IMPLICATIONS OF EUROPEAN TRADING FOR THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE OPEN

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ABSTRACT

We test the hypothesis that a market maker in New York faces a more competitive market for cross-listed European firms trading simultaneously in their home market during overlapping trading hours as compared to U.S. firms which trade mainly in New York. A sample of seventy two European firms is matched with a control group of U.S. firms, under the same industry and with same liquidity. We find that the mean percentage bid-ask spread for the European firms is significantly smaller than that of the U.S. firms for the opening thirty minutes of trading at the NYSE, even after controlling for liquidity and probability of informed trading. When we compare the percentage bid-ask spreads during the NYSE afternoon after the European markets have closed trading, we find no significant difference. This suggests that the U.S. and the European markets are integrated during the period of overlap and synergies exist between trading venues.

INTRODUCTION

As of January 27th, 2005 there were 195 companies from 20 different European countries cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Most of these European firms cross-list their shares on the NYSE in the form of American Depository Receipts (henceforth ADR). ADR is a derivative instruments backed by home-market ordinary shares. The trend of cross-listing and cross-trading across different equity markets has precipitated a vast body of financial research. The key motivation of most of these studies has been to try and answer the big question: Are the global equity markets integrated or is there evidence of market segmentation? A highly referenced paper in this area has been that of Werner and Kleidon (1996) where they compare a set of U.K. firms cross-listed in the U.S. and a control group of U.K. firms which are not cross-listed in the U.S. Using intraday data they find that, qualitatively, the cross-listed firms do not differ from the locally traded firms in terms of the intraday U shaped price volatility curve- a result one would expect if the markets are segmented.

This result prompted a host of papers amongst which is the one by Lowengrub and Melvin (2000). They use intraday data on a set of German firms and examine the issue of intraday volatility along with volume in a time series setting both before and after the listing date on the U.S. market and find that intraday volatility and volume curves flatten after cross-listing. They conclude that this evidence is consistent with an integrated global trading environment rather than two segmented markets. Eun and Sabherwal (2003) look at the price discovery of Canadian firms on the Toronto Stock Exchange and U.S. exchanges and find that price adjustments due to cross-market information flows take place not only on the U.S. exchange but also on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Grammig, Melvin and Schlag (2004) examine the period of overlap between New York and Germany and find that price discovery for German firms largely occurs in Frankfurt trading. Howe and Ragan (2002) show that the opening volatility of ADRs is lower when the trading of the underlying asset overlaps with the trading of the ADR on the NYSE. In a recent working paper, Moulton and Wei (2004) find that for European firms listed on the NYSE, specialist behavior changes over the day depending upon whether European markets are open or not.

The main idea of this paper is the following. We know that there are many European firms cross-listed as ADRs on the NYSE. When trading opens in New York, for almost two hours there is trading going on

simultaneously in the European markets and the NYSE. Table 1 exhibits the trading hour overlap between NYSE and the fifteen major European stock markets.

Country	Exchange	Hours	Time ahead of New York	Overlap
Austria	Vienna Stock Exchange	8:30am-5:45pm	6 hrs	2 hrs 15 minutes
Belgium	Euronext Brussels	9 am-5:25 pm	6 hrs	1 hr 55 minutes
Denmark	Copenhagen Stock Exchange	9 am-5 pm	6 hrs	1 hr 30 minutes
Finland	HEX Helsinki	10am-6pm	7 hrs	1 hr 30 minutes
France	Euronext Paris	9 am-5:25 pm	6 hrs	1 hr 55 minutes
Germany	Frankfurt Stock Exchange	9am-8pm	6hrs	4 hrs 30 minutes
Ireland	Irish Stock Exchange	8am-4:30pm	5hrs	2hrs
Italy	Borse Italiana	10am-5:40pm	6 hrs	2 hrs 10 mins
Netherlands	Euronext Amsterdam	9 am-5:25 pm	6 hrs	1 hr 55 minutes
Norway	Oslo Bourse	9am-5pm	6hrs	1hr 30 mins
Portugal	Euronext Lisbon	9 am-5:25 pm	6 hrs	1 hr 55 minutes
Spain	Barcelona Stock Exchange	8:30am-5:45pm	6hrs	2hr 15 mins
Sweden	Stockholm Bourse	9:30am-5:30pm	6hrs	2hrs
Switzerland	Swiss Exchange	9am-5:30pm	6hrs	2hrs
United Kingdom	London Stock Exchange	8am-4:30pm	5hrs	2hrs

 Table 1: List of European Stock Exchanges

So there is a substitute market open for these European stocks in Europe. Now this story should be true for comparable US stocks too (by comparable we mean stocks in same industry with same liquidity). But empirically, we find that US stocks have a clear home bias in terms of trading. US stocks mainly trade at home even thought equal opportunities exist for a European trading. One possible implication, as far as the NYSE market maker (who is dealing with both these stocks) is concerned, is that he faces a more competitive market for the European stocks than the U.S. stocks because of this issue of multimarket trading. The market power of the market maker should, therefore, be reduced for the European firms as compared to the matched U.S. firms. One measure of market power of the market maker in financial markets is the bid-ask spread. So using the simple theoretical background of monopoly versus multimarket trading, we can hypothesize that European stocks will trade at a smaller bid-ask spread than the matched US stocks when markets in the two continents overlap. When trading stops in Europe both sets of stocks should behave same and this difference in bid-ask spread should vanish. We test this theoretical implication. To do that, a sample of seventy two heavily traded European firms is collected and matched with a group of U.S. firms on the basis of industry and liquidity. Table 2 documents the sample of U.S and European firms used in this study.

We then study the high frequency bid and ask quotes for two time periods: the first thirty minutes of trading, from 9:30-10 am, when the trading hours in the NYSE and the European markets overlap and from 2:30-3 pm when only the NYSE is trading and all the European markets have closed. We use high frequency tick-by-tick data from the TAQ (Trade and Quote) database and three months of data from September-November, 2000 and compare the percentage bid-ask spreads between the European and the U.S. firms. Our hypothesis is that, because of competition from overseas home markets during the NYSE morning, the European firms should trade at a smaller bid-ask spread than the U.S. firms. But this difference should vanish during the NYSE afternoon when all the European markets have closed.

