls for value to be conceptualized as a behavioral preoccupation with achieving an end state, Maslow’s needs may also be termed values. Criticisms of Maslow’s hierarchy in terms of their validity regarding individuals are varied. Individual values are myriad and diverse. A claim in this study is that when individuals aggregate into national organizations and ingroups, the organization begins to manifest patterns of behavior that are regular and may be typologized. These patterns involve perceptual manifestation predispositions that intensify during crises challenging the ingroup, i.e. stereotyping, and the policy behavior strategy displays that associate with them. E.g. an initiator actor perceiving a dangerous enemy threat from a coequal target power would exhibit the strategic policy of containment towards the target (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 100, 121).

The values/motivations that predominate in an ingroup organization depend upon the context factors and stimuli. When applied to vast, complex organizations such as national communities, Maslow’s hierarchy

of needs/values appears to display regularities. As Inglehart's findings have shown, so-called developed societies tend to display greater political support for so-called post-industrial, post-material needs/values than so-called developing societies. 2020 Germany manifests different needs/values/drives/motivations of its collective policy behavior than 1940 Germany while militant nationalist authoritarian constituencies endure within it. Nationalism as nationalistic behavior value tends to associate at a community level with satisfaction of safety, security and status needs. Post-modern/post-nationalistic behavior tends to associate with the highest levels of need, the need for individual self-actualization, motivating social behavior in Maslow's hierarchy (Venter and Venter, 2010).

Pat Tillman, the NFL football player, "walked away from his \$3.6 million NFL contract to enlist in the [US] Army" after the September 11, 2001 attacks later to die by friendly fire in Afghanistan (Lingle, 2010, 30, quoting Krakauer, 2009, jacket). Individuals may be more or less unaware of their own values and attitudes, including primary intensity loyalty to the nation, even if they attempt to articulate them. On 9/10/01, Tillman may not have known what he would feel inexorably impelled to do immediately after the attacks on 9/11 even in the unlikely event that he had ever considered such a 9/11 scenario. Someone may repeatedly claim rhetorically among their social circle that they live according to the worldview/belief/attitudinal principle that 'I always look out for #1, me, so money talks!'. Yet he or she may surprise, even themselves, by being among the first to join the military amidst a collective national security crisis.

At the collective level, national leadership will tend to articulate ideals and principles that have universalistic propaganda appeal, e.g. upholding human rights, to justify national influence expansion (Ross, 2013, 287-291, DeDominicis, 2018, 16). During a crisis, the imperatives of national security tend to override those universalistic formal ethical principles as nationalistic constituencies come to dominate the policy making process. Societal behavioral norms may change in part due to the impact of socio-economic development and its promotion of greater awareness of unavoidable global interdependency among constituencies. Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs can be applied to collectivities and publics. Nationalism is a value as a motivation in certain contexts to satisfy these needs. Nationalism as a value can associate with different ideologies, and it can be part of an ideology, but it is not itself an ideology; it is rather a deep ingroup/outgroup political behavior pattern (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 6-7). An ideology can be conceptualized as a systematized expression of norm and value ideals. If an ideology has a desired future or vision to actualize, then skeptics often label it "utopian" (Brincat, 2009, 587). The ideology may or may not be persuasively descriptive of the actual policy behavior of the articulator/adherent, collective or individual.

Culture, Globalization and Polarization

Current polarization and nationalist populism reflect this growing divergence of needs/values preoccupations among national constituencies amidst globalization. Regarding the Trump phenomenon:

"Class scholars have documented that non-elites hold more traditional views than elites, including on "family values." That's why the culture wars express class conflict: Elites embrace political issues associated with their felt entitlement to self-development (such as the right to express oneself sexually, through L.G.B.T.Q. and abortion rights). Non-elites typically put a higher value on self-discipline and respect for traditional institutions that advance self-discipline -- religion, the military and family values -- shaping the politics of what used to be called "values voters."

"Does all this still hold in the age of President Trump? Sure does. Roughly 80 percent of evangelicals voted for Mr. Trump because they hoped he would deliver the Supreme Court, and he did. Aren't they outraged by his behavior? Not really, because they view politics as an arena where compromise is made with people unlike themselves in exchange for wins on issues that are central

to their [national] identity. They rely on church, not politics, as the arena for forming a virtuous sense of self” (Williams, 2020, para. 11-12).

Along with those changing needs/values/drives are changing behavior patterns. These systemic behavior displays are indicators of the values driving collectivities. These nation-state behavior manifestations include nationalistic behavior along with other values, but during an organizational collectivity crisis, nationalistic values will more likely predominate.

Nationalistic collective behavior obstructing effective multinational organizational mobilization can occur due to component national group mobilization vis-à-vis other component national outgroups. National ingroup solidarity mobilization can associate with different norms depending upon the contextual factors perceived as shaping the challenges to national sovereignty. As noted, nationalism, while a value and not an ideology, can associate with different ideologies and be part of an ideology. A self-labelled Communist actor may explicitly disavow nationalism but that actor’s behavior patterns may still imply a deep preoccupation with national sovereignty and influence, i.e. nationalism. As noted, an ideology can be conceptualized as a philosophy of political norm and value ideals with a desired future/vision to actualize. Nationalism as a value/drive can vary in its association with different ideologies among segments of the public along with changing contextual conditions, including socioeconomic settings. E.g. liberalism, i.e. Washington’s proclaimed Cold War-era value ideals, appealed to east European self-determination movement leaders opposing Moscow-installed, Communist totalitarian regimes. Thirty years later in markedly different political and socio-economic contexts, some of those same leaders, e.g. Viktor Orban in Hungary, mobilize nationalistic support with “illiberal” xenophobic appeals (Steinberger, 2018, para. 62).

Nationalism in developed states is more likely to remain as an intense but at times latent value among more vulnerable socioeconomic classes amid globalization’s greater class and national status insecurity. Cooke, Mills and Kelly survey the literature critiquing Maslow’s work as a reflection of its Cold War American context. They conclude that these authors “[a]ll recognize that Maslow’s hierarchy [of human needs/values/motivations/drives] is a social hierarchy and see contradiction or tension in that not everyone can be self-actualized, yet so being is supposed to be a natural human condition” (2005, 135). Globalization and societal diversification have increased this anxiety and insecurity, contributing to the rise of conservative populist nationalism. Its manifestations include Trump’s political success as well as Brexit.

“These demographic and attitude patterns seem consistent with both economic and cultural explanations for the widespread surge in populist voting, including for right-wing parties. Economically, these voters tend to be the losers from globalization, capital mobility, the knowledge economy, deindustrialization, and labor-replacing technology. Culturally, these are also the people who are have been losing status in an era of growing ethnic diversity and changing gender roles. Their communities are under stress for economic and cultural reasons simultaneously.”

“As a result, successful populists craft narratives that integrate economic and cultural concerns. The familiar litany of grievances has this double-barreled quality: Immigrants are taking our jobs, siphoning off our welfare benefits, making our streets unsafe, contributing to terrorism, and making our towns unrecognizable. The educated, privileged elite looks down on us, sends our jobs abroad, and coddles historically stigmatized minorities and the undeserving poor, who do not work half as hard as we do. We want our respectable jobs and our country back, but nobody is listening to us. These narratives have their sharpest political effects where economic and cultural factors interact” (Snyder, 2017, 88).

Taras et al. (2012) and Kirkman et al. (2017) analyze changes in identity values but also changes in the contextual factors that cause nationalism to associate with different ideologies. Determining factors include the current global hegemonial power dominance that shapes the most feasible national paths to national

socioeconomic development. E.g. with Soviet disintegration at least until the rise of China, the soft power appeal of capitalism included its association with the power and influence of the economically and politically liberal US. Hanh asserts that Joseph S. Nye, Jr. originally conceptualized soft power as deriving from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political institutions and foreign policy being sufficient to change the behavior of others (Hanh, 2018, 82 referencing Nye, 2004, 7, 18-19, 30-32)]. The concept then evolved within Chinese discourse:

“By the time Nye's soft-power concept came to light, Chinese scholars used this notion as a universal reference framework, at variance with the original definition of soft power in accordance with national demands and interests. Depending on each scholar, the phrase "soft power" is translated into Chinese; ruanshili, ruanquanli, ruanliliang, and ruanguoli are the terms most used by scholars in this country. Since then, although there are different views on soft power in China, the focus often falls into one of the following categories: (1) soft power theory is a national development strategy, and (2) the theory of soft power is a foreign policy. Category (1) mainly discusses the institutional reform necessary for economic development. Meanwhile, category (2) focuses on the establishment of foreign policy in line with the rise of China (Zicheng, 2003, pp. 116-117). Since Hu Jintao took power, the need to consolidate soft power and hard power to make China a global power was urgent as a national development strategy. The emergence of peace-building in 2003 and the Beijing Consensus in 2004 especially brought "soft power" theory to the forefront as a widespread trend all over the country” [sic] [emphasis added] (Hanh, 2018, 82).

China's humanitarian aid response to the Covid-19 pandemic for developing countries illustrates the culmination of this emphasis on soft power for China's rise in global influence. “COVID-19 has become a factor in the competition between the US and China over who is the better global citizen” [sic] (Mulakala and Ji, 2020, para. 1). The Chinese authorities see an opportunity to enhance their soft power international diplomatic bargaining leverage stemming from their relative success in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic. Chinese corporate philanthropists are providing humanitarian aid to the US, including Huawei: “Shipments of protective gear by Huawei, the Chinese telecom equipment giant that American officials have accused of spying for the Communist Party, have been heavily covered by Chinese state-run media. Huawei has said it would never allow spying on its customers” (Stevenson, Kulish and Gelles, 2020, para. 16). The Chinese government is fiercely protective of Huawei: “[b]ut even if Huawei is not government controlled, Chinese officials often defend it as if it were a strategically vital state asset” (Zhong, 2020, para. 10). Africa's urgent development needs induce governments to accept alluring infrastructure contracts with Chinese corporations despite their covert installation of signal intelligence gathering devices (Solomon, 2019).

