

# EUROPEAN STATE-BUILDING: NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION VS. POLITICAL ECONOMIC STABILIZATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

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## ABSTRACT

*The goal of this paper is to critique European integration noting political psychological dynamics relative to current policy trends that shape the EU's effectiveness as a peace strategy. EU capabilities for conflict prevention include opportunities it offers to procure national security and prosperity for established states. The EU enjoys an advantage in competition with Moscow for influence in southeastern Europe. The EU is a multinational political entity that effectively projects an image of not being under the national dominance of a particular member state, i.e. Germany. The EU's institutional policy-making complexity and authority dispersion suppress perceptual patterns suspecting it as a vehicle for neo-colonial projection of the power of a member state or coalition of states. The EU's conditionality for loans to address the sovereign debt crisis is thus less prone to be seen as erasing the national sovereignty of a debtor state through capitulation to particular national dominance. A challenge lies in the EU's perceived relationship with the US. Moscow's prevailing view of the EU assumes it to be a vehicle for expansion of Euro-Atlantic influence at the expense of Russian national security. It intensifies suspicion of pro-Euro-Atlantic nationalities existing also as national minorities and in diaspora in Europe and in North America. The EU's emphasis on state building and stabilization through economic development is problematic because of resistance to sovereign national self-determination for these national minorities.*

**JEL:** F02, F5, P3

**KEYWORDS:** Nationalism, European Union, Russia

## INTRODUCTION

Eastern European national minorities and diasporas are vulnerable to stereotyping as surrogates for a state perceived as having regional imperialist or hegemonic intentions. These irredenta and diaspora of a parent state risk being stereotyped as advocates of secession to escape their current condition as national minorities. They may seek to secede, possibly to join a larger neighboring patron state as part of the latter's irredentist agenda. Another suspected agenda may be to create a nation-state out of a former Soviet state whose sovereignty Moscow may still contest, e.g. Ukraine. Kapitonenko asserts that the European Union lacks a "hard security" strategy component in its Eastern Partnership Project (EaP), the former Soviet state targets of the broader European Neighborhood Policy. Russia's response has been to reinforce so-called frozen conflicts by supporting separatists within these states. The absence of an overall EU strategy towards Russia undercuts formulation of a hard security component to the EaP (2016, 14). The analysis disputes the claim that the EU has no such strategy. One de facto exists based upon vested Cold War era bureaucratic and economic vested interests, to which the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and EaP are subordinate (Bechev, 2011 427). It reflects the bureaucratic incrementalism assumed in realism, i.e. international actors act as if the optimization of power and influence is their primary policy motivation (Keohane 2009, 370-71). The EU is founded upon these Cold War-era vested interests.

The Euro-Atlantic approach to minority policy is subordinate to state stabilization and state building. It does not place primary emphasis on self-determination as a human right when self-determination requires redrawing state borders. It is evident today in the Catalonia crisis but it has been the overriding political strategic imperative since the collapse of eastern European communism. The North Atlantic alliance opposed the creation of new sovereignties in the Balkans until nationalistic local actors created political facts to which leading NATO members acquiesced. Nevertheless, stabilization, while primary, is not the only EU objective; so is expanding North Atlantic hegemony. In this case, the Greek Catholic minority in western Ukraine is supportive of rollback of Moscow given its salient and intense antipathy to Moscow's influence in Ukraine. The exceptional suppression of Ukrainian Greek Catholicism was evidence of the perceived threat that it contributed to fortifying Ukrainian nationalism as a challenge to Moscow's authority. The Soviet authorities went beyond repression to formally abolish the Ukrainian Catholic church immediately after the Second World War (Pukenis, 2014, 87). With the requisite Stalinist façade of voluntary choice, it was forcibly absorbed into the Russian Orthodox Church in 1946 (Gallaro, 2013, 67). "At the time of the liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church by the Soviet authorities in 1945-46, the Church was closely linked to the Ukrainian national movement" (Plokhly, 1995, 851).

In early 1995, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma reportedly requested to the papal nuncio that the Vatican assist Ukraine's efforts "in integrating into Europe" (Plokhly, 1995, 863-64). The community of Ukrainian Greek Catholic believers is relatively small, perhaps only 5 million worldwide, concentrated in western Ukraine (Ibid.). The total population of Ukraine is 45 million. Yet, the political influence of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church is disproportionate to its numerical size, given that western Ukraine is also the epicenter of Ukrainian nationalism. After the Second World War, the Ukrainian "Greek Catholic Church was persecuted and could only exist in secrecy. During this period, it operated mainly in the diaspora abroad" (Solik, Filakovsky and Baar, 2017, 138 fn. 33). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov implicitly confirmed Moscow's perception of Ukrainian Greek Catholicism's innate role in militant Ukrainian nationalism. Lavrov in a 2015 interview justified Russia's annexation of Crimea. He alleged that after the 2014 overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, militant Ukrainian nationalist rhetoric included expulsion of the Russophile population because "[T]hey would never go to the Greek Catholic Church, or speak and think in Ukrainian and praise Bandera" (Lavrov, 2015, para. 119). Stepan Bandera, a mid-twentieth century Ukrainian militant nationalist leader who alternately collaborated with the invading Germans, is often portrayed in Russian mass media as a Nazi henchman. Bandera was the son a Ukrainian Greek Catholic priest (Narvselius 2012, 481). The European Parliament condemned outgoing Ukrainian President Viktor Yevtushenko's 2010 proclamation of Bandera as a "National Hero of Ukraine" for violating the spirit of "European values" ("European Parliament Resolution," 2010, para. 20). Pope Francis and Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill issued a 30-point statement to conclude the first ever meeting between the leaders of these two churches on February 12, 2016 in Havana, Cuba. Point 27 implies that the Orthodox citizens of Ukraine should not fear the intentions of the Greek Catholic Church:

*"27. It is our hope that the schism between the Orthodox faithful in Ukraine may be overcome through existing canonical norms, that all the Orthodox Christians of Ukraine may live in peace and harmony, and that the Catholic communities in the country may contribute to this, in such a way that our Christian brotherhood may become increasingly evident" (emphasis BD) ("Joint Declaration" 2016).*

The Ukrainian Orthodox community since the USSR's disintegration divided into the Ukrainian Orthodox Church subordinate to the Russian patriarch, the Ukraine Orthodox Autocephalous Church tracing its roots to 1921 briefly-independent Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate that broke with the UOC and then the UOAC in the mid-1990s. To maintain calm relations, the Vatican has emphasized its refraining from proselytizing in Russia, rather "reviving" "ethnic" parishes that the Soviet authorities had oppressed (Filatov and Vorontsova, 2000, 81).