Of course bid-ask spreads might also be driven by liquidity and informed trading in a stock. The idea of bid-ask spreads being driven by informed trading follows from the theory that the risk-averse market maker will set bigger bid-ask spreads to compensate for the risk exposure when there is a higher probability of trading with a privately informed trader. This would be especially true during the NYSE morning when we would expect privately informed traders to be more active. To account for that, we

estimate the probability of informed trading (PIN) in our sample using the method of Easley, O'Hara, Kiefer and Paperman (1996).

Tal	ole	2:	Sampl	e of	U.S.	and	European	Firms
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European Firm	Ticker	U.S. Firm	Ticker	Industry
Publicis Groupe S.A.	PUB	Harte Hanks.	HHS	Advertising
Autoliv Inc.	ALV	Tower Automotive.	TWR	Autoparts
Banco Bilbao Viscaya Argentaria.	BBV	Bancorp South.	BXS	Banking
Banco Santander Central Hispanio S.A.	STD	Bayview Capital.	BVC	Banking
ABN AMRO Bank.	ABN	Cullen/Frost Bankers.	CFR	Banking
Allied Irish Banks.	AIB	First Fed Financial Corp.	FED	Banking
Barclays Plc.	BCS	Valley National Bancorp.	VLY	Banking
Credit Suisse Group.	CSR	Bankatlantic Bancorp.	BBX	Banking
Deutsche Bank A.G.	DB	Chittenden Corporation.	CZN	Banking
HSBC Holdings.	HBC	M&T Bancorp.	MTB	Banking
Sanpaolo IMI.	IMI	Community Bank System.	CBU	Banking
UBS A.G.	UBS	Commercial Federal Corp.	CFB	Banking
Lloyds TSB Group Plc.	LYG	First Commonwealth.	FCF	Banking
Serono S.A.	SRA	Theragenic Corp.	TGX	Biotechnology
Vivendi Universal.	V	Hearst Arghyle Television.	HTV	Broadcasting
Hanson Plc.	HAN	Ameron International.	AMN	Building materials
Luxottica Group.	LUX	Guess Inc et al.	GES	Clothes and Fabrics
Alcatel.	ALA	American Tower Corp.	AMT	Communications Technology
Siemens A.G.	SI	Cable design Corp.	CDT	Communications Technology
Nokia Corporation.	NOK	Corning Inc.	GLW	Communications Technology
BASF A.G.	BF	Spartech Corp.	SEH	Commodity Chemicals
Bayer A.G.	BAY	Wellman Inc.	WLM	Commodity Chemicals
Celanese A.G.	CZ	NL Industries.	NL	Commodity Chemicals
Royal Phillips Electronics.	PHG	Harman Intl.	HAR	Consumer Electronics
Diageo Plc.	DEO	Brown Forman.	BFB	Distillers and Brewers
Endesa S.A.	ELE	Unisource Energy.	UNS	Electric Utilities
E.ON G.	EON	CH Energy.	CHG	Electric Utilities
Scottish Power UK Plc.	SPI	El Paso Electric.	EE	Electric Utilities
Cable and Wireless.	CWP	IDT Corporation.	IDT	Fixed line Communications
Deutsche Telekom A.G.	DT	Cincinnati Bell.	CBB	Fixed line Communications
France Telecom.	FTE	Sprint Corporation.	SDE	Fixed line Communications
TDC A/S.	TLD	Centurytel.	CTLPRA	Fixed line Communications
Telefonica SA.	TEF	BCE Inc.	BCE	Fixed line Communications
Groupe Danone.	DA	M&F Worldwide.	MFW	Food Products
Cadbury Schweppes Plc	CSG	Ralcorp Holdings.	RAH	Food Products
Unilever N.V.	UN	Mccormick &Co.	MKC	Food Products
Delhaize Group	DEG	Smart and Final.	SMF	Food Retailers & Wholesellers
Natuzzi SPA.	NTZ	Fedders Corp.	FJC	Furnishing and Appliance
Royal Ahold.	AHO	Winn Dixie Stores.	WIN	Food Retailers & Wholesellers
Aegon N.V.	AEG	CNA Financial.	CNA	Full line Insurance
Allianz A.G.	AZ	Horace Mann Educators.	HMN	Full line Insurance

European Firm	Ticker	U.S. Firm	Ticker	Industry
AXA.	AXA	Stancorp Financial.	SFG	Full line Insurance
Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Grp Plc	RSA	FBL Financial Grp.	FFG	Full line Insurance
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.	CBI	MasTec Inc.	MTZ	Heavy Construction
Adecca S.A.	ADO	Crawford and Company.	CRDB	Industrial Services
AMVESCAP Plc.	AVZ	Gabelli Asset Mgt.	GBL	Investment Services
ING Group.	ING	Nationwide Fin Services.	NFS	Life Insurance
BP Plc.	BP	ConocoPhillips.	COP	Major Oil Companies
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.	RD	Marathon Oil Corp.	MRO	Major Oil Companies
TOTAL S.A.	TOT	Unocal.	UCL	Major Oil Companies
Alcon Inc.	ACL	Apogent Technology.	AOT	Medical Supplies
Rio Tinto.	RTP	Cleveland Cliffs.	CLF	Mining
Core labs.	CLB	Carbo Ceramics.	CRR	Oil Drilling
Stora Enso.	SEO	Buckeye Tech.	BKI	Paper Products
UPM-Kymmene Corporation.	UPM	Schweitzer Mauduit Intl.	SWM	Paper products
Aventis S.A.	AVE	Bradley Pharmaceuticals.	BDY	Pharmaceuticals
GlaxoSmithKline Plc.	GSK	Pharmaceutical Resources	PRX	Pharmaceuticals
Novartis.	NVS	Medicis Pharmaceuticals.	MRX	Pharmaceuticals
AstraZeneca Grp.	AZN	Alpharma Inc.	ALO	Pharmaceuticals
Elan Corp.	ELN	Mylan Labs.	MYL	Pharmaceuticals
Schering A.G.	SHR	KV Pharmaceauticals.	KVB	Pharmaceuticals
Wilis Grp.	WSH	Allmerica Financial Corp.	AFC	Property and Casualty Insurance
Pearson Plc.	PSO	Coachman Industries.	COA	Recreational Products and Services
Carnival Plc.	CUK	Dover Motorsports.	DVD	Recreational Products and Services
Infineon Technologies	IFX	Memc Electronic Materials.	WFR	Semiconductors
ST Microelectronics N.V.	STM	Fairchild Semiconductors.	FCS	Semiconductors
Imperial Chemical Industries Plc.	ICI	Arch Chemicals.	ARJ	Speciality Chemicals
Syngenta.	SYT	Rogers Corp.	ROG	Speciality Chemicals
SAP A.G.	SAP	Cadence Design System.	CDN	Technology,Software
Gallagher Group Plc.	GLH	Standard Commercial Corp	STW	Tobacco