South Korea's rapid economic development, the “miracle on the Han River” (i.e. the main river running through Seoul) is the foundation of its international soft power as a US Cold War client and ally (Howe, 2017, 249). Seoul adopted a capitalist development model highlighting a close state alliance with what became the family-owned commanding heights of the economy, the *chaebol* (Kim and Choi, 2019, 14). These highly diversified, export-oriented business conglomerates have extensive international operations and consequently support Seoul's overseas development assistance policies (vom Hau, Scott and Hulme, 2012, 195). Seoul's subsequent “globalization” of its foreign policy has been characterized as a national “status drive; an easy and cheap way of projecting a new Korean entity” (Lee and Lee, 2015, 132, quoting Kim, 2000, 3). In certain contextual dynamic circumstances, even highly developed societies with global MNEs headquartered within them display intense nationalism that is opposed to transnational globalization. Attitudes change more readily than long term predispositions towards collective behavioral displays of loyalty to a shared national ingroup. Perception of a shared national culture is a subjective assessment of shared membership in a community of fate. Attitudes change depending on the international and domestic

political context. Tung and Stahl note, “[u]nfortunately, few studies on culture in IB have systematically examined contextual moderators” (2018, 1177).

These contextual moderators include the collective ingroup member shared perceptions of self and other. In sum, the greater the self-perceived shared defining and delineating ingroup characteristics, including vis-à-vis outgroups, the greater the propensity towards nationalistic behavior. A conceptualization of contextual moderators requires a focus on factors also at different levels of analysis: 1) individual, e.g. human resources; 2) intra-organizational/ingroup, i.e. organizational characteristics, structures and policies and their system of aims, including the state as a vast, complex organization and; 3) strategic international relations, including international organizational, factors, e.g. the UN. The last of these three levels includes the international systemic level, i.e. the international alliance configuration among states and their proxies. States compete for influence more or less intensely with each other at times utilizing and influencing IB corporations/MNEs for diplomatic bargaining leverage (Cottam and Gallucci, 1978, 41). Individual-level contextual factors, e.g. socio-cultural generational changes in culture, may evolve more slowly than organizational variations, e.g. bankruptcy restructuring. Context determines if and when collective identity values are evoked, i.e. that which is intense but latent becomes salient. If they exist and are evoked, then they become salient in terms of organizational behavior, i.e. national component ingroup stereotyping towards challengers.

The impact of culture manifests itself prominently when, amidst intergroup conflict, the members of the organization share comparatively strong self-identification with the same national ingroup. As noted, the behavioral manifestation of strong culture is not always salient, i.e. cultural ingroup loyalty may be an intense value/motivation but latent until factors external to the organization/ingroup evoke it. Those behavior patterns include a greater propensity: 1) to perceive the external environment in terms of threats and opportunities for the national organization/ingroup; 2) to perceive those challenges in affective, stereotypical terms, i.e. perceptually to simplify the challengers’ complexities in terms of motivational attribution to the perceived target source of the challenge, and; 3) to overestimate the organization/ingroup’s relative power capabilities to overcome those challenges (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 87-122).

The US is a nation-state but internal subnational racial identity polarizations reflect its compound identity complexity. Examples closer to ideal-type nation-state collective self-apparent ethno-cultural homogeneity include Iceland, Japan and Norway as well as postwar Poland (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 18). Politically significant American subnational identity cleavages emerge around ethno-racial identity divisions (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 71-83). Trump’s populism has its enthusiastic core supporters among the white-assimilatory European-American subnational cultural ingroup. Building upon its White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) foundation, it has historically dominated the American nation-state. Its lower socio-economic strata are more likely to perceive a threat from globalization and American political value diversification. “This has helped to make the politics of identity prevail over bread and butter politics, severing social ties or empathies outside of one’s own groups” (Kardaş, 2017, 101). The barriers to communication in the nation-state as a vast, complex organization are evident in the polarizing respective charismatic attraction and intense disdain engendered by Trump:

“the intellectual, popular, and policy imperatives of Trumpism are rooted in a new form of racial politics that I am calling white nationalist postracialism. This is a paradoxical politics of twenty-first-century white racial resentment. Its proponents seek to do two contradictory things: to reclaim the nation for white Americans while also denying an ideological investment in white supremacy. And they attempt to accomplish this feat by a highly selective reading of post-Civil Rights era US history” [sic] (Maskovsky, 2017, 434).

Regarding management challenges, this polarization produces differing, affect-laden worldviews regarding the future of the US economy in response to the Covid-19 pandemic profound national crisis:

“One group remains a relative holdout in expressing faith that the economy will experience continuous good times over the next five years and that their own families will be better off a year from now: conservative Republicans. They are also far more likely to oppose the restrictions on activity [social distancing and shelter-at-home orders] that public officials have put in place, saying they have gone too far.” [...]

“The recent decline in [consumer] confidence cuts across political and ideological categories, separating it from other recent periods where sentiment dipped among Democrats but not Republicans. Now, moderate Republicans have turned pessimistic, even as more conservative Republicans expect the economy to fare well in coming years.”

“Republicans, not surprisingly, are much more likely to give Mr. Trump credit for his handling of the crisis. Some 91 percent of Republicans said they approved of Mr. Trump's response, compared with 51 percent of independents and 22 percent of Democrats” [in New York Times SurveyMonkey results] (Casselmann and Tankersley, 2020, para. 6, 15-16).

Self-described “conservative” Republicans, i.e. Trump enthusiasts, manifest worldviews reflecting their intensive ingroup vs. outgroup intra-American mobilization. This enthusiasm manifests itself in their consequent steadfast faith and trust in Trump and their concomitant intense disdain for Trump’s opponents.

Culture and Mobilization

Rhetorical conduct is political behavior to be incorporated into a theoretical framework to conceptualize the role of culture in organizational strategy. Incorporating rhetorical performance in a theory of organizational national ingroup community motivation faces a paradox. For internal audiences, its articulations are at best often aspirational, and for external publics it is more typically propagandistic. It serves a mobilizational purpose and effective deployment of resources is critical for organizational policy and potential success. A determinant is on the nature of the source of the perceived challenge. Archetypical stereotypes of self and other are part of the romanticized symbol set of the nation, i.e. the primary, terminal self-identity community and its component communities. Tung and Stahl (2018) in effect highlight this legitimation function in their positive reference to earlier work in international business that conceptualizes culture as an ecological system of symbolic memes. Tung and Stahl (2018) spotlight the conceptualization of Weeks and Galunic (2003) who use “memes” as an “umbrella term” to label “cultural modes of thought: values, beliefs, assumptions, know-how, and so-on” in studying organizational culture. “[C]ulture results from the expression of memes, their enactment in patterns of behavior and language and so forth” (Tung and Stahl, 2018, 1181, quoting Weeks and Galunic, 2003, 1324).

In the Weeks and Galunic (2003) framework, a culture evidently consists of an ecology of memes, which this study suggests are cultural ingroup symbolic value ideals and ethical norms. An actor as an organizational stakeholder manipulates these memes in responding to stimuli from the environment in the form social interaction. In sum, culture is identifiable as a behavior pattern within a social environment of competition, cooperation and conflict. Alternatively, it is a means of organizational direction and control in this dynamic context. Leadership’s effort at direction and control via these symbolic appeal channels may be more or less effective, i.e. normative habitual, utilitarian and coercive means of control are also available. “[...] [T]he economic paradigm, positing only extrinsic incentives or utilitarian preferences as engines of exchange transactions in the market (and even beyond), is to be substituted by an alternative that also incorporates intrinsic motivation, including morality alongside material utility (Etzioni, 1990)” (Zafirovski, 1999, 331). Different organizational components/constituencies may be subject to different control formulae combinations of control means, and they may be subject to different symbolic content appeals.

Tung and Stahl approvingly highlight scholarly work that incorporates the motivational component of culture in terms of mobilizing the human resources within an organization. They reference the “Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Research Program” (GLOBE) as a refinement and development of the cultural dimensions approach in Hofstede. GLOBE’s elaboration includes two tracks: 1) surveying responders to categorize observable behavior patterns, and 2) surveying responders as to “aspirational values,” i.e. what “should be” (2018, 1171).

Leaving aside the atomistic, reification fallacy pitfalls arising from a focus on individual survey responders in analyzing organizational culture, the focus on mobilization is necessary. Culture is a behavior pattern that an individual or group manifests in an organization with an authority control system in place. An organizational culture, broadly construed, exists if control includes effective symbolic appeals to shared self-identity. This symbol manipulation includes romanticized (i.e. positively stereotyped) ingroup identity symbols to mobilize these resources to meet a perceived challenge to the group. The organizational ingroup members cognitively and affectively share this self-identification with the organization and its symbolic representation to varying degrees. If the modal ingroup member self-identifies at a primary intensity level with the organizational ingroup, then the organization’s management has the potential to display leadership charisma. Charismatic leadership is conceptualized as part of “transformational leadership,” in contrast to transactional leadership, i.e. utilitarian control (Northouse, 2013, 185-217).

Carl Jung highlighted the importance of “collective unconscious” and “archetypes” (Mohanty, 2016, 341). “Jung proposed that there are spiritual and ethical values that manifest themselves as drives” (Pietikainen, 2001, 47). This paper adopts this conceptualization of values being collective drives. I.e. nationalist motivations are collective strategic affective fixations on the influence itself of the cultural organizational ingroup in the external environment. The importance of culture manifesting itself as a collective predisposition shared by individuals within it is a core theme of Carl Jung’s work to conceptualize nationalism including in the economic realm.

“Perhaps no one in the last 100 years has been more influential to Western culture [sic] than Carl Jung. From his theories of personality type (“introversion” and “extroversion”) that led to the MBTI [Myers-Briggs Type Indicator introspective self-report test of perception], to his concepts of the “collective unconscious,” “archetypes,” and “synchronicity,” one could make a compelling argument that Jung’s influence over the last 100 years is without a contemporary equal. An untold number of therapists and researchers have built their entire practices, and careers, on his concepts and frameworks. And it is Jung’s concept of the “shadow” that is critical for understanding how normally positive traits (e.g., organized and efficient) can become negative (e.g., rigid and inflexible) under stress.”

“The “shadow” is Jung’s concept of the dark, unconscious aspect that resides within each of us. Jung believed that in addition to an individual’s shadow, there is also a collective unconscious that is essentially the repository or unconscious DNA of human history, varying by culture. Although he was convinced that the collective shadow had an enormous impact on human behavior in the present, our focus will be to further refine his notion of the “personal shadow” by looking specifically at leader behaviors under stress, and how normally positive characteristics and traits can and do become dysfunctional or outright destructive” [emphasis added] (Sparks and Repede, 2016, 27-28).