The Vatican is a sovereign state subject of international law. As a state sensitive to nationalist public opinion in emerging Russia (and China) it engages in diplomatic bargaining. The Roman Catholic Church has been mild in its response to the Ukrainian crisis including the Russian acquisition of Crimea (Vukicevic, 2015, 74). The Vatican's caution contrasts with the Pope John Paul II's strong support for the late 1989 legalization of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church by the Soviet authorities (Plokhly, 1995, 852). The paper first presents a theoretical framework for analyzing the intensifying competition for influence between Moscow and EU-NATO in Eastern Europe. It then applies it to highlight how national Catholic groups and minorities enjoy political opportunities and dangers. Their political opportunities stem partly from their association with the Roman Catholic Church as a cultural representation of Western Europe, politically represented by Euro-Atlantic structures. Their dangers stem from their vulnerability to suspicions of disloyalty on behalf Euro-Atlantic opposition to Moscow's influence. The paper then critiques the EU's CSDP as it has been applied to southeastern Europe since the end of the Cold War, followed by concluding comments.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### The Complexity of Social Comparisons

According to Cottam and Cottam, the four central propositions of social identity theory are the following: 1) maintaining a positive self-image is a striving of people; 2) a person's identity and self-image receives contributions from membership in groups; 3) by comparing their own group with other groups, people evaluate their own groups; 4) a positive comparison of a person's own group with other groups significantly determines this person's self-concept and hence gives it a positive social identity (2001, 90). Cottam and Cottam note that individuals have several alternatives available to them if they evaluate their group's position as negative in relation to other relevant groups. Their evaluation of their own group must satisfy two prerequisites in order to spark them to action. Firstly, they must see their own group in positive terms. People often accept inferior status or unfair treatment on an individual level, and on a group level, they may accept inferiority when their self-image of their own group is negative. In terms of identifying and recognizing alternatives to their inferior situation, such groups will be cognitively unable to do so. If they feel that their group's status is just and this status satisfies them, then conflict with higher-status groups will be unlikely to occur. The social context partially creates the specific nature of the comparison. When the community addresses high intensity issues in the political system, then political-group identifications will become highly salient and influential on behavior. At other times, political identities will be dormant and do not influence behavior.

Secondly, the comparisons must be in terms of relevant group comparisons. If one's own group does not view the comparison group as similar, meaning, not as a relevant comparison group, then a group will accept inferiority and disadvantage. The acceptance of inferiority is perplexing but not inexplicable and the "colonial-imperial" relationship would characterize the operative cognitive images in these political circumstances. Maintaining a form of positive self-image is not impossible in this context, despite the presence of a negative evaluation of one's own group (2001, 91). Cottam and Cottam note that once an actor makes a social comparison and finds the comparison to be unsatisfactory, the actor generally has three alternative strategies. One strategy is social mobility: they can sometimes abandon their group and join the one which they perceive to be superior. In societies in which groups are permeable, this strategy is possible. This alternative results in individual instead of collective action and it requires an individual belief in social mobility. Examples are prevalent in the US, where we see that classes are permeable but races are not in most cases. For the selection of this strategy to occur, the salience of group identity is crucial. People are less likely to pursue this alternative when a) they have a strong emotional investment in a group; b) they perceive the group as a whole to suffer from some disadvantage.

Social creativity strategies are another approach to relative disadvantage as a result of an unfavorable social comparison. In social creativity strategies, people a) choose different comparative dimensions. For example, they may change comparison of wealth to comparison of political power. Or, they may b) change the comparison group. For example, rather than comparing themselves to long-term citizens, members of an immigrant group might instead compare themselves to other immigrant groups. They may also c) redefine the basis of comparison from negative to positive. For example, racial minorities may come to view their own cultural heritage and customs positively. With regard to their own group, each of the above three social creativity approaches will enhance the positive assessment (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 91).

Finally, Cottam and Cottam note that social competition is yet another approach to addressing relative disadvantage resulting from a negative social comparison. It can lead to a questioning of the existing political conditions as the prevailing view emerges that existing group social relations are essentially zero-sum. It can therefore lead to development of severe political conflict. These conflicts can include rebellions and secession movements. People's subjective perceptions of the nature of the relations between groups will heavily influence the way in which people strive for or maintain positive social identity. Particularly important is how stable and legitimate, i.e. how secure, the outcomes of intergroup comparison are perceived to be. With regard to provoking social competition, unfavorable group comparisons are not sufficient. Identifying achievable alternatives to the existing relationship must also be feasible by group members. Factors which contribute to the identification of alternatives include the following: 1) the perception of the illegitimacy and injustice of status differences; 2) the perception of the instability of the status system. Both 1 and 2 are necessary, and when they occur, then the comparisons become "insecure." Enhancement of group self-image, with an increase in the salience of group membership, leading to an increase in mutual ethnocentrism flows from this awareness of alternatives. Prevailing perceptions that a relationship is just and legitimate and that the status quo is stable can change due to the impact of political events and trends. The historical disintegration of colonial-imperial relationships demonstrates this pattern. In response to an unacceptable comparison, through social creativity and social competition strategies the identity of a group among its members becomes necessarily stronger and more distinct (Ibid., 92-93).

Opportunities for individual and national community social mobility and social creativity should ideally increase through integration in the European Union. The relative success in projecting the European Union as a community that is not a cloak for a particular national European imperial project is an essential prerequisite. Various Eurosceptic national political parties claim that the EU is in fact a cloak in effect for German neocolonialism due to the economic predominance of Germany. The role of the German economy as the foundational base for the Eurozone risks reinforcing the persuasiveness of this claim. The question is how pervasive, salient and intense is this perception among and within the different national constituencies of EU public opinion. Clearly, some violent individual actors in Greece do perceive Germany and their supposed Greek collaborators in this manner (Kitsantonis, 2017). The cooperative behavior of the Athens government with the European Central Bank-European Commission-International Monetary Fund so-called troika indicates this perception does not today prevail.

Following the start of the global financial crisis in 2008, at least one prominent analyst publicly expressed his doubts regarding the survival of the Eurozone (Brittan, 2010). German willingness to devote the resources necessary to keep sovereign debt crisis countries particularly Greece within the Eurozone show the centrality of Germany's role. The Eurozone's survival indicates that politically prevailing perceptions in focal polities of the crisis, i.e. Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, do not perceive their relationship with Germany as insecure. The extent of German national polity influence, concomitantly with perceived German intentions have not led to prevailing inferences of an implicit but real German neo-colonialist project (Rupnik, 2016, 83). The vaunted complexity and convolution of EU policy making processes allegedly contribute to the so-called EU democratic deficit (Kanter, 2017b).

Yet, this same perceived complexity serves to shape prevailing EU general and particular national perceptions to accept EU oversight in the Greek national policy making process. EU political controls over German economic resources appear to suffice significantly to undermine collective perceptions of threat of German neo-colonialism. Greek, as well as Portuguese, Spanish, and Irish polity tolerance of EU influence over their policy making processes are much higher than would be the case otherwise. This EU democratic deficit due to its policy making process complexity and authority dispersal may be the price for obviating arousal of traditional nationalist stereotypical perceptions of the intentions of others. Paradoxically this daunting policy making complexity may in fact be a key to the success of the EU integration project; it avoids provoking latent nationalist sentiments. The democratic deficit derives from a lack of EU perceived transparency because of a perceived lack of democratic accountability of EU officials. The question is from where does this perception of transparency and democratic accountability derive in nation state polities. This analysis points to the tendency of the national public to equate the government apparatus at the pinnacle of the democratic nation state as representing the sovereign national demos (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 2). A critical Marxist observer regarding claims of democracy may argue that the widespread perception of a democratic deficit should exist in a nation state such as the US, France or Germany. Nevertheless, the public in these nation states tends to acknowledge the authority of the governing elite as representing and wielding the nation's sovereignty. The EU democratic deficit may never be overcome until a prevailing self-identification with a EU/European demos attains primacy, i.e. European nationhood. It would need to supersede the currently prevailing respective national community self-identifications of the EU national publics. Until that distant time, perceptions of an EU democratic deficit will remain prevalent and even desirable. Care is necessary to avoid making salient intense but generally latent traditional nationalist suspicions that the EU is a cloak for the neo-colonial interests of a particular nation state or group of states. The Brexit vote indicates that they may not remain latent under certain conditions, albeit unique to the multitudinous circumstances of each nation state.