The first column of the table reports the list of European firms, the second column their NYSE ticker symbol, the third column the matching U.S. firms. The fifth column lists the name of the industry to which the pair of European and U.S. firm in that row belongs. We have used the subgroup classifications under the Dow Jones Global Classification Standard.

As for liquidity, the more liquid the trading in a stock the smaller the bid-ask spread. We use the consolidated number of trades in a stock as a measure of liquidity. We then compare the percentage bid-ask spreads between the European and the U.S. stocks for the two different time periods of the day, after controlling for the effect of liquidity and the extent of informed trading. Our results show that the European firms trade at a significantly smaller bid-ask spread during the NYSE morning period. During the NYSE afternoon, however, the differences in bid-ask spreads vanish. This indicates that our initial hypothesis is true, the NYSE market maker does face competition from European trading during the NYSE morning. This also indicates that the U.S. and the European markets are integrated during the morning period of overlap.

The paper proceeds as follows. First we discuss the theory of informed trading using an earlier paper by Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara and Paperman, 1996 (henceforth EKOP). Next we discuss the empirical evidence on the bid-ask spread is presented and finally we conclude.

INFORMED TRADING

The bid-ask spreads may also be driven also by the extent of informed trading in a stock. Risk-averse market makers tend to set bigger bid-ask spreads to compensate for the exposure to privately informed traders. So when we test our hypothesis if European stocks trade at a smaller bid-ask spread than U.S. stocks because of market competitiveness, we want to make sure we control for the effect of informed trading, if any. This effect is especially important during the NYSE morning when informed traders are expected to quickly trade on their private information. It is difficult to estimate if there is private information based trading going on in a stock. EKOP (1996) have developed an empirical technique to test for the presence of informed trading in a stock. The idea is to use the information in the trade data to estimate the probability of informed trading. Specifically, they use a continuous time sequential model and develop a likelihood function to use in the estimation. The setup of their model is as follows:

- One risk neutral market maker and many informed and uninformed traders.
- Individuals trade a single risky asset and money with a market maker over i = 1, ..., I days. Within each trading day time is continuous and is indexed by $t \in [0, T]$.
- Prior to the beginning of each trading day, nature determines whether an information event happens. Information events are independent and occur with probability d. These events are bad news with probability e and good news with probability 1-e.
- $(V_i)_{i=1}^{I}$ are the random variables that give the value of the asset at the end of day I.
- Uninformed buyer and seller order arrivals are Poisson processes and the rate of arrival per minute is κ . Informed buyer and seller order arrivals are also Poisson and the rate of arrival per minute is σ . Order imbalance is expected to occur with informed trader activity.
- If a privately informed trader observes a bad signal he sells, if he observes a good signal he buys.
- The market maker is a Bayesian and he updates his belief about an information event by looking at the arrival of trade and rate of trading.

EKOP derives the probability of informed trading as
$$PIN = \frac{d\omega}{d\omega + 2\kappa}$$
.

They use a structural model to estimate the parameters d, σ, κ . The likelihood function is derived as the following:

$$L(B, S | H) = (1 - d) * e^{-\kappa T} \frac{(\kappa T)^{B}}{B!} e^{-\kappa T} \frac{(\kappa T)^{S}}{S!} + de * e^{-\kappa T} \frac{(\kappa T)^{B}}{B!} e^{-(\varpi + \kappa)T} \frac{[(\varpi + \kappa)T]^{S}}{S!} + d(1 - e) * e^{-\kappa T} \frac{(\kappa T)^{S}}{S!} e^{-(\varpi + \kappa)T} \frac{[(\varpi + \kappa)T]^{B}}{B!}$$
(1)

Where B = number of buys in a day, S = number of sells in a day, H is the parameter vector. EKOP use the Lee and Ready [1990] algorithm to classify each trade as a buy or sell. The likelihood of observing data $M = (B_i, S_i)_{i=1}^{I}$ over I days is just the product of the daily likelihoods,

$$L(M \mid \mathbf{H}) = \prod_{i=1}^{I} L(\mathbf{H} \mid B_i, S_i).$$

For our paper we use this technique to measure the probability of informed trading for our sample of European and U.S. stocks. We use the Lee and Ready technique to classify each trade as buy or sell. Then we maximize the likelihood function and find the parameter estimates and obtain the *PIN* value for each of our stocks. Each *PIN* value is a number between 0 and 1. Tables 3A and 3B document the PIN for the entire sample for the two time periods 9:30-10am and 2:30-3 pm respectively.