In an MNE with multiple constituent national cultural subgroups, attempts at transformational leadership employing charismatic appeals can be perilous. National subgroups are more prone to perceive danger from a CEO whom some see as too closely associated with one of these national ingroups. Hostile national subgroup reactions to a CEO misstep appearing to favor one national subgroup can lead to resistance, obstruction and subversion. The CEO leadership consequently becomes dysfunctional (see Carlos Ghosn

case below in the results and discussion section). Jung's so-called shadow may be conceptualized as the predisposition to form and mobilize around national ingroups and collectively to engage in stereotyping, even leading to violence, when aroused. Evidence of transformational leadership is also evidence of strongly shared ingroup self-identity so that organizational mobilization around symbols, including national memes, is effective.

Culture manifests itself as a significant organizational independent causal factor particularly when the organization confronts a crisis challenge, i.e. intense collective stress. Culture is a significant variable in part to the extent to which an intense, heretofore latent shared self-perception, typically non-salient, of membership in a shared fate community is evoked. Cottam and Gallucci conceptualize this ingroup shared primary intensity self-identification as a means of organizational regime control, describing it as normative active control (1978, 15-16). It consists of mobilizational appeals to this shared ingroup identity via manipulation of symbols rooted in romanticized self and other stereotypes/archetypes. It is an elaboration upon Amitai Etzioni's conceptualization of normative habitual control, along with utilitarian and coercive control in complex organizations. Nation-states, as opposed to non-nation-states like multiethnic states or multinational states, have a mobilizational and therefore power capability advantage in this regard. They also are as a collective entity more prone to stereotype policy targets in terms of the prevailing view in the government as the basis on which crisis decision making occurs. As previously noted, this predisposition lends an organizational resource mobilizational advantage for the nationalistic ingroup, while also leading to policy dysfunction due to the propensity to stereotype (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 3-4).

This study incorporates rhetorical behavior in order to infer the symbol set that organizational authorities manipulate in the attempt to mobilize their human resources. What Tung and Stahl (2018, 1171) refer to as the "aspirational values" which leadership may attempt to manipulate is normative active control. The dynamics of culture may be conceptualized in terms of its utilization to achieve objectives in order to understand what culture is and its significance. Culture as an ingroup/outgroup delineator may be intense but not always salient until the ingroup's influence capability comes under perceived challenge. It can thus be differentiated from among all of the individual, internal and external factors that determine organizational behavior. "Consistent with Etzioni (1964), a[n] [organizational] stakeholder is considered to have power to the extent to which it has or can gain access to certain means to impose its will on the relationship. Those means might be coercive (based on physical force, violence, or restraint), utilitarian (based on material or financial resources), or *normative (based on symbolic resources)*" [emphasis added] (Siltaoja and Lähdesmäki, 2015, 839, referencing Mitchell et al. 1997, 865).

Marin, Mitchell and Lee (2015) also reference the application by Mitchell (1997) of the typology of organizational control capability by Etzioni (1964), elaborating on "normative power, based on symbolic resources (e.g., that can offer/deliver fame, or threaten/deliver shame)" (Marin, Mitchell and Lee, 2015, 274). They note that shared ethnic ties in an "ethnic business," i.e. a business dominated by minority ingroup members within an ethnic majority society, may be an organizational management resource. Management may draw upon these ties, particularly "[i]n circumstances in which environmental conditions are hard and disadvantageous" (Ibid., 276). The capacity for normative mobilizational power capability of the organization's resources will correspond to the intensity with which a culture is shared among organizational constituencies. The salience of this ingroup internal contextual intensity depends on the dynamic external context of this cultural ingroup, including the organization's structural and operational characteristics and policies.

The centrality of follower/public values and aspirations, including collective self-identity expressions such as displayed in nationalistic behavior, is reflected in "new-genre leadership theories":

"Entrepreneurship continues to be benefited from leadership research by focusing on influence and process which have taken a new turn with what has been called new-genre leadership theories"

(Bryman, 1992) that put the leader behind the cart and the followers in the front and thereby the centrality of the followers is superimposed in the process of leading. The new leadership models emphasize symbolic leader behavior, visionary, inspirational messages, emotional feelings, ideological and ethical concerns, individualized attention, intellectual stimulation (Avolio et al., 2009), self-direction, non-hierarchical relationships (Antonakis et al., 2003), distributed leadership, shared relations and multiple exchanges” [emphasis added] (Mathews, 2017, 33).

Normative active state leadership manifests itself in effective influence and control over nationalistic publics by crisis appeals to national defense, sovereignty, dignity and even grandeur aspirations (Cottam and Gallucci, 1978, 16). The importance of affect in the processes of organizational leadership and mobilization reflects Carl Jung’s argument “that feeling and not reason is usually the most important factor in matters of good and evil: if feeling does not aid reason, the latter is often powerless” (Hultman, 2017, 20). Hultman references Williams (1979) in stating “that values bring together emotions and concept. People do not stop with a factual analysis of situations, but are constantly evaluating things as good or bad, vices or virtues, dignified or irreverent” (Ibid.).

Culture as a set of symbols manifests itself within dynamic interaction between collectivities and groups under an authority/management that mobilizes and governs the ingroup. To mobilize these resources the authority will rely upon manipulation of romanticized positive ingroup self-identity symbols. They are stereotypes of self vis-à-vis other. This legitimation function in the organizational policy making process is important in regard to the issue of culture and organization. When economic nationalism is evident, then this legitimation function is notably salient. The legitimation of a headquartered MNE policy can be in part through association of its role in developing the power capacities of the nation. The nationally headquartered MNE may at times ultimately serve the strategic objectives of a much more vast, complex organization, i.e. the nation-state. The latter organization has strong affective symbolic associations for the modal citizen in that its management is perceived as representing the nation. In other organizations, the ideals or stereotypes or archetypes are typically expressed in a mission statement, or organizational values statement, similar to a national constitution’s preamble.

Attempts at legitimation of the policy process outputs rhetorically manipulate these romantic cultural moral and ethical ideals. Typically, they might not be so important on a day-to-day level if utilitarian control is the main regime relationship between the authorities and the subordinates. When organizational allegiance becomes a prominent issue, then these romantic ideals, including their rhetorical expression as ingroup ethical norms, will be salient. Price notes that “Weeks and Galunic’s most important contribution might be to have identified the firm as a memetic ecology rather than, necessarily, a single entity” (2012, 339). Direction and control must be evident for an organization, by definition, to exist as an entity. If a comparatively strong organizational culture exists, then it may not necessarily always be salient. Normative active symbol manipulation will be more effective as a means of organizational control and direction in times of crisis, ceteris paribus. Organizational leaders will use these means if they are available to achieve objectives in this competitive, cooperative and conflictual dynamic environment. The analyst will see culture at work, and it will be particularly strong in vast, complex organizations that Cottam and Cottam typologize as nation-states (2001).

The legitimation function in the policy making process, like all elements in the policy making process, is inseparable from the dynamics of organizational management and leadership. Analyst articulate the component themes of the policy making process using different vocabularies, e.g. “agenda setting, policy formulation, decision making, implementation, evaluation” (De Marchi, Lucertini and Tsoukiàs, 2016, 20). This process encompasses the dynamics of organizational control and direction including legitimation which relevant stakeholders grant, habitually or otherwise, to the leadership’s policies. It is organizational existence. A significant organizational ethical culture exists among the stakeholders to the extent that

“[a]ttributions of both blame and credit thus occur within broader considerations of legitimacy, including a substantive moral dimension as to whether a decision is perceived to be right or wrong per se, what Schmidt (2013) called ‘throughput’ legitimacy. This exists as a procedural dimension concerning whether a decision is perceived to have been made in accordance with agreed principles and protocols (Scharpf 1999)” (Leong and Howlett, 2017, 601).

Without evidence of collective control and direction, an organization does not exist. One measure of this control and direction is successful legitimation, i.e. organizational ingroup normative meme recombination to an extent placating relevant stakeholders. It is efficacious in “exercising influence over the minds and actions” of organizational stakeholders (Cottam and Gallucci, 1978, 4). Ethics consists of the application of moral principles to making decisions to address challenges and they are part of legitimation. McKay notes that while “professional ethics” aim to ensure government action in the “public interest,” “they are inextricably linked with the concepts of legitimacy and power” in public policy making (2010, 428).

Culture, Nationalism and Integration

European authorities functionally encourage integrative, transnational trends in organizational meme recombination to ensue via incorporation at the European Union level. Social identity theory provides a framework for these political evolutionary dynamics (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 87-93). These dynamics involve incentivizing substantive social mobility and creativity to avoid intra-EU national zero-sum social competition, i.e. nationalist conflict (DeDominicis, 2020). Social mobility associates with assimilation when a negative comparison of ingroup self with outgroup other results in successful exploitation of opportunities to join the positively perceived outgroup. E.g. an ambitious, talented young east European from a poor family takes advantage of EU policies and opportunities to subjectively become so-called European as part of a promising career. Social creativity associates with integration. I.e. social creativity exploits societal opportunities to re-evaluate the ingroup positively according to different criteria in response to a negative initial comparison of national self with other. E.g. a Polish citizen may be disappointed in how Poland compares to Germany in economic development. But EU membership positively differentiates Poland’s national status as being so-called European in comparison with Russia. It occurs through re-estimation of the ingroup according to different, substantive comparison criteria and objects. Using similar, parallel concepts, Tung and Stahl note that

“in the four modes of acculturation [...] when a person has to interact with culturally dissimilar people, the individual has to choose whether to separate, integrate, assimilate, or be marginalized. [...] [E]mployees decide to join or leave organizations they are attracted to or disillusioned with; similarly, people choose to immigrate/emigrate to/from countries that exhibit societal-cultural values which they cherish/disagree with. [...] [A] subject’s response is triggered by the external stimuli [...] In the case of acculturation, the external stimuli would be the presence of a majority culture; in the case of organizational turnover/immigration/emigration, the external stimuli could be the presence/enactment of policies or legislations deemed (un)favorable and/or (un)acceptable by the employee/immigrant or emigrant, respectively” [emphasis added] (2018, 1182).