In sum, freedom or liberty or democracy, whatever the term, derives from individual and collective self-determination, i.e. opportunities to achieve social mobility and creativity. Failure to provide such opportunities can lead to social competition. European regional social creativity, in sum, is an expression of community identity construction and reconstruction, which may incorporate component national defense or expansion. "European citizenship can be perceived as an ideal of solidarity and union of European peoples and of a more inclusive form of political and social membership in Europe" (Ivic, 2016, 6-7). The construction of a European identity requires the creation and promotion of social creativity options, i.e. all national groups are contributing their own to the construction of Europe. Germany's preeminence economically is a powerful factor in its favor for perceived social primacy. Other national groups play their role, but economic and technological prowess is a major advantage. European border security and luxury consumption offered by southern European nation states provide some social creativity compensation. EU member state France possesses continental Europe's nuclear military force. Perceiving self and other as different but equal in status is the essence of social creativity strategy. The imperative is to avoid the EU appearing to serve disguised particular national neo-colonialist intentions as so perceived. This obligation indicates that imperialism has an essential connection to national identity sovereignty concerns of self vis-a-vis other. Russian concern over EU influence over neighboring Ukraine and Slavic polities in southeastern Europe as well as over Russian politics and policy itself has its basis in Russian nationalism. The EU is not a nation state, but the prevailing view in Moscow, correctly or not, is that it is an unstable "vassal" of Washington (Duleba, 2016, 125).

### The EU-US Relationship and European Identity

One political strategy by which to generate social creativity in the perception of a relationship is to mobilize around perception of a common adversary. The adage, the enemy of my enemy is my friend, captures this dynamic. Image simplifications can be positive, in the form of the ally stereotype (Cottam and Cottam 2001, 97-98). European peoples with a history of difficult relations can more readily put aside those psychological

obstacles to integration by focusing on a common enemy. The Cold War-era national security establishment which NATO represents is a challenge to the European Union as a European peace strategy. It is also a test of the extent to which European integration is dependent upon the Cold War and its vast legacy in the form of Euro-Atlantic bureaucratic instruments, public and private, for containment of Moscow. The European Union undergoes additional stresses and strains as represented by Brexit. Reemphasizing the common challenge from Moscow can be a tempting route to generate countervailing pressures to these oppose centripetal tendencies. Perhaps not surprisingly, Estonia, holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union for the second half of 2017, emphasized NATO-EU security cooperation (Raik and Järvenpää, 2017).

To avoid this perceptual dynamic, the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP, previously the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)) needs to establish a credible delineation from US-led NATO. This prerequisite, however, is unlikely to materialize, although the EU's reaction to the US Trump administration may instill greater urgency to do so. Despite its rhetoric, the Trump administration is likely to be politically constrained in its decisional latitude by the vast array of vested interests in the US national security establishment. The rise of three US generals to stabilize the chaotic, new administration illustrates the political influence of these interests within the US polity. Among these 3 individuals: US Secretary of Defense James Mattis, US National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster and Trump's chief of staff, John Kelly, the latter two replaced their predecessors. These predecessors were seen as either enabling, or at least were unable to manage, populist political pressures that threatened the vested interests of this national security establishment. These same vested interests dominate the security aspects of the European Union due to their emergence and development during the Cold War.

Their compatriot forces include the private economic interests that emerged around them, to supply and support them, interests which are essential to European Union integration. The European Union allows for social creativity in thinking but it exists within subordination to US hegemonic leadership (Layne 2008). It is vulnerable to this perceived social role in global affairs including engagement in social competition with nation states such as Russia. The prevailing view in Moscow today is that the EU is the civilian power handmaiden of US-led NATO (Roberts, 2017). The Roman Catholic Church endorsed the founding of the EU and west European Christian democratic party leaders predominated among the founders (Murdoy, 2014 509-10). Protestant Christian European institutions, however, preceded the Catholic Church in publicly supporting immediate postwar west European integration initiatives (Leustean 2011, 298). The Vatican's request for an explicit reference to "Christian roots" of Europe to be included in the draft EU Constitution treaty was rebuffed (Maillard, 2015, 7). The EU Constitutional Convention decided that the draft EU Constitution would not include a reference to God in the preamble (ten Napel 2014, 131). The perception that the EU is a civilizational political project for Euro-Atlantic hegemony expansion remains a danger. The successful Trump US presidential campaign advocated US détente with Russia to provide "Judeo-Christian" civilizational leadership against the shared, stereotyped threat from political Islam (Foster, 2017, 24). The EU's efficacy in circumventing national social competition in European frontier zones has been problematic before the election of Donald J. Trump as US president. It may be impelled to increase its capability following Trump's inauguration and subsequent behavior.

Reinforcing a European identity community is necessary in order to create amenable political conditions to allow for sufficiently pervasive opportunities for public social mobility and social creativity. Resort to social mobility, creativity or competition policies is "context dependent" (Wohlforth, 2009, 36). Generating the appropriate context equates with constructing this new identity through the European integration project. Its normative objective is to avoid or circumvent the emergence of social competition internally. Europe is a liberal community in that it may not rely upon coercion as a significant mechanism for control, as was critical in the old multinational USSR and Yugoslavia. When the coercive control apparatus disintegrated in these two states, democratic elections produced elected leaders supporting national self-determination. Competitive electoral politics also resurrected heretofore suppressed stereotypes, fears and

hatreds regarding the other, resentments which constitutional provisions particularly of the old Yugoslavia had exacerbated.

The liberal ideological necessity to avoid reliance upon coercion as a control mechanism mandates that the EU not claim and enforce sovereignty over its member nation states. In the old USSR, the Russian community constituted the de facto foundational core community that provided the leadership personnel for the coercive bureaucratic control mechanism. No such community can or may play such a role in the EU, i.e. it must remain confederal in the foreseeable future. This necessity applies except insofar as the EU acquires narrow technocratic authority in a particular policy area, indicating a move towards de facto EU sovereignty in that area (Story and Saltmarsh, 2011). This authority may imply de facto EU federal sovereignty constraining a particular member state's national policy option range, for example, over the parameters of fiscal policy (Spiegel, 2014). Meanwhile de facto confederalism prevails in EU relations with its member states in other policy areas (McCormick, 2015). The ongoing EU supervision over the Greek national budget does not imply the legal constitutional right of the EU to use coercive force to enforce its sovereign authority. With the satisfaction of this prerequisite, the construction of a new, nascent self-identity can conceivably be built to support social mobility and social creativity. In contrast, in the prewar past, the globally ambitious citizen of a small Balkan country, for example, faced pressure to choose a de facto great power allegiance. Acquiring an international career often required a commitment to the influence and policies of one of the European Great Powers, intensively competing with each other in the Balkans.