	PIN	European Firm	PIN
US Firm	1111		
Gerber Scientific	0.428	ABB Limited	0.324
Graco Inc	0.219	Mettler Toledo	0.205
Harte Hanks	0.265	Publicis Groupe S.A.	0.785
Tower Automotive	0.274	Autoliv Inc.	0.254
Bancorp South	0.257	Banco Bilbao	0.228
Bayview Capital	0.401	Banco Santander Central	0.311
Cullen/Frost Bankers	0.189	ABN AMRO Bank	0.144
First Fed Financial Corp	0.295	Allied Irish Banks	0.226
Valley National Bancorp	0.209	Barclays Plc.	0.225
Bankatlantaic Bancorp	0.246	Credit Suisse	0.231
Chittenden Corporation	0.195	Deutsche Bank	0.209
M&T Bancorp	0.138	HSBC holdings	0.171
Community Bank System	0.389	Sanpaolo IMI	0.265
Commercial Federal Corp	0.253	UBS AG	0.18
First Commonwealth	0.523	Lloyds TSB Group	0.202
Theragenic Corp	0.301	Serono	0.233
Hearst Arghyle Television	0.282	Vivendi Universal	0.186
Ameron International	0.33	Hanson Plc.	0.471
Guess Inc et al	0.345	Luxottica	0.302
American Tower Corp	0.171	Alcatel	0.125
Cable design Corp	0.278	Siemens AG	0.128
Corning Inc	0.159	Nokia Corporation	0.083
Spartech Corp	0.34	BASF AG	0.186
Wellman Inc	0.251	Bayer AG	0.178
NL Industries	0.335	Celanese AG	0.28
Harman Intl	0.193	Royal Phillips	0.144
Brown Forman	0.278	DIAGEO plc	0.13
Unisource Energy	0.197	Endesa SA	0.288
CH Energy	0.43	E ON G	0.279
El Paso Electric	0.368	Scottish Power UK plc	0.286
IDT Corporation	0.288	Cable and Wireless	0.279
Cincinnati Bell	0.273	Deutsche Telekom	0.188
Sprint Corporation	0.21	France Telecom	0.232
Centurytel	0.595	TDC A/S	0.843
BCE Inc	0.181	Telefonica	0.16
M&F Worldwide	0.317	Groupe Danone	0.111
Ralcorp Holdings	0.266	Cadbury Schweppes	0.196
Mccormick &Co	0.193	Unilever	0.226
Smart and Final	0.34	Delhaize Group	0.293
Fedders Corp	0.363	Natuzzi SPA	0.205
Winn Dixie Stores	0.155	Royal Ahold	0.155
CNA Financial	0.155	AEGON	0.149
Horace Mann Educators	0.3	Allianz	0.222
Stancorp Financial	0.236	AXA	0.193
FBL Financial Grp	0.18	Royal and Sun Alliance	0.263
MasTec Inc	0.26	Chicago Bridge&Iron	0.221
Crawford and Company	0.693	Adecca	0.423
Gabelli Asset Mgt	0.336	AMVESCAP Plc	0.193
Nationwide Fin Services	0.126	ING Group	0.191
ConocoPhillips	0.131	BP Plc.	0.114
Marathon Oil Corp	0.125	Royal Dutch Petroleum	0.168
Unocal	0.141	TOTAL S.A.	0.193
Apogent Technology	0.226	Alcon Inc	0.213

Table 3A: Probability of Informed Trading for 9:30-10 AM

	PIN	European Firm	PIN
US Firm		-	
Cleveland Cliffs	0.251	Rio Tinto	0.22
Carbo Ceramics	0.26	Core labs	0.319
Buckeye Tech	0.348	Stora Enso	0.216
Schweitzer Mauduit Intl	0.373	UPM-Kymmene Corporation	0.518
Bradley Pharmaceuticals	0.226	Aventis	0.15
Pharmaceutical Resources	0.137	GlaxoSmithKline plc	0.197
Medicis Pharmaceuticals	0.277	Novartis	0.109
Alpharma Inc	0.114	AstraZeneca Grp	0.14
Mylan Labs	0.152	Elan Corp	0.162
KV Pharmaceauticals	0.578	Schering Aktiengesellschaft	0.297
Allmerica Financial Corp	0.22	Wilis Grp.	0.205
Coachman Industries	0.281	Pearson plc.	0.245
Dover Motorsports	0.535	Carnival Plc.	0.286
Memc Electronic Materials	0.209	Infineon Technologies	0.086
Fairchild Semiconductors	0.133	STMicroelectronics	0.647
Arch Chemicals	0.376	Imperial Chemical Industries PLC	0.245
Rogers Corp	0.374	Syngenta	0.365
Cadence Design System	0.1	SAP	0.133
Standard Commercial Corp	0.376	Gallagher Group Plc	0.359

The first column of the table reports the list of U.S. firms, the second column their value of probability of informed trading (PIN). The fifth and sixth column reports the matching European firms and the value of probability of informed trading (PIN).

Table 3B: Probability of Informed Trading for 2:30-3 PM

U.S. Firm	PIN	European Firm	PIN
Gerber Scientific	0.414	ABB Limited	0.239
Graco Inc	0.217	Mettler Toledo	0.259
Harte Hanks	0.286	Publicis Groupe S.A.	1.000
Tower Automotive	0.288	Autoliv Inc.	0.184
Bancorp South	0.303	Banco Bilbao	0.242
Bayview Capital	0.432	Banco Santander Central	0.258
Cullen/Frost Bankers	0.185	ABN AMRO Bank	0.070
First Fed Financial Corp	0.302	Allied Irish Banks	0.305
Valley National Bancorp	0.179	Barclays Plc.	0.199
Bankatlantic Bancorp	0.195	Credit Suisse	0.209
Chittenden Corporation	0.199	Deutsche Bank	0.277
M&T Bancorp	0.197	HSBC holdings	0.190
Community Bank System	0.185	Sanpaolo IMI	0.095
Commercial Federal Corp	0.227	UBS AG	0.228
First Commonwealth	0.290	Lloyds TSB Group	0.293
Theragenic Corp	0.280	Serono	0.336
Hearst Arghyle Television	0.254	Vivendi Universal	0.188
Ameron International	0.152	Hanson Plc.	0.185
Guess Inc et al	0.292	Luxottica	0.290
American Tower Corp	0.194	Alcatel	0.176
Cable design Corp	0.243	Siemens AG	0.234
Corning Inc	0.116	Nokia Corporation	0.088
Spartech Corp	0.211	BASF AG	0.193
Wellman Inc	0.252	Bayer AG	0.280
NL Industries	0.191	Celanese AG	0.260
Harman Intl	0.148	Royal Phillips	0.123
Brown Forman	0.168	DIAGEO plc	0.379
Unisource Energy	0.263	Endesa SA	0.305