Cottam and Cottam’s political psychology of nationalism offers a theoretical framework for predicting tendencies towards acculturation, assimilation, integration and marginalization. Note that at the group level, another response may be to engage in social competition (2001, 90-93). Social competition refers to the relationship between the ingroup vs. outgroup coming to be perceived as dangerous and therefore zero-sum: the outgroup’s gain is perceived as the ingroup’s loss. National subgroups within an organization engaged in spiraling social competition with each other disrupt the organization, e.g. breaking up multinational states like the USSR and Yugoslavia. On the micro collective level of MNEs, disastrous constituent organizational national subgroup social competition would lead to organizational dysfunction and management failure.

Cottam and Cottam conceptualize the aggregation relationship between these micro-scale elements and the behavioral patterns of these macro-level units. The latter consist of states into which these micro-level units acculturate. Seeking social mobility through acquiring utilitarian benefits if perceived as possible can be a powerful incentive to assimilate. A concurrent incentive is the prevailing perception that power disparities make social competition strategies to achieve minority national secession and self-determination impossible. E.g. Arabic musical cultural influence is strong in Israeli “Mizrahi” pop music. These influences have grown with the rise of the Sephardic Jewish community along with the passing of the Ashkenazi founders of Israel. The Sephardic community is the at the core of right-wing Jewish populist nationalist constituency support for the Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party and his Greater Israel policies. “[T]he pop star [Ms. Nasrin Kadry] sang at Israel’s official Independence Day celebration, an unusual gig for an Arab artist. The invitation came from the Likud culture minister, Miri Regev, a sharp-tongued hard-liner whose family roots are in North Africa, like those of many Likud voters. Ms. Regev has said that Arabic music “has something to offer Israeli culture”” (Friedman, M., 2020, para. 9). Highly educated, multilingual, mobile, remunerated MNE human resources have incentives to assimilate into the MNE’s global organizational culture if it has more or less successfully created one.

As with genetic codes in living organisms, memes guide organizational “growth, development and functioning” (Tung and Stahl, 2018, 1182). They are the institutionalized utilitarian mobility and normative symbol ecology with which organizational authorities must communicate, manage and mobilize the collective. This symbol set establishes dynamic, more or less diffuse parameters for the policy making process. This symbol array constituting the organization itself continues to evolve or adapt as it interacts with stimuli from its competitive, cooperative and conflictual environment. It may also fail, disaggregate and dissolve. Tung and Stahl approve of the culture as meme ecology conceptualization because of its emphasis on attention to this process (Ibid). European integration policy attempts to shape organizational meme evolution amongst European constituencies to promote European identity. It does so by providing substantive individual social mobility as well as national identity social creativity opportunities. Memes are employed at different behavioral levels but they are utilized dynamically to pursue organizational goals by authorities seeking to legitimate them. This approach does not reify culture, but rather evaluates its intensity and salience as a group factor affecting collective behavior in the midst of intergroup cooperation and conflict. Culture as a dynamic, evolving process is more evident.

Tung and Stahl respond approvingly to Brannen’s emphasis on understanding “language” within an interactive social context as a branch of semiotics, i.e. the study of the content of symbols and signs (2018, 1183, quoting Brannen, 2004, 595). Manipulation of national, romanticized normative symbolic ideals of self vs. other is most intense and influential in this dynamic collective social interaction of competition, conflict and cooperation. Successful globalization strategies provide comprehensible concrete benefits in the form of opportunities for individual social mobility and collective ingroup social creativity. Thereby they avoid social competition among constituent national ingroups. Effectiveness in defusing national ingroup social competition potential is external context dependent. Brannen’s case study focus was the transference business success at the time of Disneyland Tokyo in comparison with Disneyland Paris. Labor disputes and other obstacles emerged more readily in the latter despite the greater “foreignness” of Japanese culture vis-a-vis the US:

“There is also quantitative support for this difference in degree of foreignness in Geert Hofstede’s national cultural classification indexes: the United States measures 91 on the individualism index, compared to 71 for France and 46 for Japan—the latter a strong collectivist result (Hofstede, 1980: 158). In addition, the United States and France have closer scores on the masculinity index (62 and 43, respectively, versus 93 for Japan). However, despite such cultural proximity and host country experience in France, in the final analysis, Disney was far less successful there than in Japan. Ironically, Mickey loses face in Paris, rather than in Tokyo, where face-saving is a more common cultural issue” [sic] (Brannen, 2004, 594).

Tung and Stahl highlight research findings that culture is a more powerful context-driven factor as a value/motivation determining outcomes “in culturally tighter, as opposed to looser, countries because people would experience more social pressure to act in ways that are consistent with societal values” (2018, 1178, referencing Gelfand, Nishiie and Raver, 2006). The degree of intensity of shared culture is itself a contextual, albeit internal, factor for culture to display itself as an issue in international business. The intensity of shared culture manifests itself via constituent national constituency and national subgroup motivation for collective ingroup self-assertion. Culture, whether tight or loose, emerges as a cause when interaction stimulates leadership to attempt to mobilize resources at the group, organizational, or country/state level. Amidst the Covid-19 pandemic crisis, Gelfand herself notes that context changes behavior to produce collectivist responses in “loose” culture societies, i.e. societies that idealize individualism, like the US:

“In all of the uncertainty, we need to remember that the trajectory of the virus has as much to do with the nature of the coronavirus as it does with culture. Our loose cultural programming needs to do a big switch in the days to come. Across history, tightening in the face of threat helps populations to survive. Our own remarkable unity during World War II shows that we’ve been able to shift from loose to tight. Now we need to do it again with strong leadership from the top. By temporarily sacrificing liberty for stricter rules, we’ll be able to limit the damage from this disease together” [emphasis added] (Gelfand, 2020, para. 11).

Gelfand is commenting upon the relative policy effectiveness of culturally “tight” Singapore and Hong Kong in containing the spread of the virus. Nationalism is by its nature collectivistic in behavior. It may shift in its association with liberal, individualistic or authoritarian, collectivist norms and ideologies. These norms, ideologies and worldviews are products of particular idiosyncratic national societal contexts and histories. Nationalism as a collectivist value to defend the nation significantly defined by culture will tend to supersede individualism in the policy making process during times of perceived national community crisis. In the US case, leadership legitimation of these crisis-era policy outputs will continue to utilize signs/semiotics in the form of idealized archetypical/stereotypical symbols of individualism. Leadership manipulates these symbols to appeal to relevant stakeholders, such as voters. E.g. an egregious divergence between the semiotics of liberalism and actual authoritarian collectivist policy behavior was the US government’s internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Other historical cases include post-Reconstruction multigenerational institutionalization of Jim Crow apartheid under authoritarian, coercive de facto one-party regimes in the American South (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, 124, 143, 204). Postwar civil rights laws enfranchising the marginalized precipitated reactionary political mobilization against consensual norms, e.g. Trumpism (Ibid., 204, 217, 220).

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This study’s focus is on a pattern of behavior which shows itself explicitly in business economic contextual relationships as well as in government policy, i.e. economic nationalism. Culture emerges as an ingroup loyalty focus. I.e. it is a behavior pattern-centered political allegiance to a community whose territorial boundaries are coterminous with a collectively perceived, shared national culture. A community’s culture is national if it has or collectively perceives an opportunity to achieve a sovereign nation-state homeland. The economic nationalist is concerned about economic nationalism, i.e. he or she perceives a challenge to the political influence of the national community via trade and business. MNEs can be vehicles and mediums in which this national community cooperation and conflict can occur.

This conceptualization of collective ingroup behavior implies reliance on the public record to observe this real-world interaction within case studies. Tung and Stahl call for more qualitative methodological studies of culture in international business (2018, 1183). A case study is a qualitative methodological approach to social scientific research (Creswell and Poth, 2018). This perspective on culture portrays it as manifesting

itself in instances of dynamic competitive, cooperative and conflictual idiosyncratic social contextual national intergroup interaction. Analyzing intra-organizational communication involving symbols implies understanding the emotive, affective content of national symbols and their manipulation. The turbulent example of Carlos Ghosn's departure from leadership of the Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi alliance illustrates the emotive potential of national component ingroup self-identity in an MNE.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Conflict involves "misconstrued meanings" (Tung and Stahl, 2018, 1183, quoting Brannen, 2004, 597). This misinterpretation may be conceptualized as the misapprehension of motives and capabilities of a target that implies challenging threat or opportunity to the perceiver/initiator. Misperception of state foreign policy motivation happens repeatedly in international relations. E.g. the basis of London's appeasement strategy towards 1939 Hitler's Germany was misperception of the motivation for the belligerency in Berlin's foreign policy behavior. London's prevailing view saw it as due to the primary value motivation drive of national dignity against perceived national subjugation and humiliation since the 1919 Treaty of Versailles (Trubowitz and Harris, 2015, 306). In fact, the primary German national government foreign policy value motivation was the German collective aspiration to global hegemony under Hitler's leadership. The politically prevailing view in the Berlin of Hitler's Germany misperceived opportunity to exploit the stereotyped, supposed political degeneracy of Germany's adversaries. Nazi Germany strove to exploit this misperceived degeneracy and the consequent opportunity for achieving German global hegemony through its superior collective will and determination (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 258-59).

In sum, appeasement inadvertently confirmed this prevailing view in Berlin espoused by Hitler, thereby further strengthening Hitler politically domestically and making war more probable, not less. Nationalists are more prone to perceive threats and opportunities in the external environment and to stereotype policy targets as the source of these threats and opportunities (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). As Carlos Ghosn, the former CEO and chairman of the Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi alliance learned with his arrest in late 2018, they are also more prone to respond viscerally.