Vladimir Putin's Moscow responses include its own social creativity strategies to the challenge of Europe's attraction and influence. Moscow has assumed a position as standard bearer of traditional nationalist conservative positions. These include hostility to gender minority rights, promotion of the influence of a state-affiliated church, and endorsement of traditional patriarchal family roles (Roberts, 2017, 38). The European Union in promoting the advocacy of the rights of minorities may not focus only on national minority rights; it aims to promote intersectionality. The aim is to encourage social creativity, i.e. developing and promoting new identities, if the individual is receptive, but heretofore suppressed, thereby deemphasizing national identity. It appears to be most successful insofar as it appeals to youth. Putin's Russia is a reaction against it, appealing to conservative nationalists perceiving a threat from the EU and globalization.

## DISCUSSION

### Diasporas and Minorities

Cottam and Cottam note that diasporas are an important factor for understanding the influence of "public opinion" on the policy of the "international community" towards various regional conflicts. "Diasporas comprise members of minority communities who have emigrated to one or several host states for commercial or political reasons but who continue to grant a first-intensity loyalty to the parent community." They are somewhat resistant to full integration within the host territorial community because they wish to share a common life with the other members of their community (2001, 23). Diasporas are important for understanding the foreign and domestic policies of particular states of southeastern Europe, and they are an explicit target and instrument of foreign policy. Aside from economic migrants, a major diaspora category consists of members of a national community who are in political exile. These exiles are likely to display a consuming interest in the developments within the homeland because they fled the country for political reasons. They will display a tendency to behave nationalistically with a focus on that homeland. Diaspora members however may see their role as a lobby group for the interests of the home country in the policy making process of the host country. Group members cooperating with twentieth-century German invaders to secede from Moscow or Belgrade who then emigrated with the German retreat would be in this category. An example would include elements of the Ukrainian Catholic diaspora.

Aside from government policy, the concept of soft power may have its foundations in perceived polity influence. A polity encompasses more than the government, i.e. the polity includes the broader set of constituencies in which government representatives have their respective political base supporters. Civil society may be conceptualized as the societal component of the polity. Soft power lies in the appeal of the polity as a model of development. The polity of an initiator state insofar as a target polity perceives it as a neo-colonizing challenge to the target may be viewed as a source of threat to the target government and its constituencies. Those constituencies within the target polity that other constituencies in the target view as collaborating with the initiator state are likely to be stereotyped as foreign agents, even quislings. This tendency may confront those Catholic minorities within Ukraine as they tend to be perceived by Russophile constituencies. Neo-colonialism emphasizes means of control focusing on the broader polity to polity influence, rather than on the blunt coercion of an occupying imperial force (Marks, 2003, 451). Postwar Ukrainian Catholic pastoral leaders obtained support from the Vatican to maintain the church in diaspora (Matuszak, 2015). The exiled head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Archbishop Josyf Slipyj, established a “prototype” of the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome in 1964 preparing the groundwork for the 1994 (re)opening of the Lviv Theological Academy (Ibid. para. 8). It has developed into today’s Ukrainian Catholic University (“Ukrainian Catholic University,” n.d.).

The Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv is today a recipient of Euro-Atlantic polity support as an aid project contributing to European nation and state building in Ukraine (“Ukrainian Catholic Education Foundation,” n.d.). For example, this writer presented at the Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies-International Association for the Humanities convention in Lviv, Ukraine, June 26-28, 2016, entitled “Images of the Other,” at the Ukrainian Catholic University (“2016 ASEES-MAG Summer Convention, Lviv,” n.d.). Program-listed financial donors included a Ukrainian non-governmental organization, the International Renaissance Foundation, that receives funding from George Soros’ Open Society Foundations (“International Renaissance Foundation,” n.d.).

If the parent community with which a minority identifies is the community of a nation state, then interstate political interaction can exacerbate this diaspora identity polarity (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 23). If the members of the majority in the host state view this parent state of the minority as a threat to the security of the host state, then the tendency towards exacerbation of this polarity will be greater. Catholic minorities in post-Communist eastern Europe do not have Catholic parent states per se, but they do have ethno-sectarian patron states and Catholic lobbies in EU core states. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* was an assertive conduit for German Catholic public opinion’s support for Croat and Slovene independence aspirations in disintegrating Yugoslavia (Touval, 1996, 410-11). In the prelude to Germany’s late 1991 unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* editorial positions “relentlessly” portrayed Croatia as committed to “European” values, while the Serbs were “hardly European at all” (Crawford, 1995, 9). Italian Catholic nationalist public opinion would later come to regard Croatia “as one of the last remaining Catholic strongholds” (Favretto, 2004, 181). Catholic constituencies also have the European Union, born during the Cold War and part of the Western alliance as a component of US led containment of the USSR. At the height of the Cold War in 1953, the US Roman Catholic bishops conference condemned the loss of religious freedom in Communist Eastern Europe. Colecchi cites the US bishops’ statement against

*the “war against all those who believe in God” that rages in Communist countries “from Korea to China and to Indochina; from Russia to the Baltic lands; from Poland and Lithuania to Yugoslavia; from the Ukraine to Albania; from Czechoslovakia to Hungary, to Romania and Bulgaria” and “in the eastern parts of Austria and Germany” (2012, 82).*

Colecchi notes that Pope Benedict quoted John Paul II in his 2011 World Day of Peace Message that “religious freedom ... is an essential element of a constitutional state; it cannot be denied without at the same time encroaching on all fundamental rights and freedoms, since it is their synthesis and keystone. It



is ‘the litmus test for the respect of all the other human rights’” (2012, 87, citing Pope Benedict XVI (2011)). A standard account of the end of the Cold War includes the 1978 election and policies of Poland’s Karol Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II being pivotal in the disintegration of European Communism (Bernstein, 2005). Russian influence, along with competition with the Euro-Atlantic alliance, has revived since the remarkably peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union. Consequently, these Catholic minorities risk being caught up in the post-Cold War clash of civilizations forecast by Samuel Huntington (1993).

Cottam and Cottam elaborate on the condition in which members of the minority community may identify with both the parent community state and the host state. To reconcile their identities, they will tend to see a situation, as a result of the cognitive balance process, in which the interests of the two communities are reconcilable (2001, 23-24). Such an interpretation is likely to result in a reciprocal interpretation by the host community suggesting disloyalty on the part of the minority community. Meanwhile, a steady, rapid outmigration of Catholic Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina is ongoing (Mihailova, 2017). Despite NATO’s enforcement of the inviolability of Tito-era Yugoslav republic boundaries, over half of the registered population of Bosnia-Herzegovina now resides outside this state (Kovacevic, 2017). In Republika Srpska, discontent with Bosnia-Herzegovina takes the form of discussion of irredentist separation to join neighboring Serbia, which unlike Croatia is not yet an EU member (MacDowall, 2017). Such dynamics threaten the stability that the Euro-Atlantic community claims to seek. A recurrence of this dynamic may readily occur in the Soviet successor states which have large ethnic Russophile minority populations, as the Ukraine case illustrates.