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HC F:	DIN		DIN
U.S. Firm	PIN	European Firm	PIN
CH Energy	0.296	E UN G	0.144
El Paso Electric	0.219	Scottish Power UK pic	0.137
	0.327	Cable and wireless	0.395
	0.240	Deutsche Telekom	0.175
Sprint Corporation	0.437	France Telecom	0.315
Centurytel	0.576	TDC A/S	0.750
BCE Inc	0.251	Telefonica	0.278
M&F Worldwide	0.355	Groupe Danone	0.273
Ralcorp Holdings	0.127	Cadbury Schweppes	0.208
Mccormick &Co	0.249	Unilever	0.265
Smart and Final	0.310	Delhaize Group	0.626
Fedders Corp	0.312	Natuzzi SPA	0.338
Winn Dixie Stores	0.190	Royal Ahold	0.207
CNA Financial	0.212	AEGON	0.177
Horace Mann Educators	0.251	Allianz	0.318
Stancorp Financial	0.175	AXA	0.202
FBL Financial Grp	0.430	Royal and Sun Alliance	0.466
MasTec Inc	0.242	Chicago Bridge&Iron	0.256
Crawford and Company	0.628	Adecca	0.471
Gabelli Asset Mgt	0.274	AMVESCAP Plc	0.277
Nationwide Fin Services	0.113	ING Group	0.175
ConocoPhillips	0.105	BP Plc.	0.183
Marathon Oil Corp	0.160	Royal Dutch Petroleum	0.186
Unocal	0.175	TOTAL S.A.	0.183
Apogent Technology	0.252	Alcon Inc	0.229
Cleveland Cliffs	0.253	Rio Tinto	0.261
Carbo Ceramics	0.210	Core labs	0.303
Buckeye Tech	0.318	Stora Enso	0.192
Schweitzer Mauduit Intl	0.296	UPM-Kymmene Corporation	0.180
Bradley Pharmaceuticals	0.222	Aventis	0.191
Pharmaceutical Resources	0.182	GlaxoSmithKline plc	0.183
Medicis Pharmaceuticals	0.184	Novartis	0.187
Alpharma Inc	0.222	AstraZeneca Grp	0.149
Mylan Labs	0.131	Elan Corp	0.144
KV Pharmaceauticals	0.664	Schering Aktiengesellschaft	0.652
Allmerica Financial Corp	0 179	Wilis Grp	0.202
Coachman Industries	0.387	Pearson nlc	0.286
Dover Motorsports	0.411	Carnival Plc	0.252
Memo Electronic Materials	0.208	Infineon Technologies	0.232
Eairchild Semiconductors	0.153	STMicroelectronics	0.190
Arch Chemicals	0.135	Imperial Chemical Industries DI C	0.190
Rogers Corn	0.556	Syngenta	0.273
Cadence Design System	0.205	S A D	0.227
Standard Commercial Corp	0.177	Gallagher Group Ple	0.100
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The first column of the table reports the list of U.S. firms, the second column their value of probability of informed trading (PIN). The fifth and sixth columns report the European firms and the value of probability of informed trading (PIN)

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

For our purposes we needed European stocks which are highly liquid and have active trading going on in their home markets in Europe when their ADRs start to trade at the NYSE. The stocks were selected from those European countries whose major stock markets have substantial overlapping trading hours with the NYSE. The major stock exchanges selected were those of the following 15 European countries: Austria,

Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and U.K. The sample consists of seventy two heavily traded European stocks from the above list of countries and a control group of U.S. stocks, matched by the consolidated number of trades in 2003 under the same industry. The NYSE uses the Dow Jones Global Classification Standard which divides the firms into 10 economic sectors, 18 market sectors, 51 industry groups and 89 subgroups. Each of the subgroups was examined to pick the European firm and the matched U.S. firm. Table 2 lists the firms. High frequency tick-by-tick bid and offer quotes are used from the NYSE Trade and Quote(TAQ) database which consists of time stamped intraday transactions data for all securities listed on the NYSE and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) as well as NASDAQ National Market System (NMS) and Small Cap issues. The bid and offer quotes and the trades were extracted for the sample for the months of September, October and November, 2003 for the two time periods, 9:30-10 am and 2:30-3 pm. There are 63 trading days in the sample.

Evidence on Bid-ask Spread

The data were sorted and stacked according to each firm, date, time and a variable that identifies each minute of the trading day. Then the percentage bid-ask spread, *perspread*, where $perspread = \frac{Spread}{Midprice}$

is computed for each quote in the dataset. For each firm the mean *perspread* for the entire trading period is computed. So we obtain one mean *perspread* value for each of our firms in both the samples. Table 4A lists the *perspread* values for the sample for the 9:30-10 am period and Table 4B lists the per spread values for the 2:30-3 pm period.

Sample Period 9:30-10 AM

We expected that within each set of U.S. and European firms the mean perspread should go down from the less liquid to the more liquid stocks. This is compatible with the intuition that the higher the liquidity, the lower should be the transactions cost, bid-ask spread being a widely used measure of transaction cost. We computed the correlation coefficient between the mean *perspread* and the number of trades for each of the set of European and U.S. firms and found that the correlation coefficient is -0.51771 for the U.S. firms and -0.72960 for the European firms. So the initial evidence suggests that more liquid the stock, smaller the bid-ask spread would be. Focusing on the morning sample, it was also found that the mean *perspread* for the U.S sample is 0.00522027 and the mean *perspread* for the European sample is 0.002976261. So the mean *perspread* for the European firm has a bigger *perspread*. So overwhelmingly the U.S. firms trade at a bigger bid-ask spread than the European firms.