Economic Nationalism in Non-State Actors

The so-called context referenced in Tung and Stahl (2018) includes the dynamic situational circumstances that trigger intense but heretofore latent cultural community allegiance predisposition. This context includes perception of intense challenge from the external environment to the actor, whether individual, group, organization or nation-state. This perception of intense political challenge to the socio-cultural self-identity ingroup of the actor is what causes so-called culture as a group loyalty behavioral focus to become salient. This salience manifests itself in different ways. E.g. one display would be the self-identity community symbol manipulation by the organizational authorities to mobilize human resources including willingness or at least acquiescence to sacrifice. This sacrifice may range in intensity from as low as devoting mental resources to the challenge, to working longer hours, i.e. sacrificing leisure time, to paying substantially more taxes, to risking and giving one's life in the case of war. These myriad contextual factors, as noted above, also include the intensity of shared collective perceptions of common ingroup membership in terms of organizational group identity. If an organizational culture is strong, i.e. by definition employee and staff morale are high, then the organization's leadership will enjoy greater potential management and leadership effectiveness.

An MNE is almost invariably headquartered in one country. Nissan and Renault are MNEs, but clearly the economic nationalism of their respective headquarter states have impacted them strongly. It contributed to Japan's arrest and indictment of Renault-Nissan and Mitsubishi alliance chairman Carlos Ghosn for embezzlement:

“The split between top executives[:] Mr Saikawa's [Hiroto Saikawa, in 2018 CEO of Nissan] laceration of Mr Ghosn's legacy spoke volumes of the soured relations. Outrage and violation were among Mr Saikawa's words. “The problem of governance was significant,” he said. One crucial issue was the lack of trust between Mr Saikawa and Mr Ghosn over the latter's relationship with Emmanuel Macron and the French president's machinations to engineer a merger between Renault and Nissan in which the French company would have the upper hand.”

“Mr Ghosn's arrest prompted an immediate summit between the Japanese and French finance ministers, but the crisis has its roots in an extraordinary show of brinkmanship and economic nationalism three years ago by Mr Macron as economy minister. He tried to increase the French state's 15 per cent stake in Renault and to use a new law to double the government's voting rights. That would have given it control of Renault and therefore of Nissan because of the cross-shareholdings in which Renault owns 43 per cent of Nissan with voting rights and Nissan own[s] 15 per cent of Renault with no voting rights. Mr Macron's ambition was to divert Nissan investment in Europe to France and Renault's underutilised plants. At present, much of this investment goes to Nissan's Sunderland factory, the biggest in the UK, and its European design and R&D centres in London and Bedfordshire. Nissan's counter-attack back in 2015 was led by Mr Saikawa and it became a stand-off in which Mr Saikawa eventually faced down Mr Macron” [sic] (Lea, 2018, para. 6-7).

The London *Times* report above begins noting that Ghosn was charged with fraud by Japanese prosecutors. The evident impetus behind the accusations include critical contextual factors triggering economic nationalism. Ghosn in December 2019 subsequently surreptitiously fled Japan, claiming he hid in an acoustic equipment case, to his Lebanese Maronite Catholic diaspora homeland to avoid a trial. He asserted the trial would not be fair; “[Japanese] [p]rosecutors win 99 percent of their cases” (Dooley and Inoue, 2020, para. 16).

Carlos Ghosn, who holds Brazilian, French and Lebanese passports, was born in Brazil into a Lebanese Maronite Catholic family, part of this entrepreneurial diaspora. “The Maronites who emigrated have maintained their loyalty to Lebanon and to their family members who stayed in the old country. They send money. They pay to construct a house in their ancestral village and visit it from time to time. *The Lebanese Maronites are also loyal to France, which is the result of a long, nearly thousand-year-old history that goes back to the crusades*” [emphasis added] (Ghosn and Ries, 2005, 1-2). The title page of Ghosn's memoir notes that it was first published in France in 2003 and was translated from French into English for the US edition. “The prevalent scholarship on the French colonial period in Lebanon, known as the Mandate (1920-43), stresses Maronite loyalty to the French, and the clergy's conformity to French economic and political plans” (Abisaab, 2014, 293). CEO Ghosn may not have intended to act as a de facto agent of French nationalism. But the behavior of regulators in the nationalistic Japanese polity indicates that they suspected that his motivations were indeed so. Cottam and Cottam note that nationalistic ingroups are prone to perceive hidden conspiratorial agendas among other threatening national ingroups. “[T]he tendency to view crisis situations stereotypically is an integral feature of nationalistic behavior” (2001, 111).

In 2009, Ghosn who was then also chairman of the European Automobile Manufacturers Association, perfunctorily dismissed economic nationalism in responding to journalist's interview question:

“Q. How big a danger is economic nationalism, with some countries supporting their industries at the cost of Europe over all?”

“A. I don't think there is a serious risk of nationalism” (Schwartz, 2009, para. 6-7).

In fiscal year 2012-13, Ghosn was Japan's highest-paid CEO (\$10.1 million), following little change from 2010, placing Ghosn below the top 200 paid US CEOs and the top 20 Canadian CEOs (Salazar and

Raggiunti, 2016, 3). After Ghosn's arrest, the Nissan board of directors soon forced Saikawa and other top Nissan senior executives to resign over remuneration issues including exit packages. "In the past, we [Nissan] didn't have a clear policy on compensation at the end of service," said Keiko Ihara, the director in charge of compensation issues" (McLain, 2020, para. 9). These subsequent events belie public claims that alleged inappropriate use of company expense accounts alone provoked the fierce moves by Japanese prosecutors against Ghosn.

This impact of economic nationalism on MNEs is external but still contextual, i.e. pressure from their respective governments of their nation-states where their headquarters are incorporated. This impact is also contextual but internal, i.e. from the strong ingroup national identity allegiance of significant members of their respective managements and employees. Culture, i.e. ingroup membership, became an intense, salient factor when national organizational ownership and control became an issue, intentionally or unintentionally. I.e. intra-organizational national ingroup social competition spiraled upwards in intensity, provoking economic nationalist behavior both internally and externally. MNEs as means or vehicles for national trade, investment and development opportunities can function as sources of government international diplomatic bargaining leverage towards target states. They provide this leverage to the extent MNEs are perceived by a target government as potentially under the sway of the initiator government, e.g. where an MNE is headquartered (Cottam and Gallucci, 1978, 41). Each MNE is different, but unusual is the MNE that willingly invites the wrath of the government where it is incorporated. The governments of nation-states which have legitimacy among public opinion are comparatively more likely to reflect the nationalist predispositions of their publics. Their publics may include a relatively intense if not always salient predilection towards economic nationalism.

Shaping the global IB context through formal interstate diplomatic negotiations by its nature assumes nationalism to be a legitimate, albeit volatile, motivation for international economic strategy and tactics. Different constituencies within national publics evaluate politically their respective state leaders often by their perceived effectiveness in defending the national interest, however subjectively defined. E.g. observers expect that the US government uses its weighted voting primacy in the International Monetary Fund to promote its policy aims. In international organizations without weighted voting, the US uses its diplomatic bargaining leverage to sway the votes of other states parties. E.g. "[A]n American-backed candidate on Wednesday beat out China's nominee to lead the United Nations organization charged with protecting intellectual property [the World Intellectual Property Organization], a vote that followed weeks of vicious diplomatic sniping between Washington and Beijing" (Bruce, 2020, para. 2).

Peter Navarro, trade adviser to US President Trump, "raised the specter of growing Chinese influence across the United Nations organization. Control of its intellectual property office would have given China power over five of the U.N.'s 15 specialized agencies, Mr. Navarro noted. The four already led by China include the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Industrial Development Organization and the International Telecommunications Union. No other country was in charge of more than one, he said" (Bruce, 2020, para. 17-18). The nationality of an individual CEO of a UN organization does not prove that that national government controls the international organization. Nationalists and nation-states collectively, including US, China, France and Japan, are more prone to perceive external national influence competition in terms of stereotyped threats and opportunities (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 3-4). Ghosn may not have intended to be an agent of French economic nationalism in the Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi case but influential elements among the Japanese authorities perceived him as such. A similar tendency exhibits itself in the international competition for the leadership over purportedly neutral technical UN international organizations.

Lee and Lee assert, "[p]erhaps the oscillation between economic nationalism and global openness is not a phenomenon unique to Korea. It could quite commonly surface in countries with strong traditional values driven and led by a strong state that is in a transitional stage and planning a shift toward a more mature

economy” (2015, 147). The national Brexit and Trump macropolitical phenomena, and the micro-level case of Renault-Nissan, illustrate that nationalism still shapes economic and business behavior in the most mature economies. “For all the talk of the “end of history,” there is as yet little to indicate that economic nationalism and trade and investment protectionism are on the wane” (Jakobsen and Jakobsen, 2011, 72). Values of collectivities regarding culture include group member shared self-identity political self-assertion, i.e. nationalism. The patterns of policy response to these stimuli activating a collective national ingroup reaction constitute attitudes. Attitudes that frame perception create worldviews and beliefs. The articulation of these worldviews may constitute principles and ideologies. The latter may or may not represent the actual values driving an actor but rather serve as self-justificatory rhetorical symbolic tools to affect other, target actors.

These response patterns can change along with the context as groups strive to satisfy needs. I.e. attitudes change, e.g. South Koreans have developed more “assertive” versus “allegiant” citizenship norms as they have become more prosperous as part of a so-called developed society (Welzel and Dalton, 2017). South Koreans collectively remain nationalistic; their reference point for responding to stimuli remains the shared self-identity primary terminal ingroup, i.e. Korea, to protect and promote its influence. Economic nationalism refers to a behavioral tendency to evaluate and formulate economic policy in terms of defending and promoting the influence of the sovereign state of a national ingroup/nation-state.

A focus on culture implies a concentration on how culture shapes the organization’s policy making process. Culture affects individual decision makers in terms of their role in the policy making process. Culture manifests in terms of implementation and legitimation effectiveness within the organization, e.g. organizational morale, i.e. an organizational-level factor of analysis. It also shapes organizational behavior via the policy making dynamics towards other organizations, including governments and competitors. Culture affects organizational behavior in the form of official and unofficial policy. A perspective on culture as an aggregation of individual personality traits risks the ecological fallacy in terms of attempting to explain international business. Culture here is conceptualized as a value motivation in part because economic profit is also a value motivation. Tung and Stahl themselves note that culture’s practical effect in terms of the subdomains of international business appears to be “weak in practical terms” (2018, 117). It is weak because business’ overwhelmingly typical value motivation is profit gain. In certain contexts, intentional or otherwise, culture as a value motivation emerges and can supersede this material profit organizational motivation. “EN [economic nationalism] concerns the preservation of individual economic well-being through safeguarding national economic autonomy and security” (Lee, Lee and Lee, 2014, 1152).