#### The Discourse of a Spiral Conflict: Westernizers/Europeanists versus Slavophiles/Eurasianists

Contemporary Russian foreign policy shares a continuity with the traditional Russian internal attitudinal schism between Slavophiles and Westernizers. A contemporary phrasing for the current geopolitical competitive context may be Europeanists versus Eurasianists (Turkina, 2015, 192). Europeanists/Westernizers today see Europe in the form of the European Union and Euro-Atlantic structures by which the Russian polity should comparatively evaluate its public policy. Eurasianists/Slavophiles see in post-Soviet space opportunities for reassertion of Russian national prestige that had been subsumed under the international Communist movement. Doing so, however, requires exploitation of alternative, non-Euro-Atlantic forms of integration. Hence, the Russian authorities have displayed social creativity in their proposed alternative Eurasian Union (Lomagin, 2012). Perceiving challenge from the European Union, the Russian authorities presently assert an alternative form of policy and polity integration based upon a “Russian World” concept of Moscow’s hegemony extending into Soviet-era areas of control (Laruelle, 2015, 94–95). Drawing upon the legacy of the pan-Soviet identity community, it imposes its own form of public representation. The staunch support of the Russian public for Putin’s quasi-authoritarian regime is evidence of its appeal in the Russian national community. The soft authoritarian post-Soviet traditional regimes remaining in Belarus and the Central Asian states for now serve subaltern, state building roles while stabilizing Russian regional leadership. In Central Asia, greater Russian hegemony motivations would presumably not use a pan-Slavic symbol system (Higgins, 2018). The Eurasian Union implies national status equality. Whether it is believed as so by the respective publics of the Central Asian states is difficult to discern in these authoritarian regimes.

Post-Soviet states such as Ukraine are closer to post-Tito Yugoslavia than they are to the post-1989 Polish nation state in terms of the domestic political challenges they face in economic policy. Unlike the several recognized national groups in socialist Yugoslavia, two relatively large groups are a primary focus in Ukraine: Russian and Ukrainian national self-identifiers (Wydra, 2013). In the case of Ukraine, Russian nationalists would evidently not dispute that a Ukrainian national identity exists, albeit based in the western regions. The Ukrainian national community will be the core of a state, albeit Moscow’s policy aims to prevent these boundaries from being definitively determined. Russian policy seems at present to have acquiesced to the region centered on Lviv as being a distinct national community that Moscow may not

forcibly again re-annex (Stratfor, 2016). Whether or not Moscow is willing to cede this area to the West through its accession to Euro-Atlantic structures is another question. The ever-present danger of escalation to a direct confrontation between nuclear powers provides a bargaining leverage incentive to both sides. They confront inducements to continue to acquiesce to the exceptional fluidity in de facto great power sphere of influence boundaries which first emerged during the Cold War.

The economic reforms that Western international creditors are placing as conditionality for loans require the allocation of austerity by the central Ukrainian government. Russian self-identifiers are concentrated in the heavily industrialized east of the country among Soviet-era manufacturing enterprises (Roth, 2013). Their employees are likely to experience great economic dislocation in the creation of the Ukrainian national political economy as the successor to the Soviet era. This new political economy may be EU-focused. Yet, the EU still has at its foundation the political capacity of established nation states to influence their respective publics to accommodate change. The likelihood that the Kiev central authorities will have this peaceful capacity to implement far-reaching political economic change is questionable. The Russophile population concentrated in the east is more likely to act in parallel to the patterns demonstrated by the Serb population in disintegrating Yugoslavia. The one-third of the Serb ethnos located outside of the Titoist republic boundaries tended to be intensely attracted to joining neighboring Serbia through a redrawing of the Titoist borders (Silber and Little, 1996). Nuclear armed Moscow has much more bargaining leverage than Belgrade to incentivize the international community to acquiesce to a redrawing of Soviet-era republic borders. Fossil fuel and other international commodity prices have fallen dramatically, but they are rising again, along with Moscow's international diplomatic bargaining leverage. So, also will grow the appeal of many Russophile citizens of Ukraine to join their self-determination objective with Moscow rather than Kiev.

#### The European Union and Competitive Interference in Ukraine

The appeal of European Union association is important. The social mobility attraction of visa-free travel throughout the EU for Ukraine citizens to go into diaspora would seem to be strong ("EU Approves Visa-Free Travel for Ukrainians," 2017). The possibility of EU member state public political resistance and impediment to provision of economic opportunities to Ukrainians is a complicating factor. Although legally nonbinding, the 2016 rejection by the Dutch electorate of the EU association agreement with Ukraine highlights this resistance ("Dutch referendum," 2016). The EU responded by adopting a "provisional" application of the free-trade agreement in 2016, which was finally approved by the Dutch Senate with stipulations in May 2017 (Kanter, 2017a). Moscow may seek to undermine the EU's appeal by portraying EU policy as a mask for Western imperialism, claiming Ukrainian nationalist aspirations are reminiscent of Nazi-era collaborationist designs ("Putin Says," 2014, Cunningham, 2016). One interpretation of the Russian authorities' public encouragement of this characterization in the midst of the violence is that it increases Moscow's influence capability. Influence capability would increase over actual and potential supporters of Russophile separatism. It would thereby increase influence over the Kiev authorities. It would also increase Moscow's social competition bargaining leverage over Euro-Atlantic authorities as well.

The European Union has arguably succeeded in supporting a prevailing view in Kiev as well as within the EU member states that the EU is not a cover mask for German neo-colonialism. Germany economically has benefitted greatly from European integration (Lankowski, 2015). Germany accounts for slightly more than 20% of the EU GDP, and 29% of the Eurozone GDP (Ibid., 38). Taming German power has been one of the aims of the European integration process since it started after the Second World War (Ibid., 51). West European-centered European integration may be conceptualized as a strategy shaping relations between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic alliance, i.e. the international system. The existence of the European Union pools member state capabilities. Underpinning the Euro-Atlantic alliance is the incremental, de facto collective assumption that a diminished, post-Soviet Moscow will attempt to reassert hegemony over the former Soviet space (Larivé and Kanet, 2013). Whether NATO expansion created in effect a self-fulfilling

prophecy is not an issue seriously investigated by the proponents of the prevailing political views in Western capitals. What is self-evident, however, is that a vast array of organizational and economic vested interests emerged to implement the 45-year containment strategy towards Moscow. Those political interests continue to advocate for a collective worldview that justifies their continued existence, including receipt of government and private budget allocations (Ikenberry, 2004, 610–11, Carpenter 1994). It manifests itself in a policy thrust supporting containment of a resurgent Russia, encouraging nationalism vis-à-vis Russia at least in Ukraine.

## A PATH FORWARD

### Preventive Diplomacy in the EU CSDP: National Self-Determination and Human Rights in the Balkans

The 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam specifically incorporated the “Petersberg tasks” in the new Article 17 of the EU Treaty, i.e. the military capabilities of EU member states are to be employed in: 1) humanitarian and rescue tasks; 2) peace-keeping tasks; 3) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. These tasks are in addition to contributing to the common defense under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Article V of the Brussels Treaty, upon which the Washington Treaty was founded (Austrian Institute for European Security Policy, 1999, 2,18). Note that peacemaking requires assigning blame/responsibility to one or more of the parties in the conflict. It requires taking sides in the conflict. The June 19, 1992 Petersberg Declaration formally launched the EU treaty evolution of the Western European Union (WEU) into what is now the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU. The declaration also states that what is now the CSDP may support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with its own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peacekeeping activities of the CSCE/OSCE and the UN Security Council. The Petersberg Declaration underlined support for a solid transatlantic partnership (Western European Union, 1992, 1,2).