U.S. Firm	Perspread	European Firm	Perspread	X
Gerber Scientific	0.0112014	ABB Limited	0.0066126	US
Graco Inc	0.0017825	Mettler Toledo	0.0023529	US
Harte Hanks	0.0034331	Publicis Groupe S.A.	0.0045	EUR
Tower Automotive	0.0108557	Autoliv Inc.	0.001491	EUR
Bancorp South	0.0033892	Banco Bilbao	0.00409	US
Bayview Capital	0.0038202	Banco Santander Central	0.0043657	EUR
Cullen/Frost Bankers	0.0017393	ABN AMRO Bank	0.0015749	EUR
First Fed Financial Corp	0.0024	Allied Irish Banks	0.003946	US
Valley National Bancorp	0.0025414	Barclays Plc.	0.0019518	EUR

Table 4 A: Percentage Bid-ask spread Analysis for 9:30-10 AM

U.S. Firm	Perspread	European Firm	Perspread	X
Bankatlantaic Bancorp	0.0046525	Credit Suisse	0.0017884	US
Chittenden Corporation	0.022499	Deutsche Bank	0.00155	US
M&T Bancorp	0.001163	HSBC holdings	0.00063502	US
Community Bank System	0.0046619	Sanpaolo IMI	0.0036868	US
Commercial Federal Corp	0.0020973	UBS AG	0.001186	US
First Commonwealth	0.006732	Lloyds TSB Group	0.0020292	US
Theragenic Corp	0.0115576	Serono	0.0032615	US
Hearst Arghyle Television	0.0021103	Vivendi Universal	0.0018581	US
Ameron International	0.0046619	Hanson Plc.	0.0044619	US
Guess Inc et al	0.0092812	Luxottica	0.0038163	US
American Tower Corp	0.0037735	Alcatel	0.0020248	US
Cable design Corp	0.0049271	Siemens AG	0.0013626	US
Corning Inc	0.0016237	Nokia Corporation	0.00098545	US
Spartech Corp	0.0053746	BASF AG	0.0018222	US
Wellman Inc	0.006196	Baver AG	0.0021906	US
NL Industries	0.0071415	Celanese AG	0.004662	US
Harman Intl	0.0016568	Roval Phillips	0.0012552	US
Brown Forman	0.0011459	DIAGEO nlc	0.00086415	US
Unisource Energy	0.0040211	Endesa SA	0.0034832	US
CH Energy	0.0047346	E ON G	0.0022141	US
El Paso Electric	0.0050564	Scottish Power UK plc	0.0022458	US
IDT Corporation	0.0031806	Cable and Wireless	0.0060163	US
Cincinnati Bell	0.0053963	Deutsche Telekom	0.0020331	EUR
Sprint Corporation	0.0111713	France Telecom	0.002422	US
Centurytel	0.0080831	TDC A/S	0.0088314	US
BCE Inc	0.0016433	Telefonica	0.0018127	EUR
M&F Worldwide	0.0091046	Groupe Danone	0.0021907	EUR
Ralcorp Holdings	0.0037014	Cadbury Schweppes	0.0018732	US
Mccormick &Co	0.001295	Unilever	0.00084575	US
Smart and Final	0.0142741	Delhaize Group	0.0041157	US
Fedders Corp	0.0142426	Natuzzi SPA	0.0073232	US
Winn Dixie Stores	0.0025971	Royal Ahold	0.0029	US
CNA Financial	0.0026223	AEGON	0.0020992	EUR
Horace Mann Educators	0.004842	Allianz	0.0036317	US
Stancorp Financial	0.0018497	AXA	0.0020504	US
FBL Financial Grp	0.0077774	Royal and Sun Alliance	0.0125151	EUR
MasTec Inc	0.0042873	Chicago Bridge&Iron	0.0040511	EUR
Crawford and Company	0.0167837	Adecca	0.0058341	US
Gabelli Asset Mgt	0.0032635	AMVESCAP Plc	0.0041915	US
Nationwide Fin Services	0.0032628	ING Group	0.0018504	EUR
ConocoPhillips	0.00065312	BP Plc.	0.00052596	US
Marathon Oil Corp	0.0011581	Roval Dutch Petroleum	0.00048054	US
Unocal	0.0014577	TOTAL S.A.	0.000797	US
Apogent Technology	0.002149	Alcon Inc	0.0014776	US
Cleveland Cliffs	0.0052459	Rio Tinto	0.0013166	US
Carbo Ceramics	0.0025212	Core labs	0.005312	US
Buckeye Tech	0.0101558	Stora Enso	0.0034648	EUR
Schweitzer Mauduit Intl	0.0030526	UPM-Kymmene Corporation	0.0049122	US
Bradley Pharmaceuticals	0.0043029	Aventis	0.0012985	EUR
Pharmaceutical Resources	0.0017099	GlaxoSmithKline plc	0.00082006	US
Medicis Pharmaceuticals	0.001419	Novartis	0.00085809	US
Alpharma Inc	0.002843	AstraZeneca Grp	0.000152	US

U.S. Firm	Perspread	European Firm	Perspread	Х
Mylan Labs	0.0011831	Elan Corp	0.00587	US
KV Pharmaceauticals	0.0067368	Schering Aktiengesellschaft	0.0030094	EUR
Allmerica Financial Corp	0.0017962	Wilis Grp.	0.0019741	US
Coachman Industries	0.0102348	Pearson plc.	0.0055529	EUR
Dover Motorsports	0.0191393	Carnival Plc.	0.0034355	US
Memc Electronic Materials	0.002989	Infineon Technologies	0.0019379	US
Fairchild Semiconductors	0.0015876	STMicroelectronics	0.00090429	US
Arch Chemicals	0.005199	Imperial Chemical Industries PLC	0.004133	US
Rogers Corp	0.0033578	Syngenta	0.0050665	US
Cadence Design System	0.00141	SAP	0.00087785	EUR
Standard Commercial Corn	0.0095623	Gallagher Group Plc	0.0026384	US

Standard Commercial Corp0.0095623Gallagher Group Plc0.0026384USThe first column of the table reports the list of U.S firms, the second column the NYSE ticker symbols and the third column the mean percentage
bid-ask spread for the trading period. The columns four, five and six report the same for the European firms and the seventh column reports the
variable "X". If X = "US" ("EUR") it means the U.S.(European) firm in that pair has a higher percentage bid-ask spread. The column header
perspread denotes the percentage bid-ask spread.