Behaviorally, economic nationalists will sacrifice immediate material profit to defend national sovereignty and security in a crisis. I.e. the longer-term well-being and identity of the nation is perceived as under challenge. Observers become concerned with culture as a factor that shapes effectiveness in competition to generate profit. When culture, and specifically culture conflict, becomes a perceived behavioral obstacle to organizational achievement of profit goals, then observers are particularly interested in it. Culture conflict emerges between individuals, units, organizations and states under particular contextual factors. The case of Carlos Ghosn implies that it is not weak in practical terms in this case. It illustrates culture’s impact in part because of the organizational setbacks Nissan and Renault now face as corporate actors that must maximize profits and market share in a highly competitive global industry. “The pandemic has hit the allied auto makers at a time when they were already struggling. The arrest in Japan of former alliance leader Carlos Ghosn in November 2018 set off more than a year of management turmoil, and Nissan had seen sales fall sharply in the U.S., its most important market” (McLain and Kostov, 2020, para. 6). As of this writing, the French and Japanese authorities evidently have concluded that national economic interests require that the Renault-Nissan partnership continue. The pandemic poses new challenges for overcoming the legacy of this disruptive social competition.

National Cultural Comparisons

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner begin by noting that their text “is about cultural differences and how they affect the process of doing business and managing” (2012, 1). They emphasize that it “is not about how to understand the people of different nationalities” (2012, 1-2). The coauthors underscore in their discussion in “culture directs our actions” that culture forms the roots of action, yet it is beneath awareness in the sense that actors tend not to articulate it (2012, 32). The coauthors articulate cultural differences in terms of facilitating intra-organizational cultural intergroup communication. Conceptualization of difference is necessary to be able to incorporate cultural diversity as managers. Until cultural differences are formulated, they remain uncontrollable, unmanageable factors, serving as triggers for intraorganizational polarization and consequent dysfunctionality.

The coauthors entitle a chapter subheading, “Culture is the Way in Which People Solve Problems” referencing Hofstede (1980): “*Culture is the way in which a group of people solves problems and reconciles dilemmas*” [emphasis in original] (2012, 8). I.e. culture consists of a national community’s system of moral and ethical norms, implicit and explicit, represented and enforced by the authorities, e.g. the state in the form of government. Community members are prone to respond emotively if the existence of this system is perceived as under intense threat or as confronting a marvelous opportunity to expand its influence. The problems to which community members apply moral and ethical norm systems reflect the drives to satisfy needs. Safety, security, love, self-esteem and self-actualization are Maslowian needs that actors seek to realize in a social context. These actors’ perceived conformity with prevailing cultural norms, i.e. moral and ethical norms, in striving to satisfy their needs significantly affects their ability to do so. The nation is a cultural community with which social actors display a primary, terminal self-identity allegiance. This collectivity has this status because it is the community with the greatest resources, symbolic and material, available for utilization by ingroup members to assuage these needs.

If a national community formally organizes itself as a sovereign actor, then it becomes a nation-state. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner note that these individual values/needs include values such as “upward mobility,” “the more, the better,” status and material success. The deeper the norms and values (see figure 1 below), the more challenging they are to identify because the members of the community may only be semi-aware of them and tend not to explicitly examine them (2012, 9-10). They are cognizant that their respective national cultures and resources differ and may be in conflict with each other in the competition for more resources. When the influence of the nation appears to be under challenge, then aggregated internal constituency needs manifest themselves in the collective external/foreign policy value/drive of nationalism.

Theories of cultural differences that are interpretable by leader practitioners are more likely to have a strategic impact on social reality. A theme of Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner is that cultures are mutually comprehensible to a significant degree through their cultural dimensions framework. E.g. American culture idealizes the normative notion that actor social status depends exclusively upon individual performance and achievement. Age, family background, race, religion and other ascriptive factors are supposedly not important and should not be. All national cultural communities including the US have aspects of ascription in their social status dynamics. E.g. a degree from an American university with a famous pedigree provides ascriptive status and entering one often does not depend only upon the individual applicant’s academic performance (“End the College,” 2019). I.e. American managers can empathize to a significant degree regarding ascription’s heightened importance in Europe and Asia.

Asian cultural communities note the importance of individual performance and choice in changing societal status. In Confucian South Korea, the “democratic experience has weakened individuals’ attachment to social hierarchy and rule by morality, but group primacy and social harmony remain strongly held principles among the citizens” (Choi and Woo, 2018, 505). Through the application of their model, in conjunction with a willingness to empathize, the Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner theoretical framework facilitates

intercultural communication, making it more feasible. The aim is to avoid “misconstrued meanings” that generate conflict (Tung and Stahl, 2018, 1183, quoting Brannen, 2004, 597). Suspicious misperception may emerge of the ultimate intent of the other being the competitive influence aggrandizement of the other’s national ingroup at the expense of the perceiver’s national ingroup. Such an outcome is a particularly pathological misconstrued meaning within an MNE.


Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner affirm that common ways of processing information are a necessity for cooperative social interaction, i.e. effective communication, to occur. The existence of mutual expectations is “an absolute condition for meaningful interaction in business and management” (2012, 27). MNE organizational management has to construct institutionally these common ways of processing information in a multicultural setting. Management incentivizes, materially and normatively, multicultural organizational constituents to constitute the organization’s system of meanings, i.e. a memetic ecology. Creating an integrative organizational culture is synonymous with generating common beliefs. An indicator of success in promoting an integrative organizational culture is high organizational morale. Avoiding a spiral of intra-organizational national subgroup polarization due to a negative feedback loop of suspicion and misconstrued meanings is necessary if not sufficient to create this morale.

“[B]asic assumptions - implicit” (figure 1 below), i.e. where a national culture is placed on seven cultural orientation dimensions (outlined below), are deep behavioral choice orientation patterns. As an organized community, these “basic assumptions – implicit” are the foundation for creating a system of “norms and values,” i.e. culture: “the way in which a group of peoples solves problems and reconciles dilemmas” (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2012, 8). These norms and values are assumed to be right and wrong ways of behavior, i.e. systems of moral and ethical norms and the emotions that associate with them. In order to discuss and analyze these “basic assumptions - implicit,” a theoretical framework is necessary to conceptualize them. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner aim is to highlight systematically and comparatively the challenges of managing effectively a multicultural, multinational organizational unit. They endeavor to do so in a framework that assists managers to communicate more effectively with staff, i.e. to be aware of different cultural assumptions of what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior. The manager is thus better equipped to communicate with the desired outcome to motivate the staff more effectively. The framework aims to avoid misconstruing meanings that provoke nationalist umbrage and humiliation, leading to MNE national constituency subgroup polarization and organizational dysfunction.

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner present a theoretical framework that reflects the existence and functioning of psycho-social processes at different levels of analysis of the individual and group as indicated in Figure 1.

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner present these “basic assumptions - implicit” in a model consisting of seven cultural dimensional continua along which different national cultures can be comparatively placed: 1) “universalism versus particularism,” i.e. assumptions regarding the primacy of universal rules vs. personal obligations in social interaction; 2) “individualism versus communitarianism,” i.e. assumptions regarding the focus on the desires of the individual vs. the needs of the group; 3) “neutral versus affective,” i.e. assumptions regarding the function of emotional display in professional settings; 4) “specific versus diffuse,” i.e. assumptions regarding the delimitation of professional vs. personal relationship boundaries; 5) “achievement versus ascription,” i.e. assumptions regarding the role of individual achievement vs. social pedigree in determining individual social status; 6) “attitudes with regard to time,” i.e. assumptions of sequential vs. synchronic notions of temporality; 7) “attitudes with regard to the environment,” i.e. assumptions regarding internal individual vs. external environmental notions of locus of control (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2012, 10-12). The first five focus on social relationships.

Figure 1: “A Model of Culture”



Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner present a framework for conceptualizing culture in a form that permits articulating national cultural differences to facilitate integrating them by an organization’s leadership. Cultural differences consist of distinctions in prevailing community behavioral orientations towards other members and to external reality, what they label as “basic assumptions, implicit.” Among “norms and values” the former refers to behavioral obligations, and the latter refers to the emotion/affect that associates with them. “Artifacts and products, explicit” refer to the explicit manifestations of culture, including language, behavioral mannerisms, and aesthetics. Their use of the term “value” overlaps the definition utilized in this study, i.e. values as needs/motivations (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 2012, 29).

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner make these “basic assumptions - implicit” differences explicit and relevant from an MNE organizational management perspective by articulating them via this model. These cultural features translate into normatively positive and negative assessments of proper behavior and the affective emotions that associate with them, i.e. “norms and values” (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 2012, 29, see Figure 1). E.g. in diffuse and communitarian cultures, publicly criticizing a colleague is more likely to be viewed as a graver affair than in mechanistic, individualist cultures. These norms can be articulated, e.g. they can be formalized as law, or in another context as company policy. When they remain informal, they serve a social control function as an actor’s conscience. They may be romanticized while being articulated to become symbolic ideals. Leadership may seek to manipulate them as semiotics and signs in the organizational policy making process.

Again, Trompenaars has stated elsewhere, “Norms are shared orientations of what we define as what we should do. Values are what we like to do. Basic assumptions are values that have become norms” (“Dr Fons Trompenaars on Culture” [sic] 2009, ~0:43-49). In a social context, individual and group actors strive to satisfy Maslowian needs, and they interactively respond to challenges to their fulfillment utilizing behavioral “basic assumptions - implicit.” They are more likely to generate the responses they desire or expect if they share the same set of “basic assumptions – implicit” but they may not in a multicultural/multinational context. They may “like” to interact preferably with those who share these “basic assumptions – implicit.” They may “like” to defend or advance this national ingroup in response to perceived threats or opportunities stereotypically perceived as emanating from other national outgroups. One of the prevalent values of *homo sapiens* particularly at the collective level, is to “like” to defend and expand the security and status of shared, large, intensely held, self-identity communities, i.e. nations (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Actors “like” to act in this way while also prone to perceive a significant challenge, i.e. threat or opportunity, regarding the influence of these communities, i.e. their respective

nations. A common norm is that one should be loyal to their nation and betraying this nation in the form of subverting the sovereignty of the state governing it is treason and traitors are wicked.