The EU focus on human rights concerns exists within this framework. Protection of human rights under the rule of law is necessary for state stabilization. European Union minority policies impact the Balkans through the accession process including satisfaction of the so-called Copenhagen criteria (Olsen and McCormick, 2017, 76). The Copenhagen criteria require maintenance of a liberal democratic regime along with political economic capability requirements for implementing the EU single market. As the EU engages in state stabilization strategies in southeastern Europe, it works with the leadership of titular communities that tend to culturally prevail within these states. Yet, a national minority existing in a state, typically bordering on a patron state, is predisposed to demonstrate irredentist patterns of collective political behavior. Ethno-sectarian national minorities are prone to stereotyping and being stereotyped as an outgroup. The affiliation of Catholic minorities with Western Europe traditionally has led to them being perceived as agents of European great powers with imperial intentions in Eastern Europe. Recent historical events as well served to affirm this view. For example, the role of the Roman Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II in the end of European Communism was an argument for inclusion of a reference to Christianity in the draft European Constitutional Treaty (Menendez, 2005, 200). During intense conflicts, this stereotyping in social competition for state resources intensifies to pathological levels.

Historically, this Catholic association with the West can also be a source of bargaining leverage. For example, in Bulgaria, the Catholic minority is small, numbering about 50,000 (Altanov, 2012, 13). Yet, one Bulgarian historian at USAID-supported American University in Bulgaria related to this writer that Bulgarian Catholics played a significant role in political dynamics that led to secession from Ottoman Turkey in 1877. The reference may be to the threat by Bulgarian nationalist figures in the Orthodox clergy in the mid-nineteenth century to convert to Catholicism. Bulgarian hostility to continued subordination of the Bulgarian ecclesiastic community to the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople motivated this threat. According to Naxidou, the threat provoked the Ottoman government

as well as the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Russian government to respond to their demands. In 1870, the Ottoman Sultan recognized the autonomy of the Bulgarian clergy over the objections of the Ecumenical Patriarch, ultimately strengthening Bulgarian nationalism. The vast majority of Bulgarians who had converted to Roman Catholicism reconverted back to Orthodoxy following the intervention of Russia against their clergy leadership (2012, 34-36).

This psychological underpinning may provide part of the explanation for Moscow's dismemberment of Ukraine. Social mobility by joining the core community, one favored by the North Atlantic alliance, supports Ukrainian nationalism. A core component of it will include the Ukrainian Catholic national constituent element. At present, Ukraine is not a cohesive nation state, although it does have a core ethnic national Ukrainian community with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic community as a crucial element. The absence of nation state behavior is evident in the relative lack of relative consensus on norms of behavior in Ukraine. For example, despite definitive media exposure of individual cases high level corruption, guilty parties are not removed from their position (Higgins and Kramer, 2017). European integration boosts the diplomatic bargaining leverage of its individual member states in their bilateral negotiations with Moscow regarding Ukraine and other issues. One highlight of the June 2001 Gothenburg European Council was the formal approval of the "EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts" ("Presidency Report," 2001). Its focus was on preventive diplomacy including the integration of civilian and military functions under the evolving Common Security and Defense Policy. Conflict prevention has been a prominent theme in the formal statements of European Council conclusions, as well as in the proposals at the EU Constitutional Convention. Implementation of the so-called rule of law in conflict-vulnerable areas is part of the mantra of the prerequisites for conflict prevention, alongside prevention of human rights abuses.

Nationalism is a challenge to current trends in the development of the CSDP as part of a peace strategy. Strategies develop in response to interaction with the political environment. Nationalistic values are an essential feature of the southeastern European political environment today since the increase in the pace of disintegration of the Cold War in the 1980s. The perception that the central political authority is unbiased in resolving conflicts is necessary for the emergence of a prevailing public attitude supporting behavior comporting with the rule of law. In a democratizing multi-national/multi-ethnic state, this attitude among ethno-religious national groups will tend to disintegrate in the Balkans or elsewhere (e.g. Iraq), if it ever existed. If under international mandate, then irredentist tendencies emerge among national minority components of Balkan national groups (Serbs, Albanians, Croats). They will also tend towards collective prevailing views that the international mandate authorities (NATO/EU/UN) retain a prejudice against them while favoring the other. The international mandate authorities rely on neo-imperial mechanisms to resist the human rights norm of self-determination. Stabilization efforts have confronted the forces of ethno-national self-determination in Kosovo ["United Nations Mission in Kosovo" (UNMIK) since 1999 together with "European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo" (EULEX) since 2008] (Hopkins, 2017). The long-term viability of Bosnia-Herzegovina (under EURFOR Althea) is questionable; one 2014 report concluded that it is "slowly spiraling towards disintegration" (International Crisis Group, 2014, i). Under supervision by EURFOR Concordia/EUPOL Proxima, ineffectiveness characterizes implementation of EU-mandated reforms in Macedonia (International Crisis Group, 2015). Communities collectively may recognize that they have submarginal power capability for viable national self-determination among hostile neighboring national groups, e.g. Bosnian Muslims/Bosniaks. They will submit to the international mandate for protection (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 262). Macedonians are likely in this category as well.

A necessary, but not sufficient facet of peacebuilding is that the EU's CSDP commitment to conflict prevention satisfies the tactical requirement to coordinate national government policies. Unilateral conflict intervention by a great power will be vulnerable to an emerging perception among the target public that expressions of universal human rights justifications are a guise. EU coordination in principle lessens the options for the focus to manipulate governments into competing against each other, e.g. on issues of trade benefit. As a consequence, the target state's bargaining position should significantly decrease relative to

the initiator. The June 2001 Sweden-chaired Gothenburg European Council affirmed the ESDP/CSDP's commitment to fulfillment of the Petersberg tasks:

*“3. Conflict prevention calls for a co-operative approach to facilitate peaceful solutions to disputes and implies addressing the root-causes of conflicts. It is an important element of all aspects of the external relations of the European Union. The development of ESDP [renamed CSDP in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (BD)] has, since the outset, been intended to strengthen the EU's capacity for action in the crucial field of conflict prevention” (emphasis BD) [“Draft European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts,” 2001, para. 3, (adopted by European Council, “Presidency Conclusions,” 2001, para. 52)].*

The “EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts” is a peace strategy through a diplomacy of human rights, broadly understood:

*“1. The international community has a political and moral responsibility to act to avoid the human suffering and the destruction of resources caused by violent conflicts. The European Union is a successful example of conflict prevention, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, justice and solidarity, economic prosperity and sustainable development. The process of enlargement will extend this community of peace and progress to a wider circle of European states” (emphasis BD) [“Draft European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts,” 2001, para. 1, (adopted by European Council, “Presidency Conclusions,” 2001, para. 52)].*

The Swedish Presidency's report to the Gothenburg European Council on the ESDP/CSDP emphasized imposition of the “rule of law” to prevent violent conflict through human rights protection:

*“I. RULE OF LAW” “2. The EU attaches great importance to the strengthening of the rule of law as a tool for both conflict prevention and crisis management. Experience shows that strengthening the rule of law is a pre-condition for consolidation of peace and security. International efforts to strengthen, and where necessary re-establish, credible local police forces cannot be fully successful if the police are not complemented by a functioning judicial and penal system” (“Presidency Report,” 2001, para. 2). [...] “6. [...] In such a situation, the re-establishment of local judicial and penal systems should be initiated as soon as possible. While rule of law missions would usually be deployed as a complement to a police component, they could also be undertaken without such a component. In any given mission, rapid build-up of local capacity and subsequent hand-over to local ownership is essential” (emphasis BD) (“Presidency Report,” 2001, para. 6).*

However, note that the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy publicly rejected the creation of new national sovereignties in the Balkans:

*[The Committee] Believes, however, that the presence of state-like entities could undermine the future stability of the region [Balkans]; urges the Council and the Commission, in this regard, to start an in-depth reflection with a view to defining a strategy for the future of Kosovo, revitalising regional cooperation and integrating it fully and effectively in EU policies (emphasis BD) (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2002, para. 2).*

The June 2016 EU Global Strategy declares responsible external action means investing in the EU Conflict Early Warning System, and making “all our external engagement conflict- and rights-sensitive” (European Policy Centre 2016, 48). A challenge is that the political demand for national self-determination will not go away by ignoring it. Conceptualizing it as a human need/right is necessary, superseding the heretofore primacy of stabilization of existing state borders.