Table 4B: Percentage Bid-ask Spread Analysis for 2:30-3:00 PM

U.S. Firm	Perspread	European Firm	Perspread	Х
Gerber Scientific	0.0010091	ABB Limited	0.008576465	EUR
Graco Inc	0.0012433	Mettler Toledo	0.001591212	US
Harte Hanks	0.0045953	Publicis Groupe S.A.	0.000873659	EUR
Tower Automotive	0.0019991	Autoliv Inc.	0.006547056	EUR
Bancorp South	0.0008353	Banco Bilbao	0.002316949	US
Bayview Capital	0.0031356	Banco Santander Central	0.003066669	EUR
Cullen/Frost Bankers	0.0024092	ABN AMRO Bank	0.002789415	EUR
First Fed Financial Corp	0.0013428	Allied Irish Banks	0.001775627	US
Valley National Bancorp	0.002961	Barclays Plc.	0.000840659	US
Bankatlantaic Bancorp	0.0031099	Credit Suisse	0.001094616	US
Chittenden Corporation	0.006	Deutsche Bank	0.00408147	EUR
M&T Bancorp	0.0026336	HSBC holdings	0.002664052	EUR
Community Bank System	0.002539	Sanpaolo IMI	0.004432886	US
Commercial Federal Corp	0.0028195	UBS AG	0.0005872	US
First Commonwealth	0.0030552	Lloyds TSB Group	0.002749376	EUR
Theragenic Corp	0.0010034	Serono	0.004124914	EUR
Hearst Arghyle Television	0.0026937	Vivendi Universal	0.002755641	EUR
Ameron International	0.0013878	Hanson Plc.	0.002380152	US
Guess Inc et al	0.0008868	Luxottica	0.000471316	US
American Tower Corp	0.0028004	Alcatel	0.002644023	US
Cable design Corp	0.0030788	Siemens AG	0.003014056	EUR
Corning Inc	0.0012939	Nokia Corporation	0.00242495	US
Spartech Corp	0.006263	BASF AG	0.001501128	EUR
Wellman Inc	0.00042	Bayer AG	0.00325786	US
NL Industries	0.0113109	Celanese AG	0.005144409	EUR
Harman Intl	0.0018568	Royal Phillips	0.004104	US
Brown Forman	0.0065276	DIAGEO plc	0.00300783	EUR
Unisource Energy	0.0011638	Endesa SA	0.002007695	US
CH Energy	0.0149562	E ON G	0.005626067	US
El Paso Electric	0.0030378	Scottish Power UK plc	0.000626437	US
IDT Corporation	0.0044605	Cable and Wireless	0.00173422	EUR
Cincinnati Bell	0.0010326	Deutsche Telekom	0.004545848	EUR
Sprint Corporation	0.0015501	France Telecom	0.009541478	US
Centurytel	0.0046059	TDC A/S	0.004390942	US
BCE Inc	0.0115923	Telefonica	0.003618708	EUR
M&F Worldwide	0.0023867	Groupe Danone	0.002643699	US

U.S. Firm	Perspread	European Firm	Perspread	X
Ralcorp Holdings	0.005692	Cadbury Schweppes	0.000763981	EUR
Mccormick &Co	0.0010919	Unilever	0.004277899	US
Smart and Final	0.0018762	Delhaize Group	0.000598956	US
Fedders Corp	0.0092497	Natuzzi SPA	0.005679647	EUR
Winn Dixie Stores	0.0008523	Royal Ahold	0.002159306	EUR
CNA Financial	0.0013583	AEGON	0.004333959	EUR
Horace Mann Educators	0.0020099	Allianz	0.002120634	EUR
Stancorp Financial	0.0013177	AXA	0.002666733	US
FBL Financial Grp	0.0020905	Royal and Sun Alliance	0.002047568	US
MasTec Inc	0.0060751	Chicago Bridge&Iron	0.00115963	US
Crawford and Company	0.0062644	Adecca	0.001226834	EUR
Gabelli Asset Mgt	0.0005691	AMVESCAP Plc	0.005081196	EUR
Nationwide Fin Services	0.0005573	ING Group	0.000673902	US
ConocoPhillips	0.0011367	BP Plc.	0.001036373	EUR
Marathon Oil Corp	0.00053	Royal Dutch Petroleum	0.007632609	EUR
Unocal	0.0027923	TOTAL S.A.	0.006673918	US
Apogent Technology	0.0009996	Alcon Inc	0.000535088	EUR
Cleveland Cliffs	0.0010419	Rio Tinto	0.00936036	US
Carbo Ceramics	0.0043436	Core labs	0.002511999	EUR
Buckeye Tech	0.0008011	Stora Enso	0.000885683	EUR
Schweitzer Mauduit Intl	0.0020682	UPM-Kymmene Corporation	0.003924585	EUR
Bradley Pharmaceuticals	0.0020663	Aventis	0.005506266	US
Pharmaceutical Resources	0.0083422	GlaxoSmithKline plc	0.001110406	US
Medicis Pharmaceuticals	0.0035381	Novartis	0.002804125	EUR
Alpharma Inc	0.0009415	AstraZeneca Grp	0.002532697	US
Mylan Labs	0.0104231	Elan Corp	0.003581138	US
KV Pharmaceauticals	0.0043261	Schering Aktiengesellschaft	0.000825191	EUR
Allmerica Financial Corp	0.0023074	Wilis Grp.	0.004099447	US
Coachman Industries	0.008962	Pearson plc.	0.001165023	EUR
Dover Motorsports	0.0060444	Carnival Plc.	0.007122825	US
Memc Electronic Materials	0.0012676	Infineon Technologies	0.000452386	US
Fairchild Semiconductors	0.0029978	STMicroelectronics	0.000928274	US
Arch Chemicals	0.0015351	Imperial Chemical Inds. PLC	0.0005951	EUR
Rogers Corp	0.0018954	Syngenta	0.003973407	US
Cadence Design System	0.0018845	SAP	0.001285704	US
Standard Commercial Corp	0.0034847	Gallagher Group Plc	0.000819935	EUR

The first column of the table reports the list of U.S firms, the second column the NYSE ticker symbols and the third column the mean percentage bid-ask spread for the trading period. The columns four, five and six report the same for the European firms and the seventh column reports the variable "X". If X= "US" ("EUR") it means the U.S.(European) firm in that pair has a higher percentage bid-ask spread. The column header perspread denotes the percentage bid-ask spread.