The mutual sense a group has of what is “right” and “wrong” constitutes the systems of societal moral and ethical norms. They may develop on a formal level, i.e. as laws. They may develop on an informal level as “social control” (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2012, 30). I.e. this informal form of social control is known as one’s so-called conscience: normative control. Collective values are motivations deriving from changing and evolving constituent actor compulsion responses to Maslowian needs within a national community embedded in the global context. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner note that when the norms reflect the values of a national group, then the organizational control system is relatively stable. A destabilizing tension likely will emerge when norms do not reflect changing values. Disintegration of the control system is increasing likely to result. E.g. the norms of Soviet-imposed postwar coercive Stalinist Communism were discordant with the values of society in eastern Europe for years. The discrepancy intensified along with growing economic dysfunction (2012, 30). Political community identity values derive from a community’s romantic, idealized worldview of a salient and intensely held shared membership in a self-identity ingroup, particularly national identity. Once Soviet coercive intervention to enforce them was ruled-out, the already weakened Communist regimes collapsed due to popular political participation expressing national sovereignty value demands.

Stereotyping and Polarization in Non-State Actors

In particular contexts, collective affect can drive collective national ingroup behavior against perceived threats to influence status, overriding short term material self-interest values. A nationalistic value is conceptualized here as a behavior pattern manifesting a thrust to achieve a desired collective future that addresses a perceived intense challenge to the influence of the national ingroup. Nationalistic subgroups are more prone to perceive challenges to their influence position in an MNE. A managerial aim is to avoid inadvertent miscommunication by the organizational leadership. It risks triggering MNE national subgroup collective perception of challenge to the influence rank of their national ingroup with which they intensely self-identify. The observer, analyst or manager can communicate about national differences in norms and values through their rhetorical articulation. E.g. an ideal American is self-reliant is a romanticized stereotype of self. It is an over-simplification, but it still is a sign/semiotic/meme defining the self vs. other about which the manager should know in order to avoid inadvertently communicating insult and humiliation. These signs/semiotics/memes include loyalty and defense of the nation, i.e. the self-defined ingroup cultural community. If a manager offends a staff member through appearing to denigrate their cultural values, then the emotional hostility emerges due to perceived threat and humiliation.


A manager’s inadvertent offense is magnified because he or she is perceived as prejudiced while having control over staff employment and career prospects. Who a person is, is typically very much determined by their sense of membership in a shared cultural community of fate. I.e. it is a large, national cultural community that the modal citizen believes the members of which share a common past and therefore expect to have a common future. They demonstrate this identity value through their behavioral predisposition showing a preoccupation with its level of influence in the social environment. This culture includes a system of norms, i.e. prescriptions for right and wrong behavior (morals) and systems for resolving moral dilemmas regarding social behavioral choices (ethics) (Cooper, 2012). These norms and their idealizations and the romantic, symbolic stereotyping of them associate with intense emotions among ingroup members who seek influence to defend and assert them. They do so in different contexts, including in an MNE in unfortunate situations in which national polarizations have emerged due to ineffective leadership to prevent it.

The seven behavioral orientation continua of the Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner framework focuses upon comparing national societal cultural predispositions that national ingroup members may share. Their

organizational management leadership policy prescriptions in effect concentrate upon creating social creativity opportunities to integrate national subgroup collectivities of staff within an MNE. The aim is to communicate and integrate without inadvertently confusing and offending different national staff subgroups. Providing individual social mobility opportunities is necessary but not sufficient for effective MNE strategic management. The problems for organizational management become exponentially more acute when a subgroup comes to perceive/suspect that a manager is prejudiced and biased against the national subgroup. Individuals and aggregates who share strong nationalist predispositions are more prone to perceive such slights, whether intended or not. The form of this stereotyping inclines towards suspicion that the organizational leadership has its own nationalist agenda for its own national self-identity community, which it of course attempts to obscure. The result is more intense ingroup vs. outgroup social competition behavior, i.e. nationalist polarization, which interactively intensifies. It obstructs communication and leadership, leading to greatly weakened organizational leadership and effectiveness.

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner affirm that a wide range exists among individual cultural personality traits within each culture, but this range has a pattern around an average. The variation around the modal norm can be seen as a normal distribution. Depending on the limits the observer wants to impose on each side of the distribution, the observer decides how to distinguish between one culture and another. E.g. US and French culture can have many similarities as well as differences. Typically, more noticed will be the differences, which organizational constituent participant observers label the typical culture of these two countries despite sharing many similarities as shown in Figure 2.


Figure 2: “Culture as Normal Distribution”



National identities through creation of state boundaries by their nature exaggerate differences between communities and individuals and reinforce overstated notions of cultural difference (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2012, 33). Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner emphasize that among their seven cultural dimension continua each national cultural society contains elements of both end points, while simultaneously romanticizing certain elements. E.g. the ideal-typical image of the American as rugged individualist is romanticized in the Western cowboy archetype, but so also is the soldier serving in the hierarchical American military. Effective MNE management preemptively avoids intraorganizational stereotyping among national subgroups via ethical training among MNE staff to avoid miscommunication.

Members of cultures with norms that differ significantly tend to describe each other in “terms of extremes” (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2012, 34). I.e. they tend to see each other stereotypically as indicated in Figure 3.

Figure 3: “Culture and Stereotyping”



National cultural differences tend to be exaggerated and used in caricatures/stereotyping of the challenging other (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2012, 34). National ingroups are more prone collectively to display prevailing views of perceived challengers to ingroup influence. They are more likely to perceive these challenges in stereotypical terms that associate with more intense affect/emotion. Stereotypes as simplifications refer to perceptions of behavioral patterns of the other that lead to prejudice and bias towards the outgroup and its individual members. These stereotypes emerge in the midst of perceived national group competition over extended historical periods that become institutionalized within the national ingroup in defining self vs. other. Awareness of ineluctable interdependency undermines stereotyping.

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner do not explain why observers tend to “notice” differences rather than similarities. Cottam and Cottam (2001) complement Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2012) by suggesting that people have a genetic tendency to form ingroups, and therefore outgroups as well. They tend to delineate these group boundaries in terms of prevailing perceived ingroup characteristics that differentiate the ingroup versus outgroups. The stronger the intensity of prevailing shared self-identification with the ingroup, the greater the tendency to perceive these cultural differences in simplified, i.e. stereotypical, and emotive terms. These patterns in stereotyping in response to a perceived challenge are regular and predictable in terms of the conditions that produce these collective perceptual and behavioral tendencies. On the basis of how the governing apparatus of the ingroup forms a stereotypical image of the perceived source of challenge, i.e. how it understands the challenge, it displays a behavioral pattern thrust. I.e. it acts through formal and informal policy patterns (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 87-122).

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner only note that “stereotyping” occurs because people tend to notice differences rather than sameness. People tend to equate something different with something wrong. “If their way differs from our way, then their way must not be correct.” In each cultural system, individual personality mediates (2012, 34). Nationalistic ingroups, i.e. the modal members share a primary-level intensity self-identification with the same nation, are comparatively more prone to engage in this stereotyping during times of crisis. In other contexts, more complex motivations and concomitant diversity and complexity in perceptions of relevant actors external to the ingroup will predominate, e.g. exploiting trade opportunities (Cottam, 1977, 61).

A PATH FORWARD

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner state that conscious and subconscious norms give actors a feeling of “this is how I normally *should* behave.” They write also that values give the individual or group a “feeling” of “this is how I *aspire* or *desire* to behave.” To determine a collective organizational strategic policy direction from collectively perceived alternatives, values and norms serve as dynamic collective organizational process characteristics. A drive that an individual or group has towards an end state regarding “the desirable” is a value [emphasis in the original] (2012, 30).

No single value will be driving the organizational collective. Different constituencies with differing degrees of influence in the dynamic policy making process within the organization tend to be carriers of different motivations. Organizational behavior will reflect a compound of motivations as the incremental policy making process functionally seeks politically to reconcile them. These values include economic profit values. They also include various government sectoral bureaucratic vested interest influence drives, leadership power maintenance, and even ideological, cultural and religious messianism. Nationalist influence concerns, of varying degrees of relative influence, as well public participation excitement, are communal values (Cottam, 1977, 31-53). Nationalist organizational behavior will tend to rise in intensity and influence during times, as noted, of organizational crisis, including engagement in stereotyping according to identifiable patterns (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 111). One of the functions of effective management is to avoid organizational crises. Otherwise effective management may fail due to so-called acts of God/force majeure, e.g. the Covid-19 pandemic. Management is inevitably challenged by the unforeseen calamity and still decides how to respond from among alternatives perceived as feasible (Mcneil, 2020).

Cultural value ideal memes/archetypes/stereotypes may become evident when leadership rhetorically articulates them. They are part of normative active appeals in the context of conflictual competition with a target perceived as a source of challenge to the ingroup. Effective leadership crisis appeals generate public active support. The mass public in a nation-state is more prone to respond emotively to these nationalistic meme/stereotype/semiotic appeals by representative authorities. Moral norms and ethics relate to prescribed action, and in normative active appeals, this prescription is often justified rhetorically in terms of the well-being of the nation. National ingroup political polarization may build due to a perceived divergence between actual collective ingroup values, articulated cultural value ideals and actually enforced group norms. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner note, e.g., the people in one culture may agree with the articulated national cultural value ideal towards which to strive: "Hard work is essential to a prosperous society." The group may enforce the actual behavioral norm, "Do not work harder than the other members of the group, because then we would all be expected to do more and would end up worse off." The tension may be between an articulated value ideal and a habitual behavioral norm (2012, 30). This hypothetical example may describe one element of the decay and disintegration of the Soviet-imposed, Communist regimes in eastern Europe.