Cottam and Cottam note that the problems which peace strategists associate with advocacy of the right to self-determination are daunting. They parallel those problems which associate with the advocacy of human rights in general: the need politically to reconcile conflicting rights-claims. The support, however, which a community generates for the human right of self-determination will demonstrate a major behavioral difference from most other human rights. When people perceive a serious possibility of achieving self-determination, then the nationalistic demands for achieving it are likely to be at a higher level of intensity. These demands are as well expected to be much more socially pervasive in comparison with the intensity and pervasiveness of the demands for other human rights. For groups to which people have a strong attachment, the achievement of important group goals will involve individual psychological processes of much stronger intensity. They will be stronger than the psychological processes which engage in the pursuit of the goals of other forms of human rights promotion which are more abstract and have an individual basis. The latter include personal safety from abuse by state agents (2001, 264).

### EU State-Building

State building through development is the perspective on security the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/CSDP emphasizes. Development cooperation allows for reliance upon the European Community's extensive diplomatic bargaining leverage capabilities with their basis in economic resources and trade. Merket characterizes this policy direction as the reciprocal "securitization" of development and the "developmentalization" of EU security policies. An example of this blurring of the borderline between the two areas is the 2001 movement of demining operations from the CFSP policy-making mechanism to the European Community. It thereby joined the EU's efforts to combat the spread of small arms and light weapons in the same framework. The European Commission and Parliament have an institutional interest in defining initiatives under development thereby to fall under the Community framework. CFSP initiatives, in contrast, favor the member states (2012, 634-35).-According to Merket, the development of the EU's conflict prevention strategy is basically a state stabilization strategy. In the field of development cooperation, the EU disposes of three long-term geographical assistance instruments (the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the European Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)) and two sectoral instruments (the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the *Instrument for Stability* (IfS)) (emphasis BD) to deal with various aspects of the "security-development nexus" (2012, 630).

The security-development nexus is Merket's characterization of the EU's effort to intertwine its foreign aid development and European security policies. The EU thereby aims to promote more effectively its CFSP objectives. In Merket's portrayal, the creation of the European External Action Service under the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon is the institutional embodiment of this effort. Merket further notes that "the ENPI offers co-funding for the promotion of good governance and social and economic development to the EU's partner countries of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)" (Ibid.) Merket's study came out well before the outbreak of the ongoing Ukrainian crisis on November 21, 2013. The trigger was popular protest against then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich's suspension of negotiations to sign a long-heralded EU Association Agreement. Subsequent events include covert intervention to dismember post-Soviet Ukraine, leading first to Russian annexation of Crimea, with civil war in the Donbass region quickly following. As of mid-2017, thousands are dead, hundreds of thousands are refugees, and hostility between the US and Russia risks escalation, despite the election of Donald J. Trump as US president. The European Union authorities portray European integration as a strategy for European peace:

*The notion of the EU as a peace process is an important strand in the EU's identity in dealing with the rest of the world. The European Council has declared that conflict prevention is a primary objective of the EU's external action (Davis, Habbida and Penfrat, 2017, 4).*

The 2011 Luxembourg Foreign Affairs Council meeting reaffirmed the EU's commitment to "conflict prevention" (Council of the European Union, 2011, para. 1-4). It recalled that ten years earlier the 2001 European Council in Gothenburg, Sweden adopted the "EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts" (Ibid. para. 2). For the claim that Euro-Atlantic enlargement is a peace project to be valid, it would require particular assumptions regarding the foreign policy motivations of Putin's Russia. It implies that Russia today is an imperialistic, aggressive actor that is the guilty party for the tragedy that continues to unfold in eastern Ukraine. On the other hand, Moscow's motivation for intervention may be ultimately defensive as John Mearsheimer (2014) and Stephen Cohen (2014) argue. They claim that Moscow sees the expansion of the EU's influence into Ukraine as ultimately an American-instigated imperialist threat to Russian national security. If the latter is true, then the European Union authorities may be committing a major strategic mistake. The Davis, Habbida and Penfrat study does note that EU policies may make a potentially violent conflict worse (Davis, Habbida and Penfrat 2017, 11 fn. 27). It notes that "a general lack of evidence on the EU's impact on populations in non-EU countries" characterizes analyses of the EU's positive or negative impact (Ibid. 11). Proof of the EU's contribution is typically counterfactual, and EU "conflict prevention" behavior becomes "a matter of faith" and "fuzzy" (Ibid., quoting an EEAS official interviewed on August 10, 2016). Studies note the importance of the perception of EU motivation as a critical factor in determining the perceived legitimacy of EU demands, phrased as normative arguments. In relation to a different part of southeastern Europe, Noutcheva states,

*It may well be that the conditions in the Western Balkan countries are not very conducive to the socialisation of their political elites to European ways of governance and state behaviour. Such an analysis, however, misses an important aspect of the dynamics of EU conditionality – Balkan compliance, namely the perceptions of the political elites in these countries of the motivation behind the EU's policy and the related impact on compliance decisions (emphasis BD) (2009, 11).*

Target political actors at times suspect that norms of liberal democratic regional cooperation that the EU espouses are a disguise for the EU's pursuit of "its own security interests." Consequently, compliance with EU conditionality in the Western Balkans has often been "fake or partial or imposed" (Ibid., 12). This analysis characterizes the EU's security interests towards the former Yugoslavia manifested themselves in an ill-fated stabilization strategy. For example, as Noutcheva notes, in order not to encourage separatist sentiment in the Balkans and elsewhere, the EU favored maintenance of the "State Union of Serbia and Montenegro." The popular demands of the people of Montenegro to separate from Serbia in a 2006 referendum with 55% in support forced the EU to acquiesce to what it did not favor (2009 3, 9-10). The EU deployed legal arguments for this acquiescence to former Yugoslav republic self-determination. Various EU member states, but not Spain, deployed different legal arguments for the recognition of the former Yugoslav autonomous province of Kosovo as a sovereign state in 2008. The EU has been unwilling to recognize significant separatist local sentiments in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea on behalf of stability. Davis, Habbida and Penfrat critique current EU conflict prevention directives for continuing to display a reactive orientation to conflict (2017, 15). Nevertheless, Davis, Habbida and Penfrat portray the EU's current mediation efforts in the Belgrade/Pristina processes to be, along with the Iran nuclear agreement, successes (2017, 18).