Sample Period 2:30-3 PM

Examining the evidence for bid-ask spreads from afternoon data, the mean *perspread* for the U.S. sample is 0.003287 and 0.0029956 for the European sample. So the mean *perspread* for the European sample is smaller than that of the U.S. sample by 3 basis points. The associated P value is 0.4954. Out of each of the pairs of firms it was found that for 35 pairs of firms the European firm has a bigger *perspread* and for the rest of the 37 pairs the U.S. firm has a bigger *perspread*. So the evidence seems to suggest that the pattern of bid-ask spreads for the U.S. and the European firms becomes more homogeneous during the NYSE afternoon than in the morning. We found the correlation coefficient between the mean *perspread* and the number of trades to be -0.0928 for the U.S. sample and -0.0104 for the European sample The strength of the inverse relation between the bid-ask spread and liquidity that we obtained in the NYSE morning has also diminished during the afternoon.

Cross Sectional Regression on Perspread: 9:30-10 AM

We first examine the hypothesis that during the NYSE morning the European firms trade at a smaller bidask spread than the U.S. firms because of the presence of a substitute market. To test this, we ran a crosssectional regression. The regression is specified as follows. The dependent variable is *perspread*, PS_i . It is regressed on the following dependent variables: Probability of informed trading PIN_i , a dummy d_i that takes the value 1 for a European stock and 0 for a U.S. stock, and the consolidated number of trades, $Trades_i$. The regression is done using White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. Here *i* denotes firm. The estimation results are shown in the following regression equation:

$$PS_{i} = 0.002685 - 0.001976^{*}d_{i} + 0.010838^{*}PIN_{i} - 0.00000000317^{*}Trades_{i} + \varepsilon_{1} \text{ where } \varepsilon_{i} \sim N(\xi, \delta^{2})$$
(2)
(0.0068) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0067)

We find some interesting results in this regression. The significantly negative value, 0.001976 of the coefficient on the dummy d_i denotes that, after controlling for informed trading and liquidity, if we switch from a U.S. to a European firm, the value of *perspread* goes down by approximately 20 basis points. The significantly positive coefficient value of 0.010838 on the variable PIN_i suggests that as the value of the probability of informed trading in any stock goes up by 1, the percentage bid-ask spread for that stock goes up by 108 basis points after controlling for the dummy and the number of trades. The significantly negative coefficient on the liquidity measure $Trades_i$ denotes that after we control for informed trading and dummy, percentage bid-ask spread goes down by 7 basis points as we increase the standard deviation of $Trades_i$ by one unit.

Cross sectional regression on Perspread: 2:30-3 PM

The effect on percentage bid-ask spread due to the presence of a substitute market should disappear when the European markets close. The last European market to close trading for our sample is floor trading at the Frankfurt Borse which closes trading at 8 pm local time in Frankfurt. This translates to 2 pm local time in New York. So from 2-4 pm local time in New York only the NYSE is trading. To validate our theory of smaller bid-ask spread in the presence of a substitute market, empirically, we should expect to see the difference in bid-ask spreads between the U.S. and the European firms disappear during the NYSE afternoon when all the European markets have closed. So we estimated the same cross-sectional regression as before using data from the time period 2:30-3pm using White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. The results of the estimation analysis are shown in the following regression equation:

$$PS_{i} = 0.003669 - 0.000313 * d_{i} - 0.000906 * PIN_{i} - 0.00000000988 * Trades_{i} + \varepsilon_{1} \text{ where } \varepsilon_{i} \sim N(\rho, \psi^{2}) (3)$$

$$(0.000) \quad (0.4782) \qquad (0.5024) \qquad (0.1666)$$

The results indicate that the coefficient on the dummy is negative, still, but not significant, which suggests that the U.S. and the European firms do not have significantly different percentage bid-ask spreads after we control for liquidity and informed trading. The effect of liquidity and probability of informed trading on the perspread is no longer found to be significant. The results of the cross sectional regression for the two periods 9:30-10 am and 2:30-3 pm are documented in Table 5 shown below.

Panel A: Results for 930-10:00 AM						
	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-statistics	Probability		
Constant	0.002685	0.0068	3.502580	0.0006***		
Dummy	(-)0.001976	0.0003	-3.830808	0.0002***		
PIN	0.010838	0.0002	5.075426	0.0000***		
Trades	(-)0.0000000317	0.0067	-2.642661	0.0092***		
<u>R square</u>	0.324213					
Panel B: Results	for 2:30-3:00 PM					
	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-statistics	Probability		
Constant	0.003669	0.000	10.02772	0.0000***		
Dummy	(-)0.000313	0.4782	0.453134	0.6512		
PIN	(-)0.000906	0.5024	-1.125026	0.2625		
Trades	(-)0.0000000098	0.166	-1.000537	0.3188		
<u>R square</u>	0.009403					

Table 5: Cross Sectional Regressions

The table summarizes the regression results. The results for the time period 9:30-10 am and 2:30-3pm are presented in Panels A and B respectively. The estimates are followed by the standard error, t statistic and p values. We are using 5% level of significance. The R square value is reported at the end of the table.

CONCLUSION

The study has tried to answer the question of whether the market maker at the NYSE faces more competition for European stocks which have a substitute market open during morning trading hours in New York than for U.S. stocks This effect of the presence of a substitute market should disappear when all the European markets close trading during the NYSE afternoon. The results from our cross-sectional regression analysis seem to support the hypothesis nicely as percentage bid-ask spreads of European stocks are smaller than that for U.S. stocks in the New York morning. This difference disappears during the New York afternoon when European trading has ended. This indicates that the U.S. and the European markets are integrated during the period of overlap.

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