Prevailing moral and ethical norms evolve as values/needs/drives of the organizational constituent components change albeit in a fractious, evolving, dynamic and polarizing social landscape. Tension between habitual, traditional practice and emerging, globalization-driven norms may push leaders to adopt new, formal norms, e.g. modern international human rights law. The rise of the early mass print media international reporting on the eternal horrors of warfare began with the mid-Nineteenth century Crimean War (1853-56), "the first full-blown media war" (Duncan, 2010, 929). The subsequent Martens Clause emerged at the 1899 Hague Convention regulating warfare. It puts the "laws of humanity" and the "dictates of public conscience" on the same footing as the "usage of States," i.e. actual state practice, as historical sources of "principles of international law" (Cassese, 2005, 160-61). These relatively recent transnational ethical norms are embodied in international regulations with weak enforcement mechanisms. Subsequent events repeatedly illustrated that nationalistic values are prone to override such individual human rights protections. I.e. the mass public is nationalistic and responds collectively to stereotyping of the other. These individual-focused human rights to protect the person from abuse by nation-state agents are more likely to be marginalized during a national crisis, e.g. war.

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner maintain that for a group's cultural heritage to develop and elaborate, shared "meanings" of behavioral norms and cultural values are necessary. Consciously or subconsciously, different groups of people have chosen different definitions of good or bad, right or wrong (2012, 30). These systems of norms and values develop in parochial, traditional society and tend to be habitually and unconsciously accepted. The modern era is defined in part by the rise of mass political participation

demands as a new norm reflecting in part the community growth of the value/drive of nationalism. If values increasingly appear to conflict with prevailing, imposed moral and ethical norms, legal or otherwise, then the potential for societal norm rupture and revolutionary change increases.

Authorities, i.e. those who articulate and enforce the prevailing norms system, may attempt to adapt to these dynamic trends of changing values and norms to stabilize their regime of control over the public. If they fail, then they may be replaced by counter-elites, e.g. Trump. Globalization encourages this discrepancy between emerging behavioral norms and by now traditional values, e.g. the sovereign nation-state reflecting the formally or informally legitimated dominance of an ethnic group. Transnational globalization materially incentivizing norms of diversity accommodation confront mass conservative populist reactions: e.g. Brexit, i.e. the England-centered UK polity should be sovereign as an informal value vs. Britain must allow free movement of labor as an EU norm; e.g. Trump's election, i.e. the US is a majority Caucasian Judeo-Christian polity as a widely shared, informal value vs. the US should enforce substantive civil rights equality for women, LGBTQ people, minorities and all immigrants as global human rights norms.

In the post-Cold War era, "conflict emerging from competing identity community aspirations and conflict based on economic issues will likely be translated in terms of stereotypical representations of various actors. In such an event, strategic responses surely will be far less concerned with avoiding violence in the resolution of conflict than in dealing forcefully with a perceived threat or opportunity" (Cottam, 1994, 167). Organizational leadership confronts the challenge of reconciling this growing divergence between prevailing societal nationalistic values and globalization interdependency norms. The difficulty in doing so effectively in the liberal democratic policy making process contributes to creating opportunities for political entrepreneurs. Counter-elites exploiting traditional nationalistic value and norm ideals can gain more mass political support. This American nationalist conservative reactionary populist constituent hostility and rejection is the core of the Trump phenomenon. The political appeal limitations of the Sanders 2020 presidential campaign illustrate the narrower attraction of populist democratic socialism in the US.

The reconstruction of the neo-corporatist welfare state in the wake of the vast, extended, global economic disruption due to the Covid-19 pandemic is underway. "'We went to bed as America and woke up the next morning looking like social democratic Europe," Erik Gordon, professor at the Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan, said. "We've made fun of Europe propping up their failing steel companies and car companies, and when push comes to shove we're going to outdo them'" (Tankersley *et al.*, 2020, para. 6). Reconciling nationalistic values with globalization interdependency norms implies legitimation of norm change utilizing nationalist value identity ideal symbols/memes as part of transformational leadership. National meme recombination can aim to legitimate the creation and distribution of substantive societal capacities to engage in individual social mobility and group social creativity. To the extent effective across traditional societal polarization fault lines, the authorities avoid ingroup vs. outgroup social competition.

One the one hand, Brexit and the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic crisis offer threats and opportunities to building new social mobility and creativity opportunities via Europeanization (Brattberg, Brudzińska and de Lima, 2020). On the other hand, nationalism threatens an ineluctably interdependent global polity as the US and Chinese nation-state authorities seek to bolster their public legitimacy amidst the pandemic's consequences. They mobilize their respective publics against the other by intensifying respective public threat perception. The US 2020 election may decide whether the US focuses on containing "Communist China" as "the single greatest threat to American security" for allegedly engaging in "imperialism" (Hawley, 2020, para. 9, 13, 14). Another US senator calls for "re-shoring" manufacturing operations from China to the US concomitantly with adoption of a US "industrial policy" (Rubio, 2020, para. 18, 1).

Corporatist intervention may interact with the Black Lives Matter social movement resurgence to create opportunities for social integration in the midst of perceived indirect social competition with China. The Chinese authorities have called attention to the 2020 BLM protests to counter American condemnations of

Beijing's escalating suppression of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. Beijing highlights deep American racial polarization (Hua, 2020). The two nuclear superpowers' respective condemnations of each other's internal human rights conditions are reminiscent of Soviet and American rejoinders amidst the Cold War. "Criticism of American racism formed such an important part of Soviet propaganda that the phrase "And you hang Negroes" was widely used in the Soviet era as an official retort to the West's Cold War claims of moral superiority" [*sic*] (Higgins, 2020, para.16). Some prominent African American intellectuals commented approvingly on the 1930s Soviet system in contrast to Jim Crow in the US (Ibid.). This indirect social competition in the nuclear setting instigated the space race between the US and the Soviet Union. China and the US compete to be the first to deploy a vaccine against the SARS-CoV-2 virus. "The nationalistic competition between Washington and Beijing to develop a vaccine first has begun to resemble the space race between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War" (Haltiwanger, 2020, para. 16).

This corporatist redeployment for economic autarky would conflict with the intra-bloc trade liberalism of the US-led postwar international alliance configuration that lasted until the USSR disintegrated. China became a de facto US ally in containment of the USSR in the late 1970s. China utilized this Cold War US-anchored global liberal political economic regime for its own economic development (Lampton, D.M., 2019, 46). The hostility of American conservative populist nationalism to intra-bloc economic liberalism makes a return to Cold War era-type US trade, aid and immigration policies less likely. "Climate-change denial" is embedded in the Trump-dominated US Republican party (Rosenberg and Rutenberg, 2020, para. 19). The pandemic-induced severe economic downturn is likely to mobilize Republican resistance to US worldwide climate adaptation and development trade and aid to the Global South (Friedman, L., 2020). It creates opportunities for China's one-party authoritarian corporatist development model to intervene in the so-called developing world via cooperation to address the latter's intensifying crisis development challenges (DeDominicis, 2019).

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The goal of this paper has been to illustrate the impact of nationalism as a value motivation with a foundation in nation-states on the behavior and management of multinational enterprises. The analysis engaged in a critical dialogue with some of the latest scholarly literature surveys of the state of the field of research on the relationship of culture to international business. It illustrated the insights achievable from conceptualizing culture as national loyalty community boundary delineators around which ingroup members tend to rally during organizational crises. It applied a theoretical framework conceptualization of nationalism drawing from political psychology to illustrate these dynamics and their policy-relevant consequences (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Methodologically, this analysis illustrated its points with selected case study references as reported in the public record. This qualitative methodological approach is appropriate because of the collective nature of nationalist behavior reflecting idiosyncratic national histories and contexts. Economic nationalism manifests itself in the public sphere through its impact on the organizational policy process as revealed in multinational organizational crisis case studies.

The paper illustrated the contributions that a political psychological conceptualization of nationalism can offer in developing highlighted issues in the analysis of culture in international business. The primary findings of the analysis included that intra-organizational polarization along national identity fault lines in multinational enterprises demonstrate predictable patterns. These configurations in collective national ingroup perception and behavior depend upon national ingroup internal as well as dynamic external contextual factors. The organization constitutes part of the external environment. I.e. national subgroups within a multinational enterprise may engage in social competition due to perceived challenge to national ingroup status prerogatives. States are vast, complex organizations, and nation-states differ from multinational and multiethnic states in that nation-states are more prone to engage in predictable perceptual stereotype patterns. Nation-state politics are more likely to exhibit intense affect associating with these perceived stereotyped sources of challenge. Their component constituencies are collectively more willing

to sacrifice material profit in order to defend and expand the sovereignty of the nation-state. They are concomitantly more predisposed to view MNEs headquartered in the nation-state as tools for increasing the sovereign authority and competitive influence capability of the nation-state.

The strategic policy recommendations of this study's findings imply that the European Union can play a balancing role as a non-nation-state, confederal, multinational international actor. The international political economic system has been dominated by nation-states, namely the US, China and Japan, along with a recovering Russia and mid-range European nation state powers. The political potential for crisis escalatory international conflict is great and difficult to manage amidst such actors. Nationalist value collective behavioral choice patterns intensify in the midst of rapid societal change. The European Union as a multinational economic superpower can strive to play a mediating role between the nation-state superpowers by mobilizing their business partner allies in these nation-states. The EU is less prone to be perceived as a source of nationalistic imperial threat in Moscow, Washington and Beijing because it is not itself a nation-state or controlled by any one nation state. While traditionally allied with the US via NATO, the EU will need to partner with Beijing to meet the intensifying global challenge of anthropogenic climate change.

The limitations of this paper center on its lack of analysis on the content of the lobbying efforts of the vast vested economic interests in global trade and commerce. During periods of perceived intensifying national crisis polarization, populism can override these interests, leading to Brexit as well as Trump's election. These nationalistic episodes themselves may be comparatively brief, while the ineluctability of global interdependence continually deepens. E.g. the substantive meaning of Brexit for the UK in its relation to the EU are unclear; the EU will remain by far the UK's biggest trading partner. Much of reactionary nationalist populism appears to be focused on immediate symbolic payoffs and short-term disruptions rather than long-term global decoupling. MNE case studies highlighting reconciliation of national ingroup recognition political pressures with international interdependency social creativity opportunities would be fruitful. Future research foci include US government intervention in its economy to securitize national sustainable development. Globally, corporatist public private partnerships in established industries as well as in biotech and other sunrise sectors increasingly characterize capitalism. It is a trend that is particularly likely if the pandemic public health global emergency in effect institutionalizes public health as a stark national security issue. The legitimization of US corporatist intervention in society evidently relies primarily on securitization of this intervention which politically incentivizes identifying a new Cold War-type adversary, e.g. China.

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