The analysis in this paper suggests that the Western alliance desultorily opposed Yugoslavia's disintegration. It then acquiesced as the political costs of opposing secessionist movements surpassed a low tolerance level. The vast resources the US spent in the Korean and Vietnam Wars indicates that this level was much higher in resisting Cold War-era disruptive national self-determination movements. In late 1971, the US militarily threatened India for intervening to enable the separation of what became Bangladesh in rebellion from US-allied Pakistan (Widmaier 2005, 431-32, 445). A quarter century after the Cold War's collapse, the Western alliance has formally recognized the disintegration of Czechoslovakia and the numerous former Yugoslav and Soviet republics. After violent struggle in which the globally-engaged US was to varying degrees an involved actor, the Western alliance has also recognized Eritrea, East Timor,

South Sudan and Kosovo. The Western alliance has not recognized Moscow-allied Abkhazia and South Ossetia in seceding from Georgia. It also opposes Russian irredentism towards southeastern Ukraine with its Soviet-imposed boundaries.

The US-allied EU functionally pursues a subdued stabilization strategy in responding to ethno-sectarian conflict in southeastern Europe. It is a post-Cold War default strategy for the Cold War containment coalition that no longer perceives an intense, global threat from Moscow, i.e. the original imperative behind the alliance. The US and its European allies accepted postwar decolonization in Africa and Asia partly because resistance would push nationalists to seek additional Soviet support. Formal imperial control on the basis of presumption of racial superiority and inferiority would likely have collapsed without the Cold War. The Cold War provided an incentive to accelerate this process. The Western alliance did intervene against national independence movements if Western governments viewed them as under the control, or vulnerable to control, by pro-Moscow local allies. This intervention was in some cases open, e.g. in Korea and Vietnam. In other cases, the intervention was covert, e.g. the 1953 overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran by the UK's MI-5 and the CIA. The attempt to conceal these interventions aimed to avoid intensifying nationalist hostilities, which risked making the feared alliance with Moscow a reality.

Post-Cold War reactions to nationalist disruption of recognized borders reflects the Western alliance's comparatively low level of intensity of concern with the international political environment. Stabilization is a strategy to achieve desired strategic objectives; stability is not a strategic goal in its own right. Stabilization of southeastern Europe today aims to prevent a reassertion of Russian influence in the area. Stability does not necessarily equate with peace; nationalist self-determination movements continue. E.g. aside from the Balkans, enforcement of borders has been a crucial factor in decades of communal violence since the 1919 Versailles Conference sanctioned the partition of upper Mesopotamia (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 40-42). An effective peace strategy would include an awareness of the conditions under which national self-determination movements emerge. It would also include the commitment of the necessary international community resources to intervene to accommodate and regulate inevitable political change in response. Stabilization insists on the maintenance of often problematic international borders. Disregarding nationalism until the political cost of the consequent human misery becomes too great to discount its cause can be the result.

## **CONCLUDING COMMENTS**

The goal of this paper has been to critique European integration noting political psychological dynamics relative to current policy trends that shape the EU's effectiveness as a peace strategy. It deductively applied the theoretical analytical framework of Cottam and Cottam (2001) for nationalism. This framework approaches nationalism as a political psychological and collective behavioral phenomenon that can drive foreign and domestic policy. The paper used this framework to evaluate key EU policies and their reported consequences both in the scholarly literature and in news reports of record. This analysis focused on the effects of these policies in terms of intensifying or defusing the salience and intensity of nationalist political behavior among southeastern European national communities. Social psychology offers insights into comprehending national identity conflict in terms of social competition, social mobility and social creativity. Propagation of a perception of zero-sum social competition among national member-groups is the political dynamic to avoid. The EU offers substantive opportunities for individual social mobility, particularly for those with more education. The construction of Europe requires inputs from the contributing member states. National self-identifiers can engage in social creativity by adopting a wide range of evaluation criteria to maintain a positive self-image. For example, Germany has the best national European economic performance, while Italy excels in offering regional security and luxury recreational opportunities and consumption goods to Europe. Social mobility and creativity incentives are deployed to southeastern Europe, where different national groups have a history of traditional alliances with respective European major powers. Post-Cold War Croatian and Slovenian sympathy among Catholic German and Italian public



opinion has been politically salient. Serbia's historical affiliation with France and Russia is problematic because of Russia's portrayal as an adversary to the European Union. Nevertheless, the EU's diplomatic bargaining leverage appears substantively to outweigh that of Moscow in influencing Belgrade and Kiev. Pan-Slavism may not be able to compete successfully with Euro-Atlanticism on a soft power level. Yet, this escalating clash of civilizations risks increasing the likelihood of more violence in Europe as the Ukrainian case illustrates.

This study's limitations lie in the policy prescriptions that the analysis implies. Greater autonomous EU capabilities to intervene proactively in a disintegrating state to reconcile conflicting internal national self-determination demands requires a commitment of voluminous resources. The political capacity to mobilize such resources typically emerges when the polity collectively perceives a sustained, intense external challenge. As Touval highlights, the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia was not unanticipated (1996). But the commitment of large scale intervention resources emerged in response to the media-broadcast war misery and public scorn of the apparent impotency of the post-Cold War Western alliance (Burg and Shoup, 1999, 290). As the fighting escalated, contestants' stereotypes and emotions intensified concurrently, rapidly diminishing the potential for mediated compromises on an array of complex issues. Mutually reinforcing communal fear, hatred and rage amidst mounting violence and chaos rapidly pushed contestants towards maximalist objectives, e.g. so-called ethnic cleansing (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 108). External intervention focused on humanitarian aid to refugees and in 1995 abetted ethnic cleansing against rebellious Serb populations in Croatia and Bosnia to allow a ceasefire (Silber and Little, 1996, 30, 350).

After the humiliation of Paris and Berlin's isolated resistance within the EU to the ill-fated 2003 US-led Iraq invasion, the EU CFSP and CSDP have remained subordinate and dependent on the US and NATO (Macleod, 2004, 380, Chappell and Petrov, 2014, 6, 19-20). The EU's ability to develop an independent capacity to intervene with the requisite resources before the outbreak of large-scale fighting in a multinational or multiethnic state remains doubtful. Brexit and the US Trump administration may provide a crisis inflexion point for the development of EU intervention capabilities. Research is necessary on the nature of EU CSDP neo-functional bureaucratic incremental spill-over as it relates to developing greater CSDP component capacities to support an EU peace strategy (Gavrilescu 2004, Osica 2010, 93, Erlanger, 2017). They would mobilize EU resources for the perceived neutral provision of the security foundations for European social mobility and social creativity capacities for all mobilized national groups. These capacities should develop and strengthen concurrently in both the EU and the target communities. In sum, an EU peace strategy would promote effectively European responses to circumvent national social competition in mobilized national group perception and behavior. Thereby, the EU may aim to become a more effective security actor in a multipolar nuclear world setting. Independence from Washington, particularly as so perceived in Moscow and Beijing, is a necessary prerequisite to develop the EU's potential to play a more effective role as a peace strategy for Eurasia.

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper was produced with the support of the Research Fund of the Catholic University of Korea. Walden University provided additional research resources. The author would like to thank the journal editors, Terrance and Mercedes Jalbert, as well as two anonymous reviewers for their helpful critiques. The writer also thanks his former students at the American University in Bulgaria and those at the Catholic University of Korea. Any mistakes and omissions are solely the responsibility of the author.